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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF INSTRUMENTALISM IN THE LAW AND
THE PROMISE OF RECONCEPTUALIZATION AS A SOLUTION

Instrumentalism has affected (or afflicted) legal scholarship and judicial
thinking for over a generation.1 An instrumentalist approach asks the simple
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question: What value does a particular rule have in a particular case? 2 It has
clouded many discussions of legal controversies involving rules that produce
anomalous results and has inhibited developing options for reforming those
rules. Professor Fletcher, in a classic article, criticized such instrumentalist
approaches to tort law.3 Instrumentalism has become a dominant mode of
2. See, e.g.,

RONALD DWORKIN, MORALITY AND THE LAW 29 (1969).
3. George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 538 (1972)

[hereinafter Fletcher, Fairness and Utility]. As described by Professor Fletcher, instrumentalists
build their approach to the law around questions such as the following: "What social value does the
rule of liability further in this case? Does it advance a desirable goal, such as compensation,
deterrence, risk-distribution, or minimization of accident costs?" Id.A classic example of such an
instrumentalist approach is Richard A. Posner, The Concept of CorrectiveJustice in Recent Theories
of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF

JURISPRUDENCE 313-52 (1990). Fletcher notes the distorting effect of the instrumentalist approach
in tort law: "[T]his approach generally makes the issue of fairness look like the other goals of the tort
system. Any other notion of fairness-one that is not a goal, but a non-instrumentalist reason for
redistributing losses-strikes some contemporary writers as akin to a nonrational community taboo."
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra, at 538-39. Fletcher criticizes such instrumentalism as leading
to theories that are based on assumptions that "are all false or at best superficial." Id at 539. More
recently, Professors Nolan and Ursin have been even more critical of tort-law theory and supportive
of instrumentalism:
As we approach the twenty-first century, leading torts scholars are looking back with a
sense of accomplishment on a generation "marked by a variety of highly ambitious
scholarly developments," namely the increasingly sophisticated economic and corrective
justice theories that comprise modem tort theory .... [T]his sense of accomplishment is
unwarranted-that these scholarly developments are better seen as a manifestation of what
Judge Richard Posner has called the "academification" of legal scholarship. Like their
constitutional counterparts, torts scholars have turned away from a reality-based approach
to law in favor of theoretical analyses that are "barren of any engagement with reality."
They see themselves as "members of an academic community engaged in dialogue with the
other members of the community" and "judges, practitioners, and government officials be
damned." As a consequence, that dialogue has little to offer those concerned with the real
world problem of accidental injury and "improving the legal system."
Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Deacademificationof Tort Theory, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 59,

59-60 (1999) (footnotes omitted). Rather than seeing a distinction in Fletcher's work, they
characterize it as the thinking of "'academic lawyers who want[ed] to be considered on the cutting
edge of legal thought"' and to "'strike out in new directions' of their own." Id.at 78 (quoting
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 432-33 (1990)). They attack Fletcher on

the grounds that all theories characterized as "corrective justice" are in fact "a reworking of the
conceptual framework of traditional tort theory-the approach that the enterprise liability scholars had
attacked early in the century and had discredited by the late 1950s," and they conclude that "both the
past and present generation of corrective justice theorists, whose common model assumes that losses
are shifted between individuals, are 'thinking in terms of complete unreality."' Id.at 80 (quoting
Fleming James, Jr., Accident LiabilityReconsidered: The Impact ofLiability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J.

549, 552 (1948)). But in this analysis, Nolan and Ursin appear to ignore the distinct place held by
Fletcher's theory and Fletcher's own efforts to distinguish his nonreciprocal risk approach from the
kinds of looser and somewhat willful theories that traveled under the category of corrective justice.
See George P. Fletcher, Corrective Justicefor Moderns, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1658 (1993) [hereinafter
Fletcher, Corrective Justice] (reviewing JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992)). In addition,
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thought that is now reflected in a results-oriented society struggling with the
Yet, instrumentalist
new realities of the post-"Nine-Eleven" world.
approaches to the law fail to resolve the "hard cases," or even many average
cases, in which instrumentalist rules produce results at odds with the
principles that justify having the rule in the first place.
It is the thesis of this Article, therefore, that instrumentalism is insufficient
in answer to Nolan and Ursin's endorsement of enterprise liability, it can be said that enterprise
liability can be recharacterized as a further application of nonreciprocal risk imposition. Particularly
as to the modem multinational corporation (MNC), it is clear that enterprise activities create and
impose on many tort victims nonreciprocal risks by the very nature of the MNCs aggregation of
power, its monopolies on the means of production and distribution, and its pervasiveness and
dominance in modem economic life. As Professor Geitsfeld describes enterprise liability, a doctrinal
root in nonreciprocal risks is apparent:
In the pursuit of profits, businesses often injure those who do not participate in the
enterprise as owners, employees, or customers. But unless the business was negligent, it is
ordinarily not liable for the injuries of someone with whom it did not have a contractual
relationship. The dominant role of negligence for these injuries has attracted a fair amount
of criticism over the years, particularly from the legal realists who argued that business
activities should be governed by strict liability.
This position, which became known as the theory of enterprise liability, has provided
a justification for strict products liability. The theory of enterprise liability has also been
very influential outside the products liability setting. It has persuaded some courts to apply
strict liability when a commercial activity injures someone who did not participatein the
enterprise.
Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule of Strict Liability for Abnormally
Dangerous Activities, 45 UCLA L. REv. 611, 612-13 (1998) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Thus, the very creation of nonreciprocal risks by the activities that fall within the "enterprise liability
theory" can be used to justify the claimed goal of that theory that "negligence law be displaced by
compensation plans in a wide variety of accident settings, ranging from automobile to product and
medical accidents." Nolan & Ursin, supra at 60. In other words, the theory of nonreciprocal risks is
not a competitor with, nor a detractor from, enterprise liability theory. Enterprise liability is simply a
specific rationale for an alternative remedial scheme that comes into play for the liability created by
activities involving nonreciprocal risks. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the
Law of EnterpriseLiability, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1266, 1269 (1997). Keating states:
Contemporary academic writing has all but ignored a wholly different kind of justification
for activity liability. That justification takes enterprise liability to rest "not so much" on
policies of accident prevention and loss spreading "as in a deeply rooted sentiment that a
business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be
said to be characteristic of its activities."
Id. (quoting Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968)). This
rationale insists that considerations of fairness-not efficiency-call for making activities that benefit
from particular risks bear the costs of accidental injuries resulting from those risks. Cf id at 127071, 1310-12 (asserting initially that Fletcher's reciprocal risk theory "does little to justify enterprise
liability," and then later demonstrating how, in fact, "Fletcher's account of strict liability explains
why the boundaries of enterprise liability are properly pitched beyond the boundaries of negligence
liability").
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to meet our long-term jurisprudential needs, particularly in the area of tort
law. This Article proposes instead that we undertake Ronald Dworkin's
challenge to structure our legal thinking around the principles that animate the
rules. By doing so, we can resolve seemingly irresolvable problems and
ensure that the legal system produces fairer results in a greater number of
cases. Such a principle-based approach would be especially useful in tort law,
where instrumentalism has poorly served the principle of corrective justice.
Accordingly, it is my aim in this and future articles to construct new analytic
templates for areas of the law that have suffered particularly because of
instrumentalism-including products liability, medical malpractice, and
commercial law. Relying on Dworkin's distinction between principles and
rules, the templates will be used to explore how to identify the relevant
principles and how to use these principles to derive rules; prose and graphic
forms of metaphoric reasoning will play a large part in this process. Those
templates will become the foundation for evaluating current, problematic rules
and developing new, principled rules to replace them.
Rather than merely dealing with these jurisprudential issues in the
abstract, I have chosen as my starting point the well-known forum non
conveniens rule ("FNC"). Nowhere is instrumentalism more evident than in
the judicial creation and support of FNC. FNC has always been flatly
instrumentalist; it has never been justified on any persuasive theoretical or
philosophic grounds-only on the instrumentalist grounds of expediency.4
I attempt to reconceptualize the FNC rule in this Article starting at a
relevant level of Dworkinian principle. I begin with an exposition of what I
maintain are the two relevant principles that bind together the substantive and
procedural rules in tort law: corrective justice for nonreciprocal risks, as
articulated by Professor Fletcher, 5 and home-state regulation of corporate
activity, which I call the "enterprise regulation principle." After the discussion
of those principles, I explain how they bind together the substantive and
procedural rules applicable to tort lawsuits. Those rules include: (a) the
substantive law providing remedies for product injury; and (b) the court4. Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1929); see LARRY L. TEPLEY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 2000)
(noting that Blair's article is the doctrine's first American analysis); see Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947). In a prescient dissent, Justice Black made special note of the dubious source relied upon
by the majority that adopted FNC. Id. at 517 n.5. Blair himself was an associate at Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft at the time Columbia published the piece and lacked the perspective to
comprehend fully the consequences of an FNC rule. See Peter J. Kalis & Thomas M. Reiter, Forum
Non Conveniens: A Case Management Toolfor Comprehensive Environmental Insurance Coverage
Actions?, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 391, 402 n.37 (1989-90); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and
the Redundacy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 811 (1985).
5. Fletcher Corrective Justice, supra,note 3.
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access rules that define the process for obtaining remedies.
In that discussion, I employ two metaphors to elucidate how court access
rules and substantive rules are bound together by the corrective justice and
enterprise regulation principles. First, I use a verbal metaphor based on a
factual continuum I will call a litigation event. Second, I translate the verbal
metaphor into graphic metaphors using Cartesian coordinate planes and Venn
diagrams. The verbal and visual metaphors provide the basis for constructing
a new rule-a "preservation of court-access" rule-that is consonant with
legal principles, substantive tort rules, and court-access rules. Applying the
preservation of a court-access rule in representative case studies demonstrates
how a rule focused on preservation rather than denial of access produces
results that are coherent and consonant with the principles and their rulearticulated progeny that embrace a litigation event.

II.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEMS THAT FNC CREATES IN
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT INJURY CASES

A. FNC as a Case Study ofInstrumentalistJurisprudence
1. The Anomaly of FNC in a Globalizing Business Environment
As innovations such as GATT, GATS, and NAFTA continue to open
national markets to a globalizing economy, products and activities of
multinational corporations ("MNCs") 6 headquartered or with significant
operations in the United States reach and affect innumerable individuals in
other nations.7 For example, globalization has produced a concomitant
internationalization of the scope of product-related injury claims. 8 Yet,
6. See Joshua N. Rose, Forum Non Conveniens and Multinational Corporations: A
Government Interest Approach, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 699, 700 n.9 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Lisa Lambert, At the Crossroadsof Environmental and Human Rights Standards:
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. Using the Alien Tort Claims Act to Hold MultinationalCorporate Violators
of InternationalLaws Accountable in U.S. Courts, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 109 (2000); John
Miller, Commentary: Globalization and Its Metaphors, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 594 (2000);
Emma Suarez Pawlicki, Comment, Stangvik v. Shiley and ForumNon Conveniens Analysis: Does a
Fear of too Much Justice Really Close California Courtrooms to Foreign Plaintiffs?, 13
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 175, 176-77 & nn.2-6 (2000) (quoting Ryan G. Anderson, Transnational
Litigation Involving Mexican Parties, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1059, 1059-60 (1994) (noting the
expectation that as '"increased interaction' across trade areas increases, there will be '"a significant
increase in litigation involving parties in both sides"')).
8. Stuart Dutson, Product Liability and Private International Law: Choice of Law in Tort in
England, 47 AM. J. COMv. L. 129-30 (1999) (footnotes omitted) (discussing "the content of the
choice of law rule in tort in England, and" applying "it to actions brought under Part I of the
Consumer Protection Act 1987 (UK) against foreign manufacturers in order to determine the
territorial scope of the action created by the Act").
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despite the unprecedented international free flow of goods and services, the
American federal courts often use FNC to virtually replace personal or
legislative jurisdiction analysis when foreign plaintiffs seek redress from
MNCs for injury inflicted abroad. 9 These dismissals have torn the regulatory
fabric by which MNCs are held accountable for safety of those to whom their
activities pose risk and held responsible for the harms caused by
nonreciprocal risks-a regulatory fabric that provides a persuasive theoretical
foundation for the principle of corrective justice that animates the American
system of tort law. 10 By inducing courts to focus on narrow, instrumentalist
concerns of supposed convenience and fear of docket congestion, FNC leaves
international plaintiffs, particularly those of developing nations, with only
nascent legal systems and judicial infrastructures that have not matured such
that even the rudiments of corrective justice can be expected. 1
Thus, FNC's instrumentalist heritage 12 is out of step with the broadening
9. Paula C. Johnson, Regulation, Remedy, and Exported Tobacco Products: The Need for a
Response from the United States Government, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 51-52 (1991) (criticizing
FNC as "the most significant obstacle faced by foreign plaintiffs because it has become so pervasive
in the international products liability landscape").
10. See, e.g., Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility, supra note 3, at 538.
11. See, e.g., Barry Bearak, In India, the Wheels of Justice Hardly Move, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2000, at Al (explaining that cases move at glacial pace in India's overburdened courts, where
criminal defendants who cannot afford bail often serve maximum sentences before cases come to
trial and civil suits are often delayed for a decade or more); Raymond Bonner, Bondage's Load:
Heavy Bricks and Crushing Debt, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at A4 (describing an active system of
involuntary servitude in which Pakistani adults and children are enslaved for years of indenture for
small debts to industrial concerns, for although Pakistani law prohibits such bonded labor, "[tihe law
has rarely, if ever, been enforced"); Gitarama, Justice on the Grass, THE ECONOMIST, June 8-14,
2002, at 43 (noting that Rwandan courts are choked with "115,000 suspects in jail awaiting trial"
while "so many jurists were murdered or fled the country in 1994" and concluding that "[t]he courts
cannot cope... [a]t the current pace, it will take over a century to try them all"). The state of civil
proceedings in India's court system is hardly atypical among developing countries as Mr. Bearak
summarizes some of the causes of a dysfunctional civil legal system in the developing world.
Bearak, supra,at Al.
12. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 516 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
Wiley Rutledge joined this dissent. Id. at 517. Justice Black referred to the FNC rule as little more
than a "welter of factors." Id. at 516. Included among that welter are the following:
Private Interest Factors: ... (1) The relative ease of access to sources of proof, (2) The
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; (3) The
[comparative] cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; (4) The possibility of
viewing the premises; (5) All other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive; (6) Whether any judgment eventually obtained could be
enforced.
Public Interest Factors: ... (1) Administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion;
(2) The unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty; (3) The local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home; (4) The interest in having the
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of the international canvas in which American courts must play a role in
regulating American business activities that cause significant impact abroad,
including human rights (e.g., suits based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, and the Foreign Tort Act of
1789); 13 securities fraud; 14 environmental protection;15 antitrust;16 restitution
for expropriatory actions; 17 international business; 18 and injuries caused by
trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action;
(5) The avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts of laws or in the application of
foreign law; (6) The appropriateness of a trial in a forum familiar with the law that will
govern the case.
Lonny Hoffman, Forum Non Conveniens-State and Federal Movements, ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY MATERIALS: CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURT

441, 453-54 (Feb. 2002). For an informative summary of case law illustrating the typically
conclusory "application" of these factors to justify a particular result, see GARY B. BORN & DAVID
WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 289-92 (Kluwer 2d ed.

1992).
13. See Kathryn Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens in
U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 41 (1998); Jacqueline Duval-Major, One-Way
Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the InternationalPlaintiff, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 650 (1992); see, e.g., Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate
Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 339 (2001) (discussing
issues facing MNCs in the global economy when their partner governments are engaging in human
rights abuses); Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations in the Protection of InternationalHuman Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153
(1997).
14. See, e.g., Glenn R. Sarno, Haling Foreign Subsidiary Corporations into Court Under the
1934 Act: JurisdictionalBases and Forum Non Conveniens, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 379
(1992); James J. Finnerty III, Note, The "Mother Court" and the ForeignPlaintiff: Does Rule 10b-5
Reach FarEnough?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. s287 (1993).
15. Molly M. White, Home Field Advantage: The Exploitation of Federal Forum Non
Conveniens by United States Corporationsand its Effects on InternationalEnvironmentalLitigation,
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 491 (1993).
16. See Jeremy C. Bates, Home Is Where the Hurt is: Forum Non Conveniens andAntitrust,U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 281 (2000); Mladen Don Kresic, Note, The Inconvenient Forum and International
Comity in PrivateAntitrust Actions, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (1983).
17. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1984); Ann Alexander,
Forum Non Conveniens in the Absence of an Alternative Forum, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1000 (1986).
18. See Richard D. Bertram, Conditional Orders of Dismissalfor Forum Non Conveniens Are
Appealable "FinalDecisions" Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 9 MAR. 297 (1984); Donald J. Carney,
Forum Non Conveniens in the United States and Canada, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 117 (1996); Daniel J.
Dorward, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial Protection of Multinational
Corporationsfrom Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 141 (1998); Maxwell
Gaffen, Martime Law-American Dredging Co. v. Miller: The Supreme Court Leaves the Forum Non
Conveniens Debate Unresolved, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 275 (1997); Melissa Leigh Lauderdale,
Forum Selection Clauses and Forum Non Conveniens in International Employment Contracts, 4 J.
INT'L L. & PRAC. 117 (1995); Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View of the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, 16
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 455 (1994); Christine Russell, Should Florida be a "Courthouse
for the World? ": The FloridaDoctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and ForeignPlaintiffs, 10 FLA. J.
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American products abroad, both under the rubric of traditional products
liability as well as injuries
caused by the manufacture, storage, or distribution
9
of American products.'
2. The Anomaly Created When FNC Defeats Constitutional and Statutory
Court-Access Rules: The Principal Problem is Lack Of Principle
For this case study, we take up the last category-product-related
injuries-because the effects of the FNC rule on international plaintiffs is most
apparent in such cases. In product injury cases, federal courts have taken the
FNC rule to its zenith, producing a nadir of recent decisions that have
prevented injured foreign nationals from obtaining a forum even in the federal
courts of the states in which the defendant MNC is incorporated,
headquartered, or doing business. 20 When international plaintiffs seek to sue
MNCs in the United States over injuries they have sustained because of
products or product-related industrial activity, the FNC rule has encouraged
federal courts to focus on docket-clearing, an instrumental emphasis made at
21
the expense of the important objectives of tort law in a globalizing economy.
INT'L L. 353 (1995); Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens
in InternationalLitigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposalfor a Uniform Standard,28 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 501 (1993); Allan J. Stevenson, Forum Non Conveniens and Equal Access Under
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties: A ForeignPlaintiffs Rights, 13 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 267 (1990).
19. See Kathleen Carter-Stein, In Search of Justice: Foreign Victims of Silicone Breast
Implants and the Doctrineof Forum Non Conveniens, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 167 (1995);
Douglas W. Dunham & Eric F. Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the
1990s, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 665 (1999); Harry Litman, Considerations of Choice of Law in the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 74 CAL. L. REV. 565 (1986) (discussing California doctrine's
emphasis on the possibility that the law applicable in the alternative forum is less favorable to the
plaintiff); Recent Case: Products Liability-Forum Non Conveniens-California Supreme Court
Rejects Considerationof the FavorableLaw of a ForeignPlaintiff's Chosen Forum as an Element in
Forum Non Conveniens Analysis-Strangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14 (Cal. 1991), 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1813 (1991); David W. Robertson & Paula K. Peck, Access to State Courts in Transnational
Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REv. 937
(1990); Armin Rosencranz & Richard Campbell, Foreign Environmental and Human Rights Suits
Against U.S. Corporationsin U.S. Courts, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145 (1999).
20. See infra note 28.
21. See, e.g., American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 456 (1994) (holding that in Jones
Act or federal maritime cases filed in state courts, states may apply their own rules as to FNC);
Lucck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods.
Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ala. 1995); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at
Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd & modified in part, 809
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), rev'd sub nom.
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., remanded 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), on remand Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142
F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator, Inc.,
46 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D. Conn. 1999), vacated and remanded,274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001); Proyectos
Orchimex de Costa Rica, S.A. v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 896 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla.
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The FNC rule has been a boon to MNCs, which avoid the courtroom as an
agent of the regulatory power of the American jurisdictions in which they are
incorporated, maintain headquarters, or engage in significant business
activity. By escaping judicial regulation by means of the FNC rule, the
conduct of MNCs evades the judicial oversight that regulates the MNCs'
imposition of nonreciprocal risks in modem life. Ultimately, this creates a
regulatory lacuna that tends to frustrate the principles underlying the tort law
to which the MNC has otherwise submitted itself. Specifically, FNC
produces incoherence between two key principles of tort law-corrective
justice and regulation of actors who create nonreciprocal risks-and thus
creates dissonance between substantive and procedural rules. Most notably,
federal courts have applied FNC to dismiss lawsuits instituted by foreign
plaintiffs seeking compensation from MNCs that the courts are otherwise
compelled to hear-compelled in the sense that the procedural rules of courtaccess (i.e., personal jurisdiction, legislative jurisdiction, and subject-matter
jurisdiction) 22 point to a strong jurisdictional basis for the forum's courts to
decide the plaintiffs claim. FNC's elimination of product injury lawsuits
whose resolution serves to accomplish the principles upon which substantive
tort-law rules are based (i.e., corrective justice and regulation of MNC activity
that produces nonreciprocal risks) produces dissonance between court-access
rules and FNC, which in turn produces incoherence in the regulatory aspect of
substantive tort law.
Nowhere was this made clearer than in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, z3 in

which the Supreme Court blocked a products liability lawsuit against an
American manufacturer in the defendant's home state essentially only because
the plaintiffs happened to be foreign. 24 Although the court-access rules were
1995); Ison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemeurs & Co., C.A. Nos. 97C-06-093-VAP, 97C-06-094-VAB (Del.
Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 1997), rev'd 729 A.2d 832 (Del. 1999); Gaffen, supra note 18, at 276-77.
22. Writings of Professor Stein have inspired my own use of the phrase "court access" to
describe these rules. See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937
(1991); Stein, supra note 4, at 781. Stein focuses principally on personal jurisdiction, subject-matter
jurisdiction, and venue as court access rules. I discount statutory venue for purposes of this Article,
because the "access" with which I am primarily concerned is access to an entire court-system-the
federal court system, and not a specific court within the system-and statutory venue's effect on a
litigant's choice of court system is greatly minimized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406. I add legislative
jurisdiction because access to a court system transcends merely location and judicial personnel to
encompass the legal culture and rules of law normally applied in that court system.

23. 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Among the many discussions of Reyno, Judge Friendly's was one of
the more thought-provoking. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J.
747 (1982).
24. Dorward, supra note 18, at 159-65. Significantly, each of the court-access rules was easily
satisfied by the Scottish plaintiffs-in-interest in Reyno. See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 238-69. Their
citizenship was diverse from that of the U.S.-based corporate defendants, satisfying subject-matter
jurisdiction requirements. Id. Personal jurisdiction was evident from the suits having been filed in
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fully satisfied, FNC effectively negated their operation in a case in which the
foreign plaintiffs had come to the bailiwick of defendant's operations to sue
them. To render FNC dismissals under these circumstances exposes a stark
analytic dissonance between the court-access rules and the FNC rule.25 The
dissonance is not merely evidenced by differing outcomes; it is also evidenced
at deeper levels.2 6 Not only do both sets of rules operate essentially on the
same set of jurisdictional facts but also those facts that present a strong case
under court-access rules 27 (particularly since the defendants are being sued at
defendants' backyard. Id. Legislative jurisdiction was also apparent; the home states of the
defendants obviously had an interest in regulating the design and manufacture standards of two U.S.based aeronautics producers whose products were distributed globally. Id.
25. Before Reyno, few would have suggested that FNC would apply in cases where the
requirements of all three court-access rules were satisfied. The pre-Reyno prevailing assumption was
articulated in 1970 by Professors Ryan and Berger who observed that "[i]f there is any relevant
connection between the litigation and the forum chosen, the doctrine should not be applied." John E.
Ryan & Don Berger, Forum Non Conveniens, I PAC. L.J. 532, 540 (1970) (emphasis added). Ryan
and Berger observed that "[r]esidence by either party in the forum state will usually preclude the
application of' FNC. Id at 545. Reyno ignored this basic idea.
26. Commentators made little of the analytic dissonance and, in large part, seem accepting of it.
Some commentators have partially noted this dissonance, while others have attempted to discount it
as reflection of flaws in court-access rules. Compare Dorward, supra note 18, at 167-68 (noting that
FNC as practiced by the federal courts after Piper differs markedly from the outcomes expected
under personal jurisdiction analysis and that harmonizing the two doctrines while preserving Piper
would "require[] a substantial revision of the current due process analysis and the rejection of years
of precedent"), and Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search ofa Role, 74
CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1986), with Alex W. Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction: A Confused and
InappropriateSubstitute for Forum Non Conveniens, 71 TEX. L. REv. 351 (1992).
27. See Patrick A. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of PersonalJurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 100 (1990). Dean Borchers
asserts:
Beyond the extremely limited constitutional doctrine of forum non conveniens, however,
the Constitution has no other general role in regulating state court assertions of personal
jurisdiction.... [Absent] a showing of a practical inability to defend in the forum and the
availability of a realistic alternative forum for the plaintiff.., the Constitution requires
deference to the state's decision to assert jurisdiction.
Id.; Stein, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 4, at 781; Patricia Youngblood, Constitutional
Constraintson Choice of Law: The Nexus Between World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 50 ALB. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1985). As Professor Lonny Hoffman recently
observed:
Because the private and public interest factors, taken together, overlap to a large degree
with the reasonableness factors from the personal jurisdiction test, as articulated by the
Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), it would appear
that the court is required in nearly all cases to apply the same factors twice; once as part of
the personal jurisdiction inquiry, and again as part of the forum non conveniens balancing
test. Based on these overlapping rules, it is reasonable to expect that if jurisdiction is found
to be reasonable, it is unlikely that the court could find the balance of convenience factors
to cut in favor of dismissal.
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home) are smothered in the unprincipled discretion afforded by the FNC rule
to ignore them.
Driven by instrumentalism, cases like Reyno are,
unfortunately, all too familiar in the federal courts.28
Hoffman, supra note 12, at 441. However, many courts have ignored this observation by ordering
FNC dismissals without having undertaken a personal jurisdiction analysis. See infra notes 182-85
and accompanying text.
28. Stewart et al. v. Dow Chem. Co., 865 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirming FNC dismissal
granted against Canadian residents suing for product liability for injuries caused to them or family
members from exposure to toxic herbicides manufactured by Dow Chemical despite the fact that the
forum is the home of Dow's world-wide headquarters, Dow is incorporated in the forum, and the
toxic herbicides were manufactured in the forum); Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d 1279
(1 lth Cir. 2001) (affirming FNC dismissal granted against Argentine residents suing, based on
diversity in the district court, for wrongful death of decedents based on product liability for the
defective design of the aircraft involved in an airline crash that occurred in Argentina despite the fact
Defendant McDonnell Douglas Corporation is a U.S. corporation incorporated in the state of
Maryland with its principal place of business in Washington); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants
Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (FNC dismissal granted against plaintiffs
suing for personal injury or wrongful death in products liability suit as a result of breast implants
manufactured by the defendants, despite the fact that the actions against the manufacturers in various
United States district courts based on diversity of citizenship were in the forums of the principal
places of business of the defendant manufacturers); Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co., 555 F. Supp. 9 (N.D.
Cal. 1982) (FNC dismissal granted against Japanese and Chinese residents suing for wrongful death
claims citing negligence and strict liability against a manufacturer arising from an airplane crash in
Taiwan, despite the fact that Boeing was a U.S. corporation), affd sub nom. Cheng v. Boeing Co.,
708 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1983); Ministry of Health, Province of Ont., Can. v. Shiley Inc., 858 F. Supp.
1426 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (FNC dismissal granted against Canadian provinces suing for products
liability for damages which the provinces anticipated incurring in paying medical expenses resulting
from defect valves implanted in patients, despite the fact that the forum is home of Shiley's worldwide headquarters and Shiley is incorporated in the forum); Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 159 (D. Conn. 1999), vacated, 274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (FNC dismissal granted against
Florida domicillaries suing for negligence and products liability for the death of decedent caused
when he fell five floors down an open passenger elevator shaft in an apartment building in Columbia,
despite the fact that all of the plaintiffs are U.S. citizens and UTC is an American company
incorporated in the forum); In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, 540 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1982) (FNC
dismissal granted against American and foreign plaintiffs suing airlines, company, and manufacturer
for products liability arising from the death of all passengers, who were relatives of the plaintiffs,
aboard a plane that caught fire in flight from Riyadh to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that the
manufacturer of the plane was an American corporation); Proyectos Orchimex de Costa Rica, S.A. v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 896 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (FNC dismissal granted against
Costa Rican farmers suing for personal injury and property damage caused to their crops, lands, and
families by pesticide Benlate despite the fact that the forum is the home of DuPont's world-wide
headquarters, DuPont is incorporated in the forum, and DuPont's key decisions regarding Benlate as
a product were made in the forum); Frazier v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1129 (D. Minn.
1985) (FNC dismissal granted against Danish citizens suing for product liability/personal injury due
to the use of a mitral valve prosthesis surgically implanted in the plaintiff, that was manufactured and
distributed in Denmark by the defendant's representatives, despite the fact that the forum is the home
of St. Jude Medical's world-wide headquarters and St. Jude is incorporated in the forum); In re
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (FNC dismissal granted against
United Kingdom residents suing for product liability and injuries received as a result of their
mothers' ingestion of the drug Debendox during pregnancy, despite the fact that Richardson-Merrell
is a wholly-owned subsidiary owned by the U.S. company incorporated in the forum and the
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B. Inadequacy of InstrumentalistApproaches to Solving the FNC Anomaly
Although FNC takes up a healthy portion of academic literature, no

commentator has identified the heart of the problem and gone to it. To the
contrary, extant scholarship divides roughly into three positions: scholars who

argue that "properly conducted personal jurisdiction and choice of law
29
inquiries eliminate the need for [the] forum non conveniens doctrine;
scholars who contend that the currently-constituted

FNC "doctrine...

provides a mechanism for courts to reach desirable forum selection results
without distorting the doctrine of personal jurisdiction;" 30 and scholars who
would have FNC swallow personal jurisdiction doctrine altogether. 3' None of
defendant's records and files are located in the forum), aff'd, 865 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1984); Lacey v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 736 F. Supp. 662 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (FNC dismissal granted against Australian
citizen suing for products liability when the plane he was flying in, manufactured and owned by the
defendants, crashed despite the fact that the defendants were all based in the U.S. and that one of the
defendants, Hanlon & Wilson, is headquartered in the forum); Abiaad v. Gen. Motors Corp., 538 F.
Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (FNC dismissal granted against plaintiffs, citizens of Lebanon and Brazil
residing in Pennsylvania, suing for personal injuries brought under a products liability theory when
the plaintiff was injured while working on a car manufactured by defendant, when the car's engine
burst into flames, despite the fact that the plaintiffs were residents of the forum and General Motors
was a U.S.-based corporation with its headquarters in the United States), aff'd sub noma.Abiaad v.
C.T. Corp. Systems, Gen. Motors Corp., 696 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1982); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142
F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (FNC dismissal granted against Ecuadorian residents suing for
property damage, personal injury, and increased risk of disease caused by negligent or otherwise
improper oil piping and waste disposal practices of a consortium in which the defendant, a U.S.
corporation, held an indirect interest); Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y 1996)
(FNC dismissal granted against Ecuadorian residents suing for personal injury caused by pollution
due to corporation's activities abroad, despite the fact that the corporation was headquartered in the
forum and that the activities of the corporation in Ecuador were controlled by the forum corporation),
vacated sub nom. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cit. 1998); Kilvert v. Tambrands, Inc., 906
F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (FNC dismissal granted against English residents suing for products
liability in the deaths of English decedent who died from toxic shock syndrome, despite the fact that
the English manufacturer was a subsidiary of an American corporation, that both companies had
some officers and directors in common, that the decedent used a tampon designed and tested by the
defendant in the United States and that the defendant is a U.S. corporation). Dowling v. Hyland
Therapeutics Div., Travenol Labs., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (FNC dismissal granted
against Irish citizens suing for products liability where the plaintiff, a hemophiliac, was administered
a blood clotting agent that was contaminated with HIV, despite the fact that the defendants, all U.S.
corporations, had subsidiaries in Ireland that marketed and distributed the blood clotting product that
was administered to the citizen); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in
December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (FNC dismissal granted against Indian citizens
suing for personal injury in the deaths and injuries of thousands, caused by the leaking of a highly
toxic gas in a pesticide manufactured by the defendants, despite the fact that the defendant, which
owned the majority of the stock of the corporation, was a company incorporated in the forum, and its
headquarters were in the forum).
29. TEPLEY & WHITTEN, supra note 4, at 354 n. 193 (citing Margaret G. Stewart, supra note
26).
30. Id. (citing Alex W. Albright, supra note 26).
3 1. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 27, at 19. It is interesting that Dean Borchers analogizes
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these approaches are adequate, however, to address the problem on a higher
plane of jurisprudence. At times, the corpus of FNC scholarship seems
reducible to the personal preferences of commentators for one rule over the
other. This Article rejects these treatments because they operate only at the
instrumental level, on the surface of the problem.
What are the shortcomings of the instrumentalist approaches? FNC
proponents generally focus on protecting the federal courts from heavy
caseloads, with an implicit subtext that American courts should be freed up
for American plaintiffs. Critics of the FNC rule have focused on the plight of
the foreign plaintiff injured by the activities of an MNC that enjoys the
protections of American law without having to answer for corresponding
liabilities. Such diametrically opposed perspectives make the FNC problem
appear as little more than a policy question, with no clear basis for preferring
one view over the other. If that were all to the matter, the only question that
might be left is whether the decision to adopt the FNC rule was properly a
judicial function or, instead, should have been committed to the legislative
branch.
Yet, there is more to the matter. Only diehard instrumentalist writers are
unabashed FNC proponents. Others are disquieted by the use of FNC,
especially when directed at international plaintiffs, but those objections, too,
are primarily instrumentalist. The principal problem with FNC is actually
lack of principle. Our difficulty with FNC is really reflective of the narrow
terms in which we examine such rules. Is a rule-level examination itself-in
which we debate debating the desirability of FNC in comparison to and
contrast with other "procedural" rules (such as those for personal and
legislative jurisdiction)-really sufficient to allow meaningful assessment of
FNC? Should we continue to examine "procedural" rules as a species entirely
distinctive from "substantive" rules of law? Or are such traditional forms of
legal discourse impeding our reasoning by obscuring the intellectual context
that lies at a more abstract and sophisticated level of jurisprudence? Is there a
principled basis upon which to approach a scholarly divisive issue such as
FNC? My aim is to answer these questions using an analytic template based
on Dworkin's principle-rule distinction.
I propose that the answer to the last two of these questions is "yes"
because the answers to the two predicate questions are "no." The argument in
support of my thesis is complex, and, to the extent it demands abandoning a

personal jurisdiction decisions to the crazy-quilt pattern of the disassembled pieces of a child's jigsaw puzzle while implying that FNC doctrine is somehow more consistent or coherent. In fact, as the
cases discussed below at notes 182 through 224 demonstrate, the best thing that can be said of the
FNC doctrine is that it has produced a legacy of unprincipled judicial decisions.
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substantive-procedural dichotomy that comforts many lawyers as a default
organizing paradigm built up during our training as lawyers, somewhat
counterintuitive. It demands a willingness to think outside of the metaphoric
box to which Wittgenstein consigned the narrow viewer of his beetle.32
Despite the complex demands of my analysis, the conclusion it achieves is
straightforward: The principal problem of the FNC rule is its lack of principle.
Put less aphoristically, the FNC rule has been devised and applied without
reference to the other procedural and substantive rules relevant to a litigation
case 33 and without due consideration of "higher" jurisprudence. By higher
jurisprudence, I mean the principles upon which (in a Dworkinian conception
of law at least) those rules are grounded and which the rules exemplify. 34 I
have set out to create a methodology for thinking about such heterogeneous
rules. This methodology requires a reconceptualization of long-accepted lines
of demarcation between substance and procedure and an acceptance of broad
principles as the justification for rules.
C. The Methodologyfor Reconceptualization
The challenge of reconceptualizing any instrumentalist rule such as FNC
requires us first to reconceptualize the fundamental relationship between
substantive and procedural law. This fundamental relationship has been
insufficiently emphasized in our legal training. Law school curricula
unintentionally encourages lawyers to make a formalistic assumption-that the

32. See Wendy Collins Perdue, PersonalJurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L.
REv. 529 (1991) (quoting L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHIC INVESTIGATIONS 293 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed.)(1958) (using the hypothetical describing individual observers describing
the content of their ideas by the same appellation when in fact each observer may actually be
describing a different thing because "[n]o one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he
knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle")).
33. Arguing that substantive and procedural rules are linked in a continuum might at first seem
surprising, but it is the very absence of this link in the scholarship and reported opinions that has
prevented a meaningful examination of the problem caused by FNC when routinely applied to deny
an American forum to the international plaintiff Procedure is simply the handmaiden (to use a dated
but vivid phrase) to substantive law. Thus, procedure is not an objective in itself, but rather a means
of accomplishing the objectives of the substantive law. This is illustrated by the discussion of
principle and the use of metaphoric reasoning in Part IV.
34. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967); Rose,
supra note 6, at 708. The ultimate purpose of all procedural rules is to effect the goals of the
substantive law derived. Forum non conveniens has torn the fabric of this continuum because the
Supreme Court has allowed it to be treated sui generis without considering its relationship to the
other procedural doctrines and to the goals of substantive law. Instead, it has been allowed to act as a
kind of analytic short-cut, in which supposedly overburdened federal judges can, in effect, "pull the
plug" on a case regardless of whether the defendant is a U.S.-based MNC whose conduct is most
appropriately regulated and judged by the courts in a U.S. forum. Thus, FNC doctrine is producing
results that strike the objective viewer as unfair.
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law applicable to substantive and procedural issues constitutes separate
subjects that are studied largely in isolation from one another. Separate
bodies of rules to govern each issue provide a traditional justification for this
bifurcated approach. This approach has the unintended effect of obscuring,
however, the important relationships between substantive and procedural
rules, thereby leading to the kind of compartmentalized thinking that produces
analytically dissonant rules such as FNC-rules that are not associated with
the important principles that underlie the rules in a Dworkinian concept of law
must provide intellectual foundations for the legitimacy of any rule.
The Dworkinian concept of law posits that "a proposition of law is true
only if in conjunction with other premisses [sic] it follows from principles
which both best fit the legal system's institutional history and also provide the
best moral justification for it."' 35 Principles are, in essence, the glue that holds
together the "collection ... of rules" that most people think of as "the law." 36
Dworkin "distinguish[es] principles in the generic sense from rules" because
"[r]ules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion" such that "if the facts a
rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer
it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing
to the decision. 0 7 By contrast, principle (such as "no man may profit from his
own wrong") "states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not
necessitate a particular decision., 38 Unlike rules, "principles ... conflict and
interact with one another, so that each principle that is relevant to a particular
legal problem provides a reason arguing in favor of, but does not stipulate, a
particular solution. 3 9
In Dworkin's concept of the law, as Professor Terrell effectively describes
it in metaphor, "principles are the mortar between the bricks of specific rules,
but the whole wall must be considered the 'law. ' '4° Indeed, Professor
Dworkin noted in his early writings that "[p]rinciples have a dimension that
rules do not-the dimension of weight or importance."4 1 Principles have this
higher value because they provide the ratio et auctorites for the rules,
although, unlike rules, principles "need not have been enunciated by an

35. The description is the late Professor Hart's, who, despite his disagreement with Dworkinian
principles as the basis for law, summarized Dworkin's approach well. H. L. A. HART, Poscript, in
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 253 (2d ed. 1994).
36. Dworkin, supra note 34, at 39.
37. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23-25 (1977).

38. Id. at 26.
39. Id. at 72.
40. Timothy P. Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the
Development ofFundamentalNormative Principles,72 CAL. L. REv. 288, 298 n.37 (1984).
41. DWORKIN, supra note 37, at 26.
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official source ' 42 as the principles themselves establish the context in which
"official sources" (e.g. a legislative or judicial source) is bound to operate.4 3
I develop the thesis in more detail in Part III, which sets the stage for the
remaining sections. Parts IV and V are devoted to the metaphoric and graphic
models of reasoning to demonstrate how the corrective justice and regulatory
principles link the rules of substance and procedure in tort cases, how that
42. Id. at 22-39. Although I take the original concept a bit out of context, the term
"intendment," as used years ago by Professor Fuller, seems to mirror the sourcing of principles I
have described in the text. Fuller used the term to explain how law is embraced by individuals: "Our
institutions and our formalized interactions with one another are accompanied by certain interlocking
expectations that may be called intendments, even though there is seldom occasion to bring these
underlying expectations across the threshold of consciousness." LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 217 (2d ed. 1969) (giving example that "the institution of elections may be said to contain the
intendment that the votes cast will be faithfully tallied"). Although Fuller wrote of this concept in
the context of legal institutions, intendments inherent in the structuring of our legal system appear
also to be a well-spring of the principles from which rules are derived.
43. The distinction was well known to German nineteenth-century jurists between principles
and rules as they "stud[ied] the German legal system in its historical context . . . [and] dr[e]w from it
a set of historically verified and essential principles." JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION, 31, 32, 61-64 (2d ed. 1985). Yet not all scholars are persuaded by Dworkin's principlerule distinction to defining law. E.g., POSNER, supra note 3, at 21-23; HART, supra note 35, at 25963. Richard Posner has been particularly unsparing in his criticism of Dworkin's approach:
Yet defining law as broadly as Dworkin does provides no escape. When law is defined to
include, under the rubric of "principle," the ethical and political norms that judges use to
decide the most difficult cases, decision according to law and decision according to
political preference become difficult, sometimes impossible, to distinguish in a society as
morally heterogeneous as ours. Dworkin does distinguish between policy and principle,
and he argues that only the latter is a fit foundation for and limitation on judicially declared
rights. The argument is unconvincing, the distinction arbitrary, the principles merely the
policies that commend themselves to Dworkin's brand of political liberalism.
POSNER, supra note 3, at 22. But it must be observed that such a perspective, which has appeared
under the labels of "realism" or more currently "pragmatism," is rooted in stripping the law of values
and the principles which embody them that began in earnest with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s
assertions that we should "'wash [the notion of duty] with cynical acid and expel everything except
the object of our study, the operations of the law."' ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT
VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 172 (2000) (quoting Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)). Thus, the pragmatist approach ultimately focuses on
"'know[ing] the law' through the "'bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which
such knowledge enables him to predict."' Id. at 12 (quoting Holmes, supra, at 459); see POSNER,
supra note 3, at 19, 466 n.5. Yet, such pragmatism has ultimately proven to be a sterile jurisprudence
that "puts second things"-i.e., instrumentalist or consequentialist payoffs-"first." ALSCHULER,
supra, at 191. Thus, "[firing a demand for hogchoker proof at every belief'-in the style of Posner's
attack on the principle-rule distinction quoted above-"may leave one without beliefs," perhaps only
"a hopeless jumble of ill-considered prescriptive and descriptive ideas," and an accompanying "sense
of emptiness and despair." Id. at 176, 194. That kind of incoherence is evident in the operation of the
very pragmatic FNC rule, which is why I chose FNC as a case study of legal incoherence that can be
resolved by shifting one's frame of reference from pragmatism to a structural approach based on
Dworkin's principle-rule distinction.
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linkage demonstrates the sui generis nature of the FNC rule, and how FNC
must be reconceptualized to fit logically within the principle-rule structure. I
construct in Part VI a reconceptualized FNC rule in the form of a model
statute and apply that statute to a representative selection of international
product-injury cases. I then demonstrate how the model statute leads to more
consistent, fairer outcomes that are consistent with tort law's underlying
principles.

III. THE THESIS OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: DISTINGUISHING
UNIFYING PRINCIPLES FROM SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL RULES THAT
ACTUATE THEM
A. Applying the DworkinianPrinciple-RuleDistinction and Using Metaphor
to Show that the Rules Describe a Single "LitigationEvent"
Scholars typically view corrective justice as a principle underlying the
substantive aims of tort law. 4 This principle intersects with the broader
principle of what I call enterprise regulation.4 5 What we typically describe as
tort law is a set of substantive rules that emanate from one or both of those
principles. Tort law, however, also embraces the procedural framework for
evaluating litigation events under substantive law. In a Dworkinian model,
the enterprise regulation and corrective justice principles are realized through
two sets of rules. The first set is the substantive rules we call tort law-case
law, statutes, and scholarly compilations leading to model rules such as
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts4 6 and Section 2 of the

44. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 13-16 (2000); see, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS
AND WRONGS 361-89 (1992); POSNER, supra note 3, at 188; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 84-113 (1995); Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Fletcher, Fairnessand
Utility, supra note 3, at 538; Gregory C. Keating, Distributiveand CorrectiveJustice in the Tort Law
of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193 (2000) ("Tort scholarship on the law of negligence has long
been torn between two competing conceptions. One of these conceptions-the [corrective] justice
conception-holds that negligence law is (and should be) an articulation of our ordinary moral
conceptions of agency and responsibility, carelessness and wrongdoing, harm and reparation.");
Susan Randall, Corrective Justice and the Torts Process, 27 IND. L. REV. 12 (1993) ("Corrective
justice stands in direct opposition to instrumental views of tort law, positing a moral foundation of
and rationale for the present system of tort law."); Alan Schwartz, Responsibility and Tort Liability,
97 ETHICS 270 (1986); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence
and Corrective Justice, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997); Catharine Pierce Wells, Corrective
Justice and Corporate Tort Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769 (1996); Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort
Law as Corrective Justice:A PragmaticJustificationfor Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348
(1990).
45. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.

46.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965).
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Restatement of Products Liability.47 The second set is the procedural court-

access rules that provide a structure for the application of substantive rules to
individual cases. We typically compartmentalize the procedural rules under
headings such as "personal jurisdiction," "legislative jurisdiction," and
"subject-matter jurisdiction" in the federal courts. Yet, in the context of an
individual tort claim, both the substantive and procedural rules combine to
reify the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles in a
Dworkinian model.48 Conversely, those principles justify the rules for
framing and pursuing a tort cause of action.
Viewed from the perspective of the corrective justice principle, then,
substantive rules and procedural rules cannot be separated into neat, artificial
compartments-a habit of intellectual sloth to which most lawyers at times
succumb. Both "sets" of rules serve the same animating corrective justice
principle that requires compensating individuals for injury caused to their
persons and property when corporations engage in commercial activity that
creates a nonreciprocal risk to those individuals and that causes that risk to
eventuate in personal injury. The nonreciprocal risk articulation of the
corrective justice principle provides a substantive objective that the
substantive and procedural court-access rules are designed to achieve. When
the domain of the corrective justice principle permits realization through
litigation in a specific case, it occurs within a domain shared with another
principle that authorizes adjudication involving the parties. By contrast, when
a rule operates to thwart realization of corrective justice, that rule's operation
must be justified by the fact of disconnection between the corrective justice
principle and the principle that authorizes adjudication. Thus, for example,
when a procedural court-access rule ends a plaintiffs lawsuit before the
plaintiff has had a full opportunity to obtain corrective justice, that outcome
must be justified by the countervailing action of another Dworkinian principle
of equal value.
What is that principle of equal value-a principle that authorizes
adjudication involving business conduct? It is the enterprise regulation
principle-which I articulate as a principle that sovereigns should regulate
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).

48. "Within Dworkin's jurisprudence, principles have a descriptive and a normative function.
Principles simultaneously explain (descriptive) and justify (normative) the legal practice within a
particular community." Eric Dworkin, Debunking Integrity's 'Equality Advantage': The Absence of
Coordination in Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire, 83 IOWA L. REV 1071, 1080 (1997-98);
DWORKIN, supra note 37, at 22; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 147 (1978); see
Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity,
and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CAL. L. REV. 369, 373 (1984) ("Dworkin's objections" to an
entirely rule-bound view of law "are motivated by the need to provide principled justification for the
state's use of coercion and force in enforcing judgments.").
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conduct of corporations that they either create or assist by fostering a business
environment in which the corporations may operate. That state-fostered
environment is typically the forum where the corporation is organized,
headquartered, or doing substantial amounts of business.
Regulating
corporate conduct in those forums will have the greatest impact on obtaining
conformance of corporate conduct to substantive rules and, thereby, will
achieve results that actuate the corrective justice principle. The enterprise
regulation principle makes it legitimate for a sovereign to act to affect the
corrective justice principle. To use Dworkin's lexicon, the enterprise
regulation principle delineates those situations in which it is appropriate for
the state to apply its coercive rules to shape corporate activity and to provide
remedies for the effects of nonconforming corporate activity. 49 Conversely,
the enterprise regulation principle also limits the appropriate subset of cases in
which it is appropriate for the state to use coercive power to effect corrective
justice through the application of its progeny rules. The enterprise regulation
principle defines the categories of cases in which a state may legitimately
impose its positive rules of law (typically, when an alleged tortfeasor is a
corporation of the state, maintains its headquarters there, or does business
there). By contrast, when a corporation is not organized under a state's law,
headquartered in a state, or doing substantial amounts of business in or from a
state, the enterprise regulation principle does not apply, and the court-access
rules take precedence in a prohibitive manner to require dismissal of a civil
lawsuit against that corporation.
The relationship described above between the corrective justice and
enterprise regulation principles can be a challenging one to process through
words alone. Accordingly, we turn to a graphic metaphor for assistance in
achieving clarity. The principles can be understood through a graphic
metaphor 50 depicted as Diagram 1.
The domains in Diagram 1 are populated by a composite of the
substantive and procedural rules that actuate the relevant principles, as well as
by combinations of operative facts (i.e., the litigation event, to use my phrase,
or minimum contacts, to use the language of modern personal jurisdiction
law) to which the rules apply in actuating the principles. The relationships
among principles, rules, and the litigation events on which they operate often
produce confusing and opaque writing that struggles to articulate the
relationship. However, by visualizing the relationships among Dworkinian
principles, positive rules, and facts, Diagram I resolves a verbal haze into a
49. See Dworkin, supra note 34, at 14.
50. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of verbal and
graphic metaphor in legal reasoning.
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sharply focused image. That image is of different concepts describing the
same phenomenon from different vantage points. That phenomenon is the
bundle of facts--"minimum contacts"-that I shall call a "litigation event."
As Diagram 1 illustrates, the nature of the litigation event invokes the
Dworkinian principles underlying tort law. Those principles encompass
within their ambit particular substantive and procedural rules. Relative to one
another and to the litigation event, the rules are positioned relative to the same
litigation event like the differently situated observers of a physical
l
phenomenon described in Albert Einstein's special theory of relativity.

51. ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY, THE SPECIAL AND GENERAL THEORY, Chs. V, at 15; IX,
at 29-31; XVII (Robert W. Lawson, tr. 1961), availableat http://www.bartleby.com/173/5.html (last
visited July 20, 2002) (noting differences in the observation of the same factual event from different
vantage points along a space-time continuum, e.g., an embankment past which a train is moving
when two lightning strikes separated by some distance occur, and Minkowski's conceptualization of
physical phenomena in four-dimensional space characterized by three space coordinates and a time
coordinate). For a similar conceptualization of the litigation event, see infra Diagram 11. The use of
natural science theory to construct new approaches to analyzing problems in the political and social
sciences is a recognized interdisciplinary approach. See, e.g., Richard Bernstein, Arguing That
Historians Can Be Scientists, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at E7 (reviewing JOHN LEWIS
GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY: How HISTORIANS MAP THE PAST (2002)). As one example
of this phenomenon, Bernstein provides the following synopsis of this variety of interdisciplinary
thinking:
Science has abandoned the linear, predictable Newtonian world of the past in favor of a
new world defined by Einstein's theory of relativity and Heisenberg's uncertainty
principle. Scientists like Einstein couldn't do laboratory experiments. They relied on
thought experiments, and a thought experiment is like a historical narrative. And a
narrative is an investigative tool. It uses the mind to isolate variables in the effort to
simulate how something happened, in science and in history, and to determine the causes.

THE IRONY OF INSTRUMENTALISM

2004]

DIAGRAM 1: DWORKINIAN PRINCIPLES: A METAPHORIC VENN
DIAGRAM
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Operative facts of litigation events fall within domain of Corrective
Justice Principle, but outside domain of Enterprise Regulation
Principle-Maps to Cartesian (Quadrant IV).

UE

Operative facts of litigation events fall within domain of both
Corrective Justice and Enterprise Regulation principles-Maps to
Cartesian (Quadrant I).
Falls on limb of intersection between domains of Enterprise
Regulation and Corrective Justice principles-May fall outside
Enterprise Regulation Principle Domain depending on (1) Quality
and/or (2) Quantity of minimum contacts (Quadrants II and III).
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Employing a simple metaphor, the seamlessness of the rules' relationship
to one another and to the litigation event can be explained by analogizing each
set of substantive and procedural rules to an Einsteinian observer of a physical
phenomenon. The "observers" of a typical litigation event will look at the
same bundle of facts from the perspective of substantive and procedural rules.
Some observers will focus on the substantive rules. Other observers will
focus on the procedural rules. However at all times, all observers are viewing
the same litigation event. The integral linkage represented by a litigation
event reminds us that we cannot view the rules as analytic ends in themselves,
nor should we apply the rules in isolation. Indeed, Diagram 1 illustrates that
each rule really functions as a metaphor for the other rules in that each rule,
while employing a different lexicon, in fact describes the same litigation
event. I shall refer to the relationships illustrated in Diagram 1 as "the
litigation event metaphor."
The metaphoric relationship between specific Dworkinian principles and
the rules that serve them leads, intuitively, to the observation that adjudication
of a litigation event (i.e., applying the rules of tort law through the vehicles
created by court-access rules) should advance both the corrective justice and
enterprise regulatory principles. In a few situations, the corrective justice
principle may have to give way when a rule of court access demonstrates a
lack of sufficient identity between the litigation event and the enterprise
regulatory principle.5 2 In those cases, the converse of the regulatory principle
takes ascendancy, and the rule that prevents the realization of corrective
justice is applied (i.e., dismissal on failure of personal jurisdiction because the
litigation event does not comprise facts that satisfy the regulatory principle's
prerequisite for the administration of corrective justice).
Cartesian imagery also provides a visual metaphor for these concepts.
Cartesian imagery permits us to distinguish those cases in which the
principles of corrective justice and enterprise regulation prohibit dismissal of
a lawsuit from these cases in which the litigation event falls outside of the
common domain of the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles
and, therefore, the court-access rules require dismissal. Before using that
metaphor as an analytic tool, however, we need to accomplish two
preliminary steps. First, we must lay the groundwork that justifies using
metaphoric reasoning to shed new light on legal problems that resist
persuasive solutions by other means. Second, we must explain how to
52. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1983) (holding
no court-access for survivors-plaintiffs in Texas when the wrongful deaths occurred in Peru, did not
"arise out of or relate to" the foreign defendant's activities in Texas, and the quantum of the foreign
defendant's unrelated activities in Texas did not rise to the high level required to create general
personal jurisdiction).
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construct a metaphor of sufficient sophistication to provide the solution we
seek. Both of these objectives are the subject of Part II.B.
B. Developing the LitigationEvent Metaphor
1. The Justification for Using Metaphoric Reasoning to Shed New Light on
Legal Problems that Resist Persuasive Solutions
It should be apparent from the discussion in Part II.A that rigid
compartmentalization of substantive law-as meaningfully distant from
procedural devices through which the law is "realized"-has obscured the role
of procedural rules, such as FNC, in the larger context of the law's goals
(expressed as principles in the Dworkinian sense).. Substantive law has
among its goals the regulation of private conduct that exceeds prescribed
parameters. In common-law legal systems, substantive law on private
subjects-such as torts and contracts-achieves the regulatory goal through
the litigation process. The law is not meaningful nor "enforced" until private
parties bring their causes to a judicial forum. Our common-law legal culture
has grown up around regulation achieved through proceedings in a judicial
forum. Within that forum, a court acts as a regulator in applying the relevant
law to the litigation event before it and procedure actuates the substantive law
into regulation through the process of a lawsuit. Without procedure, the
substantive law remains, at best, hortatory and indeterminate.53
The litigation event metaphor articulated in Part II.A exploits an
intellectual device-the metaphor-whose simplicity will assist us in viewing
the relationship between substance and procedure in a way that illuminates the
failures of FNC doctrine and allows its reconceptualization. 54 Metaphoric
reasoning has gained ground in legal scholarship since the period in which
George Fletcher lamented that "metaphoric thinking command[s] so little
respect among lawyers" and urged us "to perceive the link between
53. See generally NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 44-45, 48-50,

71-71 (rev. ed. 1994) (discussing ways in which procedures permit the articulation of resolutions
under substantive law).
54. Metaphoric reasoning is useful on a number of practical grounds to illuminate otherwise
seemingly intractable problems or apparently irreconcilable differences. For example,
[it] "provide[s] a means for individuals and, ultimately, organizations to create and share
understanding." At the same time, metaphors serve as filters through which we perceive
and process information. They are comparable to other instruments of conceptualization
such as models and theories in science. Metaphors employed to study "an emerging
[analytic process] usually end up influencing the shape it takes."
Clay Calvert, Regulating Cyberspace: Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Framing of Legal
Options, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 541, 542 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
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achieving.., substantive goals and explicating.., value choices in a simpler,
sometimes metaphoric style of reasoning. ' '55 The role of metaphoric
reasoning has been described "as the attempt to understand one domain of

55. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 3, at 572-73 & n.131; see, e.g., Bernard J.
Hibbits, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the ReconfigurationofAmerican Legal
Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229, 235 (1994). Hibbits observed that:
Today, few would dismiss [metaphoric reasoning] as mere semantic decoration, ornament,
or rhetorical device. Some scholars have indeed gone so far in the other direction as to
suggest that metaphors are fundamental tools of thought and reasoning-so much a part of
the deep structure of our mentality that "our ordinary conceptual system.., is...
metaphorical in nature.".
Id. (quoting GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 3 (1980)); see Richard
E. Vatz & Lee S. Weinberg, Metaphor as Law, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 845 (1988) (reviewing
MILNER S. BALL LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY (1985)) (noting that
"metaphoric choices are the central means by which events of the world take on meaning" and
"[w]hether conscious or not, a dominant metaphor inevitably reveals some aspects of reality while
masking others"); Alani Golanksi, Kahn's Reign and its Metaphors for Law-A Critique in the
Philosophy of Legal Culture, 27 S.U. L. REV. 89, 93 (2000) (discussing Professor Kahn's three
"metaphors [for law] .. . (1) law as language, (2) law as religion, and (3) law as legal artifact"). For
a review of the use of metaphor in legal reasoning and other sources both supportive and critical of
metaphoric reasoning, see Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053 (1989).
Professor Joo notes that some "legal realists" argued that metaphor was merely an effort to obscure
legal reasoning or conceal the lack of it. Thomas W. Joo, Corporations Theory and Corporate
Governance Law Contract,Property, and the Role ofMetaphor in CorporationsLaw, 35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 779, 782 & n.8 (2002). Other scholars see metaphor differently, describing
metaphor and analogy as mappings (in the mathematical sense of the term) from one
domain of knowledge (the source, or base, domain) to another (the target domain). Based
on the mapping, the analogist can abstract a more generalized domain, or schema that
accommodates both the source and the target phenomenon.
Id. at 783. The more structured the mapping, the more "analytic" and ultimately persuasive it
becomes. Id. at 788. Professor Joo provides an effective example of how metaphor is used to unify
concepts and reach a higher understanding of their relationship as follows:
An elementary scientific analogy maps characteristics of waves in water to corresponding
characteristics of sound....
"The first person who noticed that sound behaves something like water waves
presumably did not already conceive of wave as a category so general as to include both
water and sound waves. But seeing the analogy may have paved the way for forming such
a category. We will refer to the representations of complex concepts such as wave, which
convey patterns among constituent elements, as schemas ......
[This] analogy.., can be called sound as water wave.
Id. at 783 (emphasis omitted). "The example shows that the analogy is not just a comparison of
sound to water waves. Instead, the analogist uses the comparison to construct a complex concept.
The schema wave is a super ordinate category that embraces, at a high level of abstraction, both
sound waves and water waves." Id. at 783-84 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
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knowledge (the 'target') in terms of another (the 'source ).,,56
".[U]nderstanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another"' is
a helpful way to explain the metaphor's essence.57 Moreover, using
metaphoric reasoning to contextualize conceptual abstractions "translates the
abstract concept into concrete and often vivid terms, shaping the concept with
connotations and giving it a weight and carrying power independent of its true
worth." 58

2. Constructing a Metaphor of Sufficient Sophistication to Provide the Basis
for Reconceptualizing the Content and Role of FNC
My purpose in addressing the concept of metaphoric reasoning in law is
directed toward the application of metaphor to create a basis on which,
ultimately, to reconceptualize FNC so that it does not produce results at odds
with the interplay of the governing corrective justice and enterprise regulation
principles. To perform this task, the framework for metaphoric reasoning that
we construct must be sufficiently sophisticated to bear the intellectual weight
of the FNC problem. In this subsection, I explain how I will construct such a
powerful metaphor in Parts III and IV, and what the fruits of our labors will
be when we use the insights we have gained to re-articulate and apply FNC as
a rule of court-access preservation in Part V. Metaphor is employed in my
analysis to "render the underlying idea," as explained in Part II.A, "more
concise or concrete." 59 The relationships that I find continuous and
overlapping in the litigation event metaphor have largely been obscured from
the focus of commentators because "lawyers are equipped only with reams
and reams of text-black letters printed on white pages, constantly demanding
attention" away from "a clear view of the law." 60 Obscuring words can be
reduced and the structure of the law enhanced through visualization.
Visualization of information allows us to manage the law's informational
complexity, to organize that information, and to make that information
"intuitively accessible" by providing "an approach to thinking about the
law.",6 1 Visualization is accomplished with a combination of metaphors and

56. Id. at 779.
57. Id. at 780 (quoting GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 5

(1980)).
58. Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395, 395
(1986). As Boudin observed, "so far as it compares two things, metaphor is also a reasoning
device-a specialized means of reasoning by analogy." Id. at 406.
59. Id. at 405.
60. Matthew J. McCloskey, Note, Visualizing the Law: Methods for Mapping the Legal
Landscape and DrawingAnalogies, 73 WASH. L. REV. 163, 163-64 (1998).
61. Id. at 167.
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graphics. "[V]isualizing the law's organizing metaphors" through graphics
such as Venn diagrams and Cartesian coordinate planes "reveals perspectives
and relationships between principles and rules that are otherwise obscured by
traditional discussions." 62 Here, the "metaphor is a mapping.., from one
conceptual domain.., to another" 6 3-in this case, from the corrective justice
and enterprise regulation principles as the target domains to the court-access
rules as vantage points from which to view a litigation event as the source
domain.
The most structurally rigorous metaphors are built on
correspondence between the relationships among elements within one domain
and parallel relationships within the other domain.64 The litigation event itself
provides those correspondences-it is, to borrow from Professor Terrell's
lexicon,65 the "wall" that emerges from the intersection of the principles (the
"mortar") and rules (the "bricks") that are applied to the facts composing the
litigation event. Visualizing the principles and rules as metaphors for
litigation events demonstrates their substantial overlap, the artificiality of the
current analytic separation, 66 and the distortion of the principle-rule
62. Id. at 165; see William M. Richman, Graphic Forms in Conflict of Laws, 27 U. TOL. L.
REV. 631 (1996); see, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab, Limited Domain Positives as an Empirical
Proposition, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1111, 1112-13 (1997); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The
EqualProtectionof the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 347 (1949).
63. Joo, supra note 55, at 781.
64. Referring back to the wave metaphor described in note 55, above, Professor Joo explains in
more detail what happens during the process of metaphorical reasoning:
It is tempting to think of the analogical process as a sequence of discrete, independent
steps: the identification of a target problem (how does sound behave?); the identification of
a source analog (the behavior of waves in water); the drawing of correspondences between
the domains; and finally the construction of a generalized schema (wave). But analogical
thinking is not nearly so simple. Rather than successive steps, these tasks are overlapping
and interdependent. For example, the target and source domains do not exist in a vacuum.
Unlike a "source domain" and a "target domain," any two subjects are more complex than
two pithy lists of characteristics that can be compared to one another. Thus, the analogist
must create an abstract, simplified portrait to serve as each domain. The analogist does so
with the ultimate purpose of constructing a schema that will shed light on the problem at
hand. Thus, she will emphasize the aspects of each subject that contribute to this goal and
ignore other aspects that she finds irrelevant. For example, in sound as water wave, the
analogist's portrait of water waves emphasizes the fact that they can compress and refract
but ignores the fact that they are cool, blue-green, and wet. The latter properties defining
characteristics of water waves are just as important as the former. As they have no apparent
analogs in sound, however, they are not helpful in solving the problem of how sound
behaves. Thus, the analogist discards these properties.
Joo, supra note 55, at 784-85 (footnotes omitted).
65. Terrell, supra note 40, at 298 n.37.
66. See, e.g., WARREN FREEDMAN, FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS:
THE DEFENSE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS 40, 40-45 (1988). At the time it was published,
Freedman's book was the most comprehensive survey of FNC's development and situation as to
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relationship caused by the current federal courts' use of FNC to dismiss
international product-injury cases.6 7
The process of constructing a metaphor around which we can
reconceptualize FNC is not a simple one. Our purpose will be accomplished
only through a number of steps, each of which builds on the other. As a guide
through this process, I offer a concise synopsis of what each of the succeeding
Parts will contribute to the process of reconceptualizing FNC.
First, the relevant Dworkinian principles are discussed in Part III.
Corrective justice is discussed as a target domain of the litigation event
metaphor.
In particular, corrective justice is defined using Professor
Fletcher's well-known nonreciprocal risk theory as a basis for regulating the
conduct of U.S.-based MNCs towards international plaintiffs who are injured
by the MNCs' products or product-related activities. The enterprise regulation
principle is the other target domain of the litigation event metaphor, and its
origin and content are described in detail. The argument is then advanced that
the two principles have a symbiotic relationship-i.e., that the application of
corrective justice can be achieved in a common-law jurisdiction such as the
United States only through the regulatory functions of a given forum's
judiciary in resolving private disputes between individual or groups of
individual international plaintiffs and tortfeasing MNCs.
Second, in Part IV we proceed to construct the source domains that
compose a litigation event: the court-access rules commonly referred to as
juridical (or personal) jurisdiction, legislative jurisdiction (or choice of law),
and subject-matter jurisdiction. Each source domain is constructed starting
other court access documents. Freedman's observations about the relationship between FNC and
other court access doctrines betrays the traditional compartmentalization:
It is said that U.S. procedure has developed a four-part hierarchy to describe limitations on
a court's ability to resolve a lawsuit, to wit: personal jurisdiction ... subject matter
jurisdiction ... venue... and forum non conveniens. An objection to personal jurisdiction
or venue must be promptly raised or the objection is waived; subject matter jurisdiction
may be raised at any time, even on appeal, and forum non conveniens objections can
appear at any time.
Id. at 41. Freedman then discusses each of the court access doctrines in the rigid, compartmentalized
fashion that presents no opportunity for rising above instrumentalist, rules-bound view to see
relationships suggestive of more significant principles at work. Id. at 41-55.
67. In choosing the metaphor, care must be taken to create a metaphor that is practically useful
in solving the problem to which it is addressed. See, e.g., Bert Black, A New Metaphorfor Clarifying
the Difference Between Cause-in-Factand Proximate Cause, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 159, 160
(2000) (arguing that the "causal chain" metaphor in torts fails to "really capture[] enough about the
causation concept to enable us properly to distinguish between cause in fact and proximate cause,"
and proposing the replacement metaphor of "infinite web analysis" that "encompasses the causal
chain analysis," as well as "complexities that you ... would not capture with just the traditional
causal chain analysis," such as "alternative causal pathway[s]").
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from the Cartesian coordinate plane metaphor that Professor Patricia
Youngblood first proposed in 1986.68 Building on Professor Youngblood's
work, a combination of Venn diagrams 69 and Cartesian planes 70 allows us to
68. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 1.
69. John Venn, a Cambridge-trained mathematician and scholar, introduced diagrams to
graphically represent sets and set operations in a scholarly article. John Venn, On the Diagrammatic
and MechanicalRepresentation of Propositionsand Reasoning, 9 LONDON, EDINBURG, & DUBLIN
PHILOSOPHICAL MAG. & J. OF SCI. 1 (1880); see J. VENN, SYMBOLIC LOGIC (1881). The term
"Venn diagram" appears to have come into use to describe these representations in 1918. See
CLARENCE IRVING LEWIS, A SURVEY OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC (1918). In a Venn diagram, each diagram
begins with a bounded rectangular field representing a universe-a collection of all possibilities with a
defined subject. Defined subsets of the universe are represented within the bounds of circles
delineating the operation of a rule that differentiates the members of the subset from the universe as
well as from other defined subsets. When defined subsets share members, the circle boundaries
overlap
to create a domain
of shared members
called
an
intersection. See
http://infinity.sequoias.cc.ca.us/faculty/woodbury/stats/Tutoria/sets-Venn2.htm (last visited August
1, 2002). Venn diagrams are frequently called upon to illustrate the validity of categorical syllogisms
(i.e., an argument with two categorical propositions for syllogisms and one categorical proposition as
the
conclusion).
See
http://sask.usask.ca/-wiebeb/Venn2.html
and
http://sask.usask.ca/-wiebeb/syllogism.html (last visited August 1, 2002). In this Article, Venn
diagrams serve a purpose with more emphasis on understanding abstract categorical concepts and
less emphasis on mathematical rigor.
70. "The Cartesian plane, named after the mathematician Rene Descartes (1596-1650), is a
plane with a rectangular coordinate system that associates each point in the plane with a pair of
numbers."
http://www.uncwil.edu/courses/mat1 lhb/functions/coordinates/coordinates.html (last
visited June 22, 2002). The Cartesian plane provides a geometric way of viewing data based on two
variables; it is a geometric picture of the operation of two variables in a function.
http://www.svsu.edu/-hyahmad/HTML/Classes/M125/AlgRev Ch4.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2003).
Youngblood's use of the Cartesian coordinate plane is another example of metaphor, demonstrating
that the relationship between the level of contacts and the connectedness to the cause of action can be
portrayed in the manner of quadratic equations. See Youngblood, supra note 27, at 1. Descartes, as
noted by Professor Hibbits, also employed visual metaphors in his scholarship:
Descartes pointedly analogized vision and thought: "We shall learn how to employ our
mental intuition by comparing it with the way that we employ our eyes." A child of the
black and white printed text rather than of the colorful iconographic manuscript, Descartes
was more interested in the discmbodied "mind's eye" of the imagination than in the
physical perception of images, but he regarded cogitation as a "seeing" notwithstanding.
Hibbits, supra note 55 at 255. Other legal writers have turned to the Cartesian plane to produce a
graphic metaphor of the operation of legal rules or legal process. See, e.g., Clark A. Remington,
Llewellyn, Antiformalism and the Fear of TranscendentalNonsense: Codifying the Variability Rule
in the Law of Sales, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 29, 53-54 (1998) (using Cartesian plane as metaphor for
critiquing formalist approach to law codification as failing to recognize "that something that can be
quite clearly grasped by thinking outside the system must necessarily be reducible to a simple rule of
the sort that we find within the system"); Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1999 Term, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543, 625-26 (1999) (using Cartesian coordinates to map
"[rielationships between two Justices' voting records"); Jeffrey O'Connell & Christopher Pohl, How
Reliable is Medical Malpractice Law? A Review of "Medical Malpractice and the American Jury:
Confronting the Myths About Jury Incompetence, Deep Pockets, and Outrageous Damage Awards"
By Neil Vidmar, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 359 (1997) (examining which of two Cartesian "metaphors most
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visualize the court-access rules as metaphors for the litigation event that they
describe and demonstrates that the rules operate as applied metaphors for the
principles. The impact of this metaphoric relationship clearly demonstrates
that the FNC rule is not derivable from the controlling principles and,
therefore, as currently conceptualized, produces unprincipled results that fall
outside of the Dworkinian principle-rule perspective of the litigation event.
The purpose of Part III is threefold: to demonstrate that the FNC rule has no
legitimacy as it is currently conceptualized because it emanates from no
principle; to establish that an FNC-based dismissal of any international
product-injury plaintiff lawsuit brought in a home forum of a MNC defendant
is impermissible; and to create a framework reconceptualizing FNC into a rule
that emanates from the relevant corrective justice and enterprise regulation
principle.
Having established that the relevant Dworkinian principles do not provide
a logical justification for the FNC rule, I use Part V to delineate a new rule
that is consonant with Dworkinian principles. To reflect the change in
emphasis as a result of reconceptualization, the new rule's purpose is
"preservation of court access." With product-injury cases filed in federal
court by international plaintiffs against U.S.-based MNCs as a touchstone, the
new preservation-of-court-access rule is articulated as a set of presumptions to
reposition it within the domain of rules justified by the corrective justice and
enterprise regulation principles. Accordingly, these presumptions mirror the
presumptions arising from Youngblood's Cartesian metaphor for personal and
legislative jurisdiction. 71 In addition, these presumptions assist in the
realization, rather than the frustration, of corrective justice and enterprise
regulation by imposing liability on those MNCs who create nonreciprocal
risks eventuating in injury to persons and their property. Part V concludes by
examining several case studies in which courts applied the FNC rule to
dismiss product-injury lawsuits initiated in American courts by foreign
plaintiffs. After critiquing the application of the FNC rule in early cases, I
demonstrate how application of the new preservation-of-court-access rule
produces outcomes in harmony with the controlling principles.
aptly describes the chief characteristics of medical malpractice litigation"); Manuel A. Utset, Back to
School with Coase: The Production of Information and Modes of Knowledge Within and Across
Academic Disciplines, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1063, 1070 n.28 (1995) (citing "techniques for formalizing
relations, manipulating them algebraically, and picturing them in Cartesian and post-Cartesian
planes" as among "modes of knowledge that.., are important within an academic discipline, but
which can also be useful when transferred across disciplines"). For a free adaptation of a Cartesianlike graphic metaphor to illustrate conceptual relationships (eg., the relationship of right and justice
in Kant's legal theory) see George. P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 533, 553 n.86 (1987).
71. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 6-7.
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IV. THE DWORKINIAN CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND ENTERPRISE REGULATION
PRINCIPLES AS THE TARGET DOMAIN FOR THE LITIGATION EVENT METAPHOR
A. Defining the Target Domain Through the NonreciprocalRisk Model of the
Corrective Justice Principle in Tort Law
Just as the instrumentalism in the court's use of FNC has tended to
obscure the more significant concepts of the court-access rules (particularly
personal and legislative jurisdiction), so too has instrumentalism obscured the
principles underpinning product-injury law to such a degree that there is little
recognition of the policy failure in sending international plaintiffs away from
the "backyard" of a tortfeasing MNC.72 Yet, there is an intellectual failing in
that approach-the failure to recognize product injury law is best explained
through the doctrine of nonreciprocal risks as first articulated by Professor
Fletcher.73 The nonreciprocal risk articulation of corrective justice focuses on
injured persons who are not in as good a position to protect themselves from
risk as the tortfeasor is to protect them from it:
Fletcher's rhetoric is uncommonly satisfying not just for its simplicity,
but also for its focus on the vulnerability of the injured parties.
Fletcher primarily invoked John Rawls' first principle of justice that
"we all have the right to the maximum amount of security compatible
with a like security for everyone else." Fletcher refused to sanction
individuals who "knowingly and voluntarily create risks without
responsibility for the harm they might cause." In his words, an

72. The distance between much of what has become "modem" tort theory and the practice of
tort law is disturbing because tort law approaches incoherence when theory and practice are
disjoined. "The interaction of these two factors-theory and practice-determines the effectiveness of
the system. Both are essential. Tort practice frames the issues that tort theory must address. In turn,
tort theory provides tort practice with a common culture and vocabulary." Catharine Pierce Wells, A
PragmaticApproach to Improving Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1447, 1461-62 (2001).

73. Professor Paula Johnson clearly sees such nonreciprocal risks in the tobacco products
exported by U.S.-based MNCs to developing countries:
[T]he mass marketing of tobacco products by United States-based companies constitutes an
immediate and pervasive threat to the health of Third World peoples. American tobacco
companies have expanded into the Third World in order to maintain the profitability of
tobacco products. Much of their promotional activity is conducted in the absence of
regulations requiring health warning labels or advertising restrictions, in contrast to the
comprehensive legislative proscriptions in the United States. Most importantly, many of
the affected Third World countries are unable to regulate the activities of multinational
corporations within their borders.
Paula C. Johnson, supra note 9, at 78 (footnotes omitted).
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individual "cannot fairly be expected to suffer ...in the name of a
utilitarian calculus. 74
Effecting an FNC-based dismissal against an international plaintiff and in
favor of a MNC simply imposes a second nonreciprocal risk on the plaintiffthis time, one of procedural rather than physical harm, and ultimately one of
substantial economic harm. Such a victim of FNC is effectively denied access
to the legal system whose charge is to alleviate the effect of the nonreciprocal
risk by the surrogacy of legal remedies. Viewing product injury law from the
perspective of nonreciprocal risk shows that the principles underlying
substantive tort law are the same principles that underlie court-access rulesand the same principles which FNC, as currently applied, subverts.
Using a Dworkinian approach, I will describe each of these principles in
turn, and defend their implication from both the American legal "system's
institutional history" as well as from the "moral justification" approach in the
Dworkinian sense of fairness.
1. The Corrective Justice Principle Illuminated: Compensation for Harm
Caused by Imposing Nonreciprocal Risks
The concept of nonreciprocal risks is a particular expression of the
broader tort-law rationale commonly referred to as "corrective justice., 75 The
74. Walter M. Rogers, "[lit's All Right To Kill People, But Not Trees": Landowners of
Environmentally Unsafe Properties Must be Held Strictly Liable for Personal Injuries Caused by
Their ContaminatedLand, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 934 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
75. David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First
Principles,68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 434 (1993) ("[m]ost valuable moral theorizing on tort law
in recent years has examined the problems of accident law from the perspective of some form of
'corrective justice'); Andrew R. Klein, Fear of Diseaseand the Puzzle of Futures Cases in Tort, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 986 n.103 (2002). Professor Klein quotes Professor Simons's "succinct"
survey of the diversity of theory encompassed within the "corrective justice" concept:
Jules Coleman thinks that corrective justice involves undoing wrongful gains and wrongful
losses, though he gives a non-obvious, technical meaning to "wrongful." Ernest Weinrib
defines corrective justice as the obligation of a negligent "doer" to respect the equality of
the victimized "sufferer." Richard Epstein, prior to becoming a born-again utilitarian,
defined corrective justice as one of several paradigmatic forms of causal liability. George
Fletcher defines corrective justice as liability for imposing nonreciprocal risks. Catherine
[sic] Wells argues that corrective justice entails providing a fair adjudicative process to
determine whether the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff's loss. And Richard Posner,
bless his heart, reaches the felicitous conclusion that "corrective injustice" is just another
way of saying "maximize social wealth."
Id.at 986 n. 103 (quoting Kenneth W. Simons, CorrectiveJustice and Liabilityfor Risk-Creation: A
Comment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 113, 126 & nn.47-53 (1990)). For one of the more illuminating
critiques of Fletcher's theory, see Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 919, 958-65 (1994).
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nonreciprocal risk model fills in the "voids" created by "[e]mpty abstractions
of corrective justice ' 76 to provide a coherent, principled basis for imposing
accountability. Professor Fletcher explained the doctrine of nonreciprocal
risks as a "paradigm[] for analyzing tort liability" on the basis of "the nature
of the victim's activity when he was injured and on the risk created by the
defendant., 77 A nonreciprocal risk arises when a tortfeasor's activities impose
risks on the victim that are of greater magnitude and have more serious
78
consequences than any risk that the victim can impose on the tortfeasor:
[The nonreciprocal risk approach] is part of a larger rationale of
liability that cuts across negligence, intentional torts, and numerous
pockets of strict liability. The general principle expressed in all of
these situations governed by diverse doctrinal standards is that a
victim has a right to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in
degree and different in order from those created by the victim and
imposed on the defendant-in short, for injuries resulting from
Cases of liability are those in which the
nonreciprocal risks.
defendant generates a disproportionate, excessive risk of harm,
relative to the victim's risk creating activity .... Conversely, cases of
nonliability are those of reciprocal risks, namely those in which the
victim and the defendant subject each other to roughly the same
degree of risk.79
Articulating the corrective justice principle in terms of imposing tort
liability upon those who harm others by creating nonreciprocal risks has its
most distinct effects in those cases "in which a socially useful activity
imposes nonreciprocal risks on those around it."' 80 Such activities include
pollution from industrial activities as well as injuries from products and
industrial activities.8' Cases in which the products or industrial activities of
MNCs injure citizens of other countries are paradigms for nonreciprocal risk
analysis. 82 In the purest of terms, the economic clout of the MNCs permits
76. Owen, supra note 75, at 435 n.21. These are the terms in which Professor Owen has
criticized much of the corrective justice scholarship.
77. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility, supra note 3, at 540.
78. Id. at 537; Fletcher, Corrective Justice,supra note 3, at 1658.
79. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility, supra note 3, at 542.
80. Id. at 569.
81. Id. at 569-70; see, e.g., Alfred Avins, Absolute Liability for Oil Spillage, 36 BROOK. L.
REV. 359 (1970); William F. Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 50-53 (1968).
82. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
CorporateTorts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991). Hansmann and Kraakman observe that:
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them to construct operations or engage in commerce in developing
countries.8 3 While the political groups in control of developing countries
benefit from the activities of MNCs, most of the non-empowered citizenry
Ate
does not. 84 Instead,
they are in the role of passive victims; they cannot do
without a product, or they cannot move away from the site in which the MNC
extracts, processes, manufactures, distributes, or stores the product. 85 Thus,
they are passive victims for having been relatively powerless in the face of

Environmental harms, such as oil spills or the release of toxic materials, are one potential
source of massive liability; hazardous products and carcinogens in the workplace are
others. At the same time, the mergers and acquisitions movement of the past decade has
converted many large corporations that were formerly publicly-traded into highly
leveraged closely-held firms; these firms, which have proportionately small net assets and
are under great pressure to maximize cash flow, have an unusually strong incentive to
engage in excessively risky behavior.
Id. at 1880-81 (emphasis added); see also Sudhir K. Chopra, Multinational Corporations in the
Aftermath of Bhopal: The Need for a New Comprehensive Global Regime for Transnational
CorporateActivity, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 235 (1994).
83. Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational
Corporationsfor Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 359, 380-82

(discussing the disproportionate influence of MNCs on the governments of host countries such "that
the [MNC] can abuse the government's citizens in peace"). Recently, in what some might see as
moves to mask the risk of their activities, MNCs have engaged in "much-trumpeted... corporate
social responsibility" by "sen[ding] scores of sociologists, anthropologists and other clipboardtouting consultants into.., villages to listen and learn from... 'stakeholders."' BP in Indonesia:
Sociologists Before Geologists?, THE ECONOMIST, June 29, 2002 at 59.

84. The MNC exploitation of Nigerian oil resources is a good example. MNCs have brought
government cooperation to exploit the country's oil resources for petroleum products with an
industry that "suppl[ies] 80 percent of [the government's] revenue." Nadine Gordimer, In Nigeria,
the Pricefor Oil is Blood, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1997, § 4, at 11 (Op-Ed). Indeed, MNCs often
become the functional government of developing countries like Nigeria. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi,
Deep in the Republic of Chevron, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 4, 1999, § 6, at 26 (discussing how MNC
employees act as politicians, diplomats and mediators to fill in for governments in "war-ravaged and
lawless places like [Nigeria,] Angola and Congo," supplying electricity and water, building roads,
bridges, schools and hospitals, all in order to contain public discontent that could erupt and interfere
with business); Paul Lewis, After NigeriaRepresses, Shell Defends its Record, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,

1996, at Al. The Nigerian legal system is torn by a conflict in fundamental legal ideology from the
British colonial heritage in the southern provinces to the spread of Islamic law-shar'ia-in the
Northern provinces. See Norimitsu Onishi, A Nigerian State Turns to the Koran for Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1999, at A4; World Briefing, Another State Adopts Islamic Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

21, 2001; Richard Dowden, Death by Stoning, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 22, 2002. See generally,
Joshua P. Eaton, Note, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation Of Transnational
Corporations,and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 261 (1997). This

creates an additional power vacuum for MNCs to fill.
85. Richard Cohen, High Claims in Spill Betray Depth of Nigerian Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.

20, 1998, at Al (chronicling injury to Nigerians by a 40,000 gallon leak from submerged oil pipeline,
the latest in a history in which, "[s]ince oil was discovered here 42 years ago by Royal Dutch/Shell,
enormous wealth has been taken from the area by Mobil, Chevron, Shell, Texaco and other Western
companies, and by Nigeria's generals, who have ruled for 28 of the last 32 years.").
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exposure to risk that they have no reasonable alternative but to face. 86 The
victims are effectively dominated by the MNC, 87 and it is this dominance that
makes choate their injury from exposure to nonreciprocal risks.88 Other
sources that create nonreciprocal risks to international plaintiffs in product
injury suits are those that arise out of the relationship of the MNC to the
victim-for example, as to product manufacturer and consumer:
Manufacturers have control over product quality and, therefore, have
specific knowledge of product conditions. Moreover, manufacturers
may be presumed to know of defective product conditions because of
their control over the production process and the availability of
detailed technical information. Consumers have no such knowledge
and are incapable of acquiring it. A consumer may use a product for
years and never have more than general knowledge about the
product's condition and its capabilities. Consumers are inherently at a
disadvantage in gaining the knowledge necessary to enable them to
make real choices.
Even if the use of a product indicates a possible problematic
condition, such use does not equate to knowledge of a possibly
defective condition. In fact, any knowledge gained would be based on
pure speculation.8 9
86. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for
Comparative Fault in ProductsLiability, 39 VILL L. REV. 281, 288 (1994) (proposing an approach
of "evaluating the failure of both individual and institutional responsibility in light of the
relationships to which they belong").
87. See, e.g., Neela Banerjee, Lawsuit Says Exxon Aided Human Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2001, at CI ("[International Labor Rights Fund] sued Exxon Mobil in... [U.S. District
Court], accusing the company of complicity in human rights abuses committed by state security
forces that protect its large natural gas field in Indonesia."); Larry Rohter, FordMotor is Linked to
Argentina's 'Dirty War,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, at A3 (discussing Argentina's federal
prosecutor's criminal complaint that Ford's Argentinean subsidiary's senior executives who
allegedly 'managed, participated in or covered up the illegal detention"' of labor leaders and other
Argentina political dissidents by agents of the military junta government (1976-83) who used Ford
factories as detention centers).
88. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. REV. 347, 355-60
(1996). Fletcher states:
Tort law also embodies the wrong of domination so far as some of its strains recognize the
right of the victim to remain passive in the face of danger. Therefore, when an aggressor
injures a plaintiff, the aggressor achieves a dominance over the victim that the law may
correct as both a crime and a tort.
Id
89. Davis, supra note 86, at 347. Similarly, the nonreciprocal risk theory demands regulation
of MNCs whose products or activities pollute the environment of international plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Rogers, supra note 74, at 893 (using Fletcher's nonreciprocal risk theory to impose liability for land
pollution).
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Similarly, MNC foreign activities in producing a product (or in exploiting
natural resources to produce a product) in the backyard of plaintiffs also pose
a variety of severe, nonreciprocal risks to those individuals. For example, the
extraction of oil in Nigeria by Exxon, Mobil, and Shell (and other entities as
these players have reconstituted themselves) produces serious nonreciprocal
risks to those who live in the area. In Nigeria, MNCs have pressured the
government to use violence and political oppression to prevent interference
with operations; the seven million residents of Nigeria's Niger River delta
"are among the poorest in the nation," yet "delta oil brings in more than 80
percent of Nigeria's hard currency"; and "environmental damage from oil
extraction has mined agriculture and fishing, but oil produces few jobs" for
the delta residents who must bear the heavy burden of the effects that the
MNCs have created. 90
Thus, precisely because "[t]he institution-individual relationship begins
with unequal knowledge," 91 MNC imposes a substantially greater risk to the
international products-injury plaintiff than any plaintiff can impose on the
MNC. The risks are, therefore, entirely nonreciprocal. 92 Moreover, it is
essential that MNCs that create such nonreciprocal risks be called to task not
only to compensate the victims, but also because "[b]y imposing liability on
politically influential tort defendants, courts may indirectly prompt
legislatures and agencies to consider the underlying cause of a class of
cases." 93 This influence is achieved by

90. Editorial, Tragedy in the NigerianDelta, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at A38.
91. Davis, supra note 86, at 348.
92. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 86, at 350 ("The plaintiff owes a responsibility to exercise care
to his or her family, possibly to an employer or employees, even to friends. On the other hand, the
plaintiff owes no responsibility to the manufacturer, certainly not about the defective condition of the
product, unless, of course, he or she knows about the condition of the product."); Robert F. Cochran,
Jr., Dangerous Products and Injured Bystanders, 81 KY. L.J. 687, 701-02 & n.74 (1992/93) ("The
concept of unreciprocated risk may justify extending strict products liability for bystander injury to
manufacturers of dangerous products that are not used by a substantial portion of the population" and
thus "Fletcher's analysis would equally apply to bystander injuries from nondefective dangerous
products," such that "users of dangerous products, who impose on bystanders an unreciprocated risk,
would absorb the costs of liability as manufacturers pass this cost on to them."); Patricia Marschall,
An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous
Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1065, 1074 (1973) (applying nonreciprocal risk theory to suggest that
strict liability should control manufacturer liability for all product injuries).
93. Fred C. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 698 (1986) (noting a dearth of
recognition of "the ways judge-made rules influence the political actions of litigants and public
regulators" and arguing that this is a significant function of the jury).
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a stopgap legal principle. A new rule temporarily imposes liability
upon a politically well-represented group. In response, the group is
expected to activate legislative or administrative attention to the social
problem underlying the cases in which the rule applies. In the long
run, the legislature or executive agency will provide a solution and
make9 4the determination of who should bear the accident costs, and
how.

This synergistic effect will be substantially diminished if FNC defeats the
international plaintiff suing the MNC for product injury.
2. The Enterprise Regulation Principle: Achieving Corrective Justice
Through the Regulation of Nonreciprocal Risks Created by MNCs
Intrumentalist policies are frequently employed to explain as well as
criticize American law governing MNC liability for product injury. These
policies are traditionally thought to include: "(1) enterprise liability (holding
the enterprise morally accountable and therefore liable for injuries caused by
' 96
its defective products), 95 (2) encouraging safety, and (3) loss-spreading. ,

94. Id.at 725-26. The European Union recognized the necessity of a vigorous and uniform law
on product liability for the MNCs doing business in Europe. Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25
July
1985,
1985
0.
J.
(L
210)
29,
available
at
http://www.dehpfacts.com/upload/documents/document42.pdf. The Directive provides that "[t]he producer shall be
liable for damage caused by a defect in his product." Id. The EU clearly recognized that product
liability law cannot achieve its goals unless there is strong and consistent regulation of Europeanbased MNCs without the distorting effect of FNC. See Anita Bernstein, L 'HarmonieDissonante:
Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European Community, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 703-04
(1991) (discussing the bases for the jurisdictional authority to issue the Directive "'as directly
affect[ing] the establishment or functioning of the common market') (quoting Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 1, 298 U.N.T.S. 11). The Directive clearly
provides such regulation without qualification. The European Parliament and the Council of the
European Union adopted the Directive, with amendments, in 1999. Directive 1999/34/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council, 10 May 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 141) 20, available at
http://archive.food.gov.uk/pdf files/consultations/papgame annexa.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2003);
see, e.g., Geriant G. Howells & Mark Mildren, Is EuropeanProducts Liability Law More Protective
Than The Restatement (Third)Of Torts: ProductsLiability?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 985 (1998); Alfred E.
Mottur, The EuropeanProducts Liability Directive: A Comparison with U.S. Law, an Analysis of its
Impact on Trade, and a Recommendation for Reform so as to Accomplish Harmonization and
ConsumerProtection,25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 983 (1994).
95. See, e.g., Howard C. Klemme, The EnterpriseLiability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L.
REV. 153, 158 (1976) ("[T]he theory of enterprise liability in torts is that losses to society created or
caused by an enterprise ...ought to be borne by that enterprise."); George L. Priest & Richard A.
Epstein, The Invention of EnterpriseLiability: A CriticalHistory of the Intellectual Foundations of
Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 527 (1985).
96. David J. Molnar, Note, Should Loss-Spreading be the ParamountPublic Policy Rationale
for the Imposition of Strict Products Liability? A Study of the Intersection ofStrict ProductsLiability
andLandlord-Tenant Law, 22 J. CORP. L. 93, 100 (1996).
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But these policies are episodic-merely corollaries of a foundational
principle. The relevant principle is sounded in the simple statement of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, that "[t]he basis for... [products injury law] is
the ancient one of the special responsibility for the safety of the public
undertaken by one who enters into the business of supplying human beings
with products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property. 9 7
The foundational theme sounded in this rule can be restated as a principle
holding accountable the creators of nonreciprocal risks by subjecting their
activities to state regulation-i.e., what I shall call98 the "enterprise regulation
99
principle."
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
98. My identification and labeling of a principle is not an art either of academic hubris or of
high-handed scholarship. As German legal scholars have done for over a century, "[pirinciples
derived from a scientific study of legal data are made to fit together in a very intricate way [and a]s
new principles are discovered they must be fully integrated into the system." MERRYMAN, supra note
43, at 63. Accordingly,
[b]ecause the components of [a] systematic restatement of the law, although theoretically
inherent in the existing positive legal order, did not exist there in identified, articulated
form, and because the legal order was a universe of data within which inherent principles
were to be identified, new concepts had to be invented to express these components and
principles.
Id. at 63-64. The principal difference between my approach and that of the civilian jurists-and it is a
fundamental difference-is that, like Dworkin, I look much more broadly for the indicia of legal
principles, unlike the civilian who "is deliberately insulated from what is going on outside, in the rest
of the culture." Id. at 65.
99. As Professor Wells has observed about the theory of nonreciprocal risks, it is an expression
of a fairness rationale:
This approach is best exemplified by the work of George Fletcher. Fletcher proceeds from
two assumptions: one, that there is a background level of reciprocal risk which we all agree
to share, and two, that the tort law will not intervene in cases where the plaintiffs injuries
were a product of this background level of risk. Thus, he argues: "A victim has a right to
recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in order from those
created by the victim and imposed on the defendant-in short for injuries resulting from
non-reciprocal risks." By rationalizing tort liability in terms of reciprocal risk, Fletcher is
able to recast the theoretical foundations of tort law from their roots in the concept of fault
to a more modem conception of fairness and equality.
One problem with Fletcher's theory, as a comprehensive theory, is that it is too
abstract to provide us with much guidance in difficult cases. This is because the concept of
reciprocity is hard to apply.... Given these difficulties in application, it.is obvious that
Fletcher's theory... cannot determine an unambiguous outcome in the vast majority of
cases. Despite this, the theory does have an impressive amount of explanatory force. It
sheds insight on the nature of negligence liability, its relationship to the variouspockets of
strict liability and the underlying values of the tort system.
Wells, supra note 72, at 1459-60 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although
Professor Fletcher originally appeared not to consider reciprocal risks analysis as applicable to
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In America's commercial system, the judiciary acts as the primary
regulator of nonreciprocal risks produced by business activity through the

device of the private tort lawsuit. 10 0 The enterprise regulation principle
reflects the challenge of discerning Dworkinian principles in practical

application to real legal problems. 10 Yet, at the same time, it also exemplifies
the effectiveness of Dworkin's approach. The enterprise regulation principle

is nothing less than a cornerstone of modem law, most of which has been
devoted to struggling with the economic and social consequences of the rise
of MNCs as a dominant force in the economy, as well as in the shaping of

contemporary culture and society. 1°2

Failing to grasp the existence or

products liability, Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility, supra note 3, at 544 n.24, 548 n.43, other scholars
have since seen it as a justification for both products liability and the broader category of products
injury cases. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION:
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 627 (4th ed. 2001) ("A
second fairness-based justification is that the manufacturer imposes a special kind of risknonreciprocal risks--on the consumer. That is, the manufacturer imposes risks on the consumer that
are quite different from any risks the consumer imposes on the manufacturer."); Marschall, supra
note 92, at 1074 (suggesting applicability of nonreciprocal risk analysis to products liability law).
And it is such a nonreciprocal risk that enterprise liability seeks to spread. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin,
Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REv. 1190, 1190 & n.2 (1996)
("[A]n enterprise has superior risk-spreading capacity compared to victims who would otherwise
bear the costs of accidents, and ... an enterprise is generally better placed to respond to the safety
incentives created by liability rules than is the party suffering harm.") (summarizing George L.
Priest, The Invention of EnterpriseLiability: A CriticalHistory of the Intellectual Foundations of
Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985)).
100. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 277-78 n.3 (1985) (describing how private enterprise creates
"threats to human health or safety that are centrally or mass-produced, broadly distributed, and
largely outside the individual risk bearer's direct understanding and control"); see, e.g., Samuel R.
Bagnestos, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1479,
1494-95 (2001); Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 1027, 1030 (1990); Kip Viscusi, Juries, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30
J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001).
101. This may explain why many write about Dworkin's views but few have attempted to
harness them to elucidate legal problems that have appeared intractable when approached from rulesbound or instrumentalist perspectives. To leave Dworkin's work in the ether, however, risks
marginalizing its true significance. The significance of a reconceptualizing jurisprudence such as
Dworkin's principle-rule concept is realized when it is transformed into active scholarship that uses it
as a starting point for solving contemporary legal problems in society. Otherwise, it risks going the
way of Wesley Hohfeld's analysis with its system of jural opposites and jural correlatives. See
WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1913). Although "'a staple of academic
literature,"' it is now viewed as an undecipherable relic, with but one "self-consciously offered...
extant example of an application of Hohfeldian analysis to an actual legal problem." MORTON J.
HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, 152-55 (1992).
102. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, There's a Forest in Those Trees: Teaching About the Role of
Corporationsin Society, 34 GA. L. REV. 1011, 1020 (2000). Greenfield argues that:
[T]he central question for corporate law scholars in the new century is this: Are there ways
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significance of the enterprise regulation principle, some scholars have argued
that a forum state does not have a strong interest in regulating the out-of10 3
forum product injuries or other extraterritorial activities of a domiciliary.
to make the economy more fair and just without ruining the great engine of commerce and
wealth creation that is the corporation? Essentially ... this is the debate we should be
having as a polity and indeed as a world economy.
Id.; Rosemary Coombe & Andrew Herman, Trademarks, Property, and Propriety: The Moral
Economy of Consumer Politics and CorporateAccountability on the World Wide Web, 50 DEPAUL
L. REV. 597, 598, 600 (2000) (seeking balance to "enormous amount of cultural power" that
intellectual property can invest in corporate communication and observing that "individuals do not
have the capacity to communicate. .. when they attempt to speak back"); Sarah Anne Engle,
Corporationsand Society: Power and Responsibility, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1243, 1245-46 (1988) (book
review) (discussing Arthur Miller's view that "the political and economic power exercised by the
corporation to influence governmental policymaking in furtherance of its private interests...
operates as an institution of private governance" and "evidence[s] ... the need to control and
democratize the corporation"). See generally Malcome J. Rogge, Towards TransnationalCorporate
Accountability in the Global Economy: Challengingthe Doctrine ofForum Non Conveniens in In re:
Union Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 299, 315 (2001) ("Through the
strategic coordination of economic activity across borders, corporate strategists take advantage of
global disparities in income, of vast differences in workplace health and safety standards, of lower
environmental standards, and of differences in the degree of respect for human rights and democratic
rights."); see generally ANTHONY SAMPSON, COMPANY MAN: THE RISE AND FALL OF CORPORATE

LIFE (1995).
103. Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction,65 TEX. L. REv. 689, 748 n.246 (1987). Stein states that:
In a case in which the product could not threaten residents of the state of manufacture,
namely manufacture for export only, a more difficult question arises. Although, as
discussed below, jurisdiction over such a case should probably be sustained on the ground
that a state may always assert authority over its citizens, justification for the state's
"regulatory interest" in such a case would be tenuous. The state's jurisdictional claim in
such a case would be based in reality on governing the out-of-state activities of its
domiciliaries rather than on regulating activity within the forum. The only object of the
regulation would be protection of persons outside the forum state, an objective normally
considered outside the state's sovereign authority.
Id. (citing Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 504 F. Supp. 514, 519 (N.D. Cal. 1980) ("California
has no interest in impairing the ability of California corporations to compete in other jurisdictions by
imposing upon them obligations to foreign residents which exceed those imposed by the foreign
jurisdictions.")); Melville v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 443 F. Supp. 1064, 1101 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
("New York has no interest in imposing more burdensome obligations on its own citizens.., in their
dealings with foreign citizens than those which are imposed by foreign states on their own domestic
transactions."), rev'd on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978). However, other courts, as
Stein notes, began recognizing early in the century the consequence to the state's citizenry of a
domestic company's misconduct abroad. See Stein, supra, at 748 n.246 (citing Sligh v. Kirkwood,
237 U.S. 52, 59-61 (1915) (upholding state statute criminalizing the export of unfit citrus on the
ground that it is within the legitimate police power of a state "to protect the people of the state," and
that the statute "preserved" the "reputation" of the state's citrus industry)). Some commentators have
asserted that "imposition" of American product liability law on "foreign transactions" to which
MNCs are a party is a form of "unwanted economic imperialism." See Litman, supra note 19, at
598-600 (discussing the arguments); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842,
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However, this view seems to be detached from the economic realities of a
state's regulation of corporate activities 10 4 in the products-injury area 1°5 as
well as inconsistent with the larger context of international trade, the modem,
global economy, and each nation's responsibility to the markets with which it
trades. 10 6 Indeed, corporate law scholars, as opposed to proponents of FNC,
maintain a theory of corporate accountability to non-shareholders as
"embodied in positive law ...or in explicit contracts."'' 0 7 Some corporate law
864, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (alleging that plaintiffs sought to have court engage in "imperialism" by
"an established sovereign inflict[ing] its rules, its standards and values on a developing nation,"
despite the fact that the defendant was the MNC that controlled the Indian subsidiary). Yet, a more
troubling economic imperialism can be discerned by a home country allowing one of its MNCs to
harm citizens of other host countries in ways that the home country would never tolerate if inflicted
on home-country citizens.
104. Stein, supra note 103, at 738-39. As Professor Stein has observed:
The allocation model recognizes the legitimacy of a sphere of state regulatory authority
independent of the defendant's intent or purpose. When the state asserts jurisdiction within
that sphere of authority, it cannot be argued that the defendant is being treated contrary to
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Id
105. Dorit F. Kressel, Successor Liability in Products Liability Litigation: Modern Judicial
Response to TraditionalCorporateRules, 4 PROD. LIAB. L.J. 211, 213-14 (1993) (discussing judicial
recognition that allowing successor corporations to use corporate law doctrines to defeat productinjury lawsuits "does not further the goals of products liability law" and recognizing pro-products
plaintiff judicial responses producing "a discernible trend in tort law-a trend which is supported by
the policies underlying modern products liability jurisprudence").
106. E.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 689 (Doggett, J., concurring)
("The doctrine of [FNC] is obsolete in a world in which markets are global" and "[w]hen a court
dismisses a case against a United States [MNC], it often removes the most effective restraint on
corporate misconduct."); Thomas 0. McGarity, Bhopal and the Export of Hazardous Technologies,
20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 333 (1985); Mark David McWilliams, Tom Sawyer's Apology: A Reevaluation of
United States Pesticide Export Policy, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 61 (1984); Note, An
Economic Approach to Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals Requested by U.S. Multinational
Corporations: The Bhopal Case, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 215 (1988); Note, Exporting
Hazardous Industries: Should American Standards Apply?, 20 INT'L L. & POL. 777 (1988); Note,
Hazardous Exportsfrom a Human Rights Perspective, 14 S.W. U. L. REV. 81 (1983); Comment, U.S.
Exports Bannedfor Domestic Use, But Exported to Third World Countries, 6 INT'L TRADE L. J. 95
(1980-81); see also Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather
FantasticFiction," 103 L.Q. REV. 398 (1987).
107. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End ofHistoryfor Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L. J. 439, 441 (2001); Cynthia A. Williams, CorporateSocial Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 713 (2002); see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 82,
at 1894 (arguing that "unlimited [tort-law] liability imposed on public shareholders can improve the
incentives of the managers who actually determine firm policy" to avoid assum[ing] too much risk).
Hansmann and Kraakman's observations about the desirable effect of unlimited tort liability for
shareholders are a corollary for the effective regulation of corporate conduct through the courts:
Why... should we expect the managers of public corporations to respond to liability
imposed on shareholders?
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scholars have proposed greater corporate accountability for tortuous riskcreating corporate activity because the corporate finances and restructuring of
the globalized era have created "an unusually strong incentive [for MNCs] to
engage in excessively risky behavior ' 0 8 that results in tortious conduct. 0 9
Regulating the tortious conduct of MNCs is a task that is suited for the home
states in which those enterprises have established their corporate existence or
homes, rather than the legal systems of developing host countries or in
international law." 10 In the sense of Dworkinian principle, the home state is

One answer is that a variety of market mechanisms press corporate managers to be
responsive to shareholder welfare as this is reflected in share prices. If shareholders faced

full liability for potential tort losses, share prices would incorporate available information
about the full extent of these possible losses. Managers, in turn, would then have as much
incentive to consider the full expected social costs of corporate torts as they now have to
weigh all other costs to the firm that shareholders presently bear as a matter of course.
Moreover, shareholders who faced contingent liability would presumably demand-and
managers as well as outside analysts would presumably supply-far more information
about the riskiness of corporate policies, precisely because this information would have
greater importance in valuing shares. This additional information, especially when it came
from market sources outside the firm, would further enhance management's incentive to
consider the tort risks associated with its policies.
Id.at 1907 (footnote omitted).
108. Examples of such risk-creating corporate behavior abound too numerous to be
conveniently catalogued. An illustrative anecdote from the recent obituary of the father of modem
ergonomics suffices to illustrate the corporate attitude that is addressed by vigorous efforts to actuate
the enterprise regulation principle:
In his 1999 autobiography... [Dr. Alphonse Chapanis] also shed light on the attitudes of
some corporate executives in the years before huge product-liability judgments. He
described a meeting in a private showroom with Lynn A. Townsend, the chairman of
Chrysler. "I was looking at a sporty model that had a steering column with a sharply
pointed tip extending an inch or two beyond the steering wheel," he wrote. "Townsend
asked me what I thought about it. My exact, or very nearly exact, words were: 'Mr.
Townsend, do you know what you've designed here? You've designed a spear aimed at the
driver's heart.' I also remember distinctly his cynical reply, 'Doc, it'll sell."'
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 82, at 1880-81.
109. Stuart Lavietes, Alphonse Chapanis Dies at 85: Was a Founder of Ergonomics, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at A25. Hansmann and Kraakman argue that:
[T]he mergers and acquisitions movement of the past decade has converted many large
corporations that were formerly publicly-traded into highly leveraged closely-held firms;
these firms, which have proportionately small net assets and are under great pressure to
maximize cash flow, have an unusually strong incentive to engage in excessively risky
behavior.
Id.They propose a regime of unlimited shareholder liability in response. Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 82, at 1880-81.
110. Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International
Law, 1983 DuKE L.J. 748, 749 (1983) (explaining that because transnational corporations (TNCs) are
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the moral epicenter of the MNCs' activities:
[MNCs] often consist of vast networks of legally separate corporations
linked by shifting ownership and contractual relations. It is often the
case that no sole human individual or corporate personality can be
held responsible for all the wrongful acts of a corporate network.
Nevertheless, it is still true that [MNCs] are wholly controlled by their
decision makers-by the people who occupy positions of authority
and power within the corporate hierarchy. Corporate directors and
managers make ethical decisions when they set policy and establish
strategic direction for the company. They make ethical decisions
when they site industrial facilities which carry high environmental or
health risks; they make ethical decisions when they choose to take
advantage of lower employment and environmental standards in
poorer countries. The corporate decision maker is not merely a
technician who applies his or her skills towards the aim of increasing
profits; he or she is also a moral agent who allocates resources and
risks in society-within and across national borders."'
The centrality of the host nation's laws and courts to the effective and
necessary regulation of MNCs was recognized early in the explosive growth
cycle of the MNC as it evolved into a pervasive economic phenomenon. For
example, in 1970, Harvard Professor Detlev Vagts argued for the centrality of
the American legal system in regulating the international activities of MNCs:
Still there is a strong, and to my mind, compelling case to be made for
a continuing American effort to keep the [MNC] under surveillance.
So long as [MNC]s are largely headquartered here and managed by
Americans, it will be the United States alone that has the capacity to
keep track of what [MNC]s are doing and the power to make them
change their practices. Abdication of that power might produce a
vacuum comparable to that in the later 1 9 th century when the federal
government was not effectively regulating interstate commerce and
the states were precluded from doing so. In such a vacuum [MNCs]
might expand following their internal dynamics without regard to their
broader impact. Pending effective international controls, which are
still a long way hence, the United States will have to continue and
even expand its control. The great challenge in this function will be to

not considered "juridical persons" under international law, international law is developing to their
exclusion, thereby making it more likely that TNCs will simply operate by ignoring the norms that
are being developed).
11. Rogge, supra note 102, at 316 (footnote omitted).
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exercise such power in a way that, although it is American-based and
will give effect to our national policies, it also will take into account
other nations' interests and appear to them to do so. This delicate feat
will involve, first, a willingness both to share and provide in a useful
form the data which we are increasingly extracting from [MNCs]. It
also will involve a willingness to explain to them1 12the purposes and
effects of our measures and to consider their views.
The moral barometer in contemporary society supporting an enterprise
regulation principle has been most publicly identified by Justice Doggett of
the Texas Supreme Court
in his 1990 concurring opinion in Dow Chemical
113
Corp. v. CastroAlfaro.
The doctrine of [FNC] is obsolete in a world in which markets are
global and in which ecologists have documented the delicate balance
of all life on this planet. The parochial perspective embodied in...
[FNC] ... ignores the reality that actions of our corporations affecting
those abroad will also affect [citizens of the corporate's forum state].
[For example,] [a]lthough [a pesticide banned in the U.S. but sold by
an MNC abroad] is banned from use within the United States, it and
other similar banned chemicals have been consumed by [forum14 state
citizens] eating foods imported from Costa Rica and elsewhere.1
112. Detlev F. Vagts, The MultinationalEnterprise:A New Challengefor TransnationalLaw,
83 HARV. L. REv. 739, 786-87 (1970) (footnote omitted). For an example of contemporary
treatment of Vagts's thesis, see, for example, Special Report, CorporateSocial Responsibility: Lots
ofIt About, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002, at 62 ("Far from being alien to government, companies
are a product of it: it was from the state that they derived the privilege of limited liability.").
113. 786 S.W.2d 674, 679 (1990) (Doggett, J., concurring). On the background and reaction to
this decision, in which the Texas Supreme Court confirmed the legislative abolition of forum non
conveniens in wrongful death and personal injury actions arising out of injury caused outside of
Texas or outside of the United States, see Marc C. Mayfield, Case note, Dow Chemical Co. v.
Alfaro: Aiding the Decline of the Alternative Forum, 14 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 213, 255 (1991) (arguing
that abolition of FNC will "bring with it a wave of litigation" and "[flailure to acknowledge the
sovereignty of foreign countries' laws and judicial systems"); Christopher M. Rossomondo, Recent
Developments, Dismissal of Suits Under Forum Non Conveniens, Dow Chemical Company v.
Alfaro, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 517 (1991) (dismissing as "premature" arguments that abandonment of
FNC will create a flood of foreign lawsuits in light of the experience of other states with significant
MNC activity but that do not apply FNC, such as Connecticut, Georgia, and Virginia); Julie M.
Saunders, Comment, Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro: The Problems with the Current
Application of Forum Non Conveniens: Is Texas' Solution a Sensible One or an Open Invitation to
the World to Bring Suit There?, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 717 (1991) (warning of the dangers that FNC
dismissals may pose in toxic tort coverage disputes because of "rationalization" and "piecemeal
litigation" and urging the adoption of public and private interest factors so that FNC analysis
addresses these problems).
114. Dow Chem. Co., 786 S.W.2d at 689 (citations omitted). Similarly, seven years before
Reyno was announced, Judge James Oakes called for a complete re-examination of whether FNC had
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This judicial perspective is also applicable to the function of product
liability and related tort law in addressing injuries caused by products or
production of products in other countries. As Professor Garvey recently
observed, although the realities of the modem economy and trading
partnerships compel the view espoused by Justice Doggett, that view is still
being resisted in many judicial quarters:
The simple proposition that U.S. companies, partnerships, or other
business entities should not be allowed under U.S. law to poison the
lands and lives of the citizens of our trading partners ought to be
compelling, and one would think it unimpeachable today with publics
sensitized to the impacts of globalization. Yet the stunted condition of
current extraterritorial regulation is stunning in relation to this
proposition. When it is understood that the legal and practical basis for
achieving much more effective 15regulation is available, the failure
appears even more confounding.
America's leadership-and even its intentions towards people in other
cultures' 6-may seriously be called into question since "the refusal by U.S.
courts ...

to assert some interest in the activities of [its] corporations

17
abroad ....confirms the nonaccountability of international businesses."'
8
Indeed, these are the very courts in whose hands the American system"

any viability in the contemporary business world "in light of the dispersion of corporate authority, as
here"-in a case involving Texaco-"by the use of the multinational subsidiaries to conduct
international business." Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 456 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting). Judges Oakes emphasized that "Texaco, Inc., has offices in New York, where its
corporate and intercorporate records, communications with [its multinational subsidiaries] and
officers are located." Id.at 457.
115. Jack I. Garvey, A New Evolution for Fast-Tracking Trade Agreements: Managing
Environmental and Labor Standards Through ExtraterritorialRegulation, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 1, 571 (2000); see, e.g., Michael A. Fallek, Trouble on the US.-Mexico Border: The
Mysterious Anencephaly Outbreak, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 287 (1996).
116. E.g., JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL 14344, 223 (1993) (arguing that FNC dismissal affirmed in the minds of MNCs and developing countries
a uniquely American legal notion to the effect that home washed their hands of supervising the
activities of their MNCs even as to MNC conduct that would surely be actionable if imposed on
home-state citizens); James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REv. 464, 465-66
(1899) (speaking of the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, Thayer notes "[hiad we appreciated
our great opportunity and been worthy of it, we... might have done more for mankind than anything
we may hope to accomplish now by taking a leading part in the politics of the world"; yet having
done so, "'[1]et not [America]... forget her precedence of teaching nations how to live."').
117. CASSELS, supranote 116, at 144.
118. Although rarely the subject of lawyerly reflection today, the underpinnings of tort law
regulation by the judiciary actually lie in eighteenth century statutes adopted by state legislatures:
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places most of the responsibility for regulating corporate 20conduct"
forcing adherence to minimum standards of social awareness.

9

and

In the debate about who should decide state tort law-legislatures or courts-a
fundamental part of legal history has been largely overlooked. State legislatures, not courts,
were the first to create state tort law. When colonies and territories became states, one of.
the first acts of state legislatures was to "receive" the Common Law of England as of a
certain date and have that provide a basis for a state's tort law. In the same piece of
legislation, called a "reception statute," state legislators delegated to state courts the
authority to develop the English Common Law in accordance with the "public policy" of
the state. These long-forgotten statutes were the basic vehicle through which legislative
power was vested in state judiciaries.
Early state legislatures delegated the task of developing tort law to state judiciaries,
because the legislatures did not have the time, or perhaps the inclination, to formulate an
extensive "tort code." They faced more extensive and pressing tasks, such as the
formulation of the very basics of a "new society."
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Illinois Tort Law: A Rich History of Cooperationand Respect Between the
Courts andthe Legislature, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 745, 746-47 (1997); see Kent Greenawalt, The Rule
of Recognition and The Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 649 (1987).
119. Some commentators have strenuously attacked tort-law regulation through the judiciary.
See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz et al., FosteringMutual Respect and Cooperation Between State Courts
and State Legislatures:A Sound Alternative to a Tort Tug of War, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2000). For
example, Schwartz observed:
Given the overarching importance of liability law, the question of who should create or
make that law-legislatures or the courts-is a critical one. Though the vast majority of tort
law has been and will continue to be decided by state courts, legislatures also have a role to
play in the development of tort law. No one branch of government should have a tort law
"monopoly." Courts and legislatures can and should work together.
Idat 2. Nevertheless, even Schwartz recognized that most tort regulation will be afforded through
judicial proceedings. In fact, Schwartz recognized this in proposing legislation to create original and
removal federal jurisdiction over interstate class-actions:
Given the complexity and high stakes that large class actions involve, it is unfair and
unwise to allow state courts free reign to adjudicate them. Interstate class actions are
excellent candidates for federal diversity jurisdiction because they implicate interstate
commerce, invite discrimination by states against outsiders, and tend to cultivate bias
against large business enterprises. They should be decided in more neutral federal forums.
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Callfor Federal
Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 486 (2000). Other
commentators have recognized the appropriateness of the judiciary taking the lead in regulating
through tort law adjudication. E.g., Philip H. Corboy et al., Illinois Courts: Vital Developers of Tort
Law as Constitutional Vanguards, Statutory Interpreters, and Common Law Adjudicators, 30 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 183 (1999).
120. Carter-Stein, supra note 19, at 191 (arguing that MNCs' arguments have "perverted the"
intent of FNC "by using the" FNC doctrine "to effectively insulate themselves from liability to
foreign plaintiffs and avoid responsibility for their conduct"). Carter-Stein emphasizes "the United
States' public policy interest in deterring the harmful conduct" of FNCs abroad. Id. at 193. She
points to the example of silicone breast implants that were implanted in foreign citizens as an
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The enterprise regulation and corrective justice principles intersect not
only to encompass domestic plaintiffs and injuries, but also to encompass
foreign plaintiffs injured abroad by American products. When American
products cause personal injury abroad, those persons who are injured have a
strong interest in suing in the U.S. forum where the corporation is either
incorporated, headquartered, or has significant operational facilities. Courts
and anti-litigation commentators often characterize such lawsuits as blatant
forum shopping. 121 These critics decry a foreign plaintiffs efforts to seek
example of "where United States corporations have significant involvement in the alleged tortuous
conduct, as evidenced in the designing, testing, and manufacturing of silicone breast implants." Id at
192; see also Martin A. Geer, Foreigners in Their Own Land: Cultural Land and Transnational
Corporations-EmergentInternationalRights and Wrongs, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 331, 335 (1998) (noting
that transnational corporations are "often unregulated in foreign host countries" where injuries to
international plaintiffs occur).
121. Friedrich Juenger, What's Wrong With Forum Shopping?, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 1, 13
(1994) (noting a "customary, almost ritualistic, condemnation of forum shopping"). Forum-shopping
is the principal pre-litigation activity of any competent litigator-and, in fact, seems obligatory in
meeting the litigator's duties to her clients. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.3
(2003); Russell J. Weintraub, Introduction to Symposium on InternationalForum Shopping, 37 TEX.
INT'L L. J. 463, 463 (2002) (observing that forum shopping "is not an activity that should be
associated with questionable ethics or doubtful legality. It is part of a lawyer's job to bring suit in the
forum that is best for the client's interests."). Much has been accomplished, at least in scholarly
circles, by Professor Juenger's writings that (before his death in 2001) probed beneath the traditional
opprobrium attached to forum-shopping to highlight its pragmatic appropriateness. E.g., Friedrich K.
Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International,63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 560-62, 570-71 (1989)
[hereinafter Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International] (discussing vindication of
international product-injury plaintiff's rights in a California federal court proceeding against the
MNC manufacturers of a commercial aircraft operated by a Turkish carrier that crashed in France)
(discussing Paris Air crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975)). Professor Juenger
pointedly noted that "[w]hen a relationship becomes litigious, failure to select an advantageous
forum may amount to malpractice, for attorneys owe a duty to vindicate their clients' rights wherever
they can expect the best results. That proposition might appear to be obvious, and so it would be but
for the nasty phrase 'forum shopping,' which suggests that those who represent their clients' interests
effectively commit a breach of professional etiquette." Id. at 572 (footnote omitted); accord THE
ATLANTIC STAR, A74 A.C. 436, 471 (noting that forum shopping merely reflects the natural chore of
the most favorable among a range of options, which "should be a matter neither for surprise nor for
indignation"). FNC encourages MNCs to "reverse forum-shop[ ]" resulting in a substantial erosion of
the enterprise regulating principle's objective to achieve corrective justice for the victims of
nonreciprocal risks "to which United States residents are accustomed." Juenger, Forum Shopping,
Domestic and International,supra, at 563; see Alan Reed, To Be Or Not To Be: The Forum Non
Conveniens Performance Acted Out on Anglo-American Courtroom Stages, 29 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 31, 73 (2000) (noting that so-called forum-shopping "can operate in a positive sphere...
promot[ing] important substantive policies, such as the protection of those injured by transnational
activities"); C.G.J. Morse, Not in the Public Interest? Lubbe v. Cape PLC, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 541,
552 (2002) (discussing House of Lord's rejection of Reyno-style "public interest factors" in the FNC
analysis because a "[c]ourt cannot allege its own convenience, or the amount of its own business, or
its distaste for trying actions which involve taking evidence in French, as a ground for refusal")
(citing Lubbe v. Cape, PLC [2002], 1 W.L.R. 1545, 1561 (H.L.) (Lord Hope) (quoting La Societe du
Gaz de Paris v. La Societe Anonyme de Navigation "Les Amateurs Francoise," 1926 SESS. CAS. 13,
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redress against an American company in America, because, the critics say, the
plaintiffs simply want to sue here under a more "generous" legal system than
the one they have at home. Of course, this misses entirely one of the principal
purposes of tort law: "to reduce conduct" that "the state, on behalf of the
community," views "as undesirable."'' 22 One of the strong rationales
supporting a system of tort law to accomplish this purpose is that of outcomeresponsibility-the concept that those who are "of full capacity and hence in a
position to control [their] behavior" are "responsible for the outcomes of our
conduct, whether act or omission."'' 23 Outcome responsibility is best allocated
in the forums in which the tortfeasor operates; there, history of litigation
becomes the most consistent set of regulation to produce changes in conduct
based on past wrongful acts or omissions. Thus, plaintiffs who are willing to
trek halfway around the world to an American courtroom to sue a MNC
corporation in tort are serving our own socio-legal goals, not merely their own
alleged avarice. Under American tort theory, imposing costs of accidents on
the best-decider (the entity who can determine whether a product's potential
defect costs should be avoided or borne and insured against) 24 obviously
works best when the best-decider is sued in the American courts that are
typically called upon to regulate the best-decider's conduct and are most
effectively positioned to do so.
B. Source Domain One: Mapping the Rules of JuridicalJurisdictionto the
Corrective Justice and EnterpriseRegulation Principlesas a Metaphorfor
Describinga Litigation Event
We continue constructing our litigation event metaphor by turning from
the principles of the "target domain" to the rules that compose the source
domains and thus establish the metaphor. The first metaphor for the litigation
event we shall examine is juridical jurisdiction. Juridical jurisdiction,
commonly called "personal jurisdiction," is that group of rules that describes
the litigation event from the perspective of the forum court's power.125 The
21 (H.L. 1925) (Lord Sumner))).
122. Tony Honore, The Morality of Tort Law: Questions and Answers, in DAVID G. OWEN,
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 76 (1995).

123. Id. at 81 (citing Tone Honore, Responsibility and Luck, 104 L.Q. REV. 530, 541, 545-46
(1988)).
124. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Testfor Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); John B. Attanasio, Aggregate Autonomy, the Difference Principle,and
the CalabresianApproach to ProductsLiability, in OWEN, supra note 122, at 302 & n. 19 (1995).
125. TEPLEY & WHITTEN, supra note 4, at 164; John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls of "Hit and Run"
History: A Critique of ProfessorBorcher's "Limited View" of Pennoyer v. Neff, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 591 (1995). As scholars have observed, the origins of modem personal jurisdiction doctrine are
rooted in "the concept that governments had territorialpower over persons and things within their
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power in question is that "of [a] state [to try] in its court a case with which it
has no adequate relationship.' ' 126 The classic expression of state power is the
minimum contacts rules articulated in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.127 Those rules are based on the internal structure of the litigation
event-they describe a fixed number of scenarios based on an internal

boundaries." TEPLEY & WHITTEN, supra note 4, at 125. This is reflected in the most famous
personal jurisdiction opinion of them all, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1978). See Adrian M.
Tocklin, Pennoyer v. Neff: The Hidden Agenda of Stephen J Field, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 75
(1997). Although articulating a rule in Pennoyer,Justice Field made it clear that his "territorial rule"
is based on the enterprise regulation principle:
To prevent any misapplication of the view expressed in this opinion, it is proper to observe
that we do not mean to assert, by anything we have said, that a State may not authorize
proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non resident ....The
jurisdiction which every State possesses to determine the civil status and capacities of all
its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe the conditions on which proceedings
affecting them may be commenced and carried on ....Nor do we doubt that a State, on
creating corporations or other institutions for pecuniary or charitable purposes, may
provide a mode in which their conduct may be investigated, their obligations enforced, or
their charters revoked ....
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-35.
The American model of personal jurisdiction that arose with Pennoyer has come under attack
from numerous scholars, particularly on the constitutionalization of personal jurisdiction doctrine. It
is true that the doctrine is less than perfect, and that the Supreme Court's struggle to articulate
workable common-law jurisdictional rules has left analytic holes and excessive judicial intervention
due to the heavily factual nature of the multi-factored legal tests that courts employ. However,
efforts to separate personal jurisdiction from the regulatory powers of the state, as much of the
scholarship in this area of late has been devoted to attempting, is misplaced. For example, some
commentators see Pennoyer's influence differently-as undermining rather than strengthening
personal jurisdiction law by placing the defendant's in forum physical presence in a posture of
primacy. Harold L. Kom, Rethinking PersonalJurisdictionand Choice of Law in Multistate Mass
Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183, 2190-92 (1997). In terms of defendants located outside of the
forum, this is certainly true, but that observation is insufficient to undermine the territorial personal
jurisdiction. To the contrary, the territorial principle still has validity for if it is not the defendant's
contacts that justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction, then it may be the plaintiffs contacts-i.e.,
residence in and injury in the state-that give rise to the kinds of regulatory interests that justify
application of jurisdiction and substantive law. Pennoyer and the sovcrcignty model of personal
jurisdiction continue to be the theoretical underpinning that justifies the core of most assertions of
jurisdiction by state courts. Arthur M. Weisburd, TerritorialAuthority and PersonalJurisdiction,63
WASH. U. L.Q. 377 (1985) (arguing that, because assertions of jurisdiction are exercises of
sovereignty, limits on judicial power must be derived from limits on the sovereignty of the states);
Stewart Jay, 'Minimum Contacts' as a Unified Theory of PersonalJurisdiction: A Reappraisal,59
N.C.L. REV. 429, 434, 473 (1981) (InternationalShoe is neither an exception to nor an overruling of
Pennoyer, but is "representative of a different basis for approaching jurisdiction."). But see Harold
S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the
Jurisprudenceof PersonalJurisdiction,58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 735-36 (1983) (criticizing the
role of sovereignty and state interests in personal jurisdiction doctrine).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24 (1971).
127. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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structure composed of facts about the defendant, the litigation, and the
forum. 128 The relationship among this triumvirate of variables is created by
the common intersection at their domains, as illustrated by Diagram 2.
DIAGRAM 2: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON PERSONAL129
JURISDICTION: THE DOMAIN OF MINIMUM CONTACTS

Significant contact or aggregation of contacts.

128. Id. at317-18.
129. See Id.; Youngblood, supra note 27, at 3-11.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[87:425

The intersection of the three fact domains in a common domain of
overlapping operative facts produces a subset of "minimum contact" facts that
create a litigation event and have significance for the operation of juridical
As Professor Youngblood pointed out in 1986,
jurisdiction rules.
International Shoe "identified two jurisdictional variables of primary
relevance" that function as the basis for the minimum contacts rules: (1) "the
quantity or frequency of the defendant's forum acts" which "distinguishes
continuous and systematic forum contacts from single or occasional forum
these acts bear to the cause of action upon
contacts"; and (2) "the relationship
30
which the plaintiff sues."
There are four possible combinations to describe the litigation event using
these variables, as Youngblood illustrated using the graphic metaphor of the
Cartesian coordinate plane represented in Diagram 3. Diagram 4 illustrates
that each of the four quadrants of Youngblood's Cartesian metaphor is an
archtypical litigation event to which one of the four general rules articulated
in the InternationalShoe opinion directly corresponds.

130. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 5.
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DIAGRAM 3: CARTESIAN METAPHOR FOR SOURCE DOMAIN ONE:
PERSONAL JURISDICTION RULES:' 3 1

CAUSE OF ACTION

UNCONNECTED

CONNECTED

f-I)

c-

0

Quadrant I

Quadrant III

Continuous & Systematic
Contact

Continuous & Systematic
Contact (Quantity Focus)

z0

&

&

-

Connected
Action

Cause

of

Cause
Unconnected
Action (Quality Focus)

of

U

z

Quadrant II

Quadrant IV

Occasional
or
Single
Contact (Quality Focus)

Single or Occasional Contact
&

&

0<
c-.i

of
Cause
Connected
Action (Quality Focus)

131. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 6.
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DIAGRAM 4: DETAILED CARTESIAN METAPHOR FOR SOURCE
DOMAIN ONE: PERSONAL JURISDICTION-CORRELATION
WITH
32
INTERNA TIONAL SHOE:
CAUSE OF ACTION
CONNECTED

UNCONNECTED

Quadrant I

Quadrant III

Continuous
&
Systematic
Contacts & Connected Cause of
Action

Continuous
&
Systematic
Contacts (Quantity Focus) &
Unconnected Cause of Action
(Quality Focus)
"[T]here have been instances in
which the continuous corporate
operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities."
326 U.S. at 318.

"'Presence' in the state ... has
never been doubted when the
activities of the corporation
there have not only been
continuous and systematic, but
also give rise to the liabilities
sued on.. . ."326 U.S. at 317.

Quadrant II

Quadrant IV

Single or Occasional Contact
(Quality) & Connected Cause
of Action (Quality Focus)

Single or Occasional Contact &
Unconnected Cause of Action
"Conversely it has
been
generally recognized that the
casual presence of the corporate
agent or even his conduct of
single or isolated items of
activities in a state in the
corporation's behalf are not
enough to subject it to suit on
causes of action unconnected
with the activities there." 326
U.S. at 317.

"[T]he commission of some
single or occasional acts . . .
because of their nature and
quality and the circumstances
of their commission, may be
deemed sufficient to render the
corporation liable to suit." 326
U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).

132. Correlation legend between quadrants and rules as stated in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Youngblood notes that litigation events in Quadrants I or IV "compel...
a particular conclusion" about whether the litigation event falls within the
rules of juridical jurisdiction. 33 By contrast, she observes that litigation
events within Quadrant II or III sit in gray areas of the rules:
[T]here exists one supporting and one debilitating jurisdictional factor.
In Quadrant II cases, involving single or occasional acts and a cause of
action connected to those acts, the propriety of the jurisdictional
exercise will depend upon the quality of the defendant's forum acts.
In Quadrant III, the constitutional propriety of a jurisdictional
exercise... depends upon the quantity of the defendant's forum
[connections]. 134
Significantly, an examination of quantity of contacts in Quadrant III is
abbreviated and confirms a conclusion of juridical jurisdiction where a
corporate defendant is incorporated in the forum, makes its headquarters in
the forum, or "does"-rather than merely "transacts"--"business" in the
forum.'

35

Youngblood's graphic metaphor of the litigation event as rules of

133. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 7.
134. Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
135. International Shoe instructs us that Quadrant III analysis becomes transformed into a
conclusion of general jurisdiction when corporate activities become "so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities." Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 3 18. Doing-business-general jurisdiction exists when the forum
state has "a regulatory relationship with the defendant sufficient to justify jurisdiction over any and
all claims." Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction,2001
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 171, 172, 205 (2001). Professor Twitchell notes that "doing business"
jurisdiction is a form of general personal jurisdiction that applies when "the state would be justified
in deciding a claim that is wholly unrelated to the defendant's forum contacts." Id. at 172. General
jurisdiction clearly applies to the forum states in which a corporate defendant is either incorporated
or has its principal place of business. Id. at 171-72. Professor Sarah Cebik has tied general
jurisdiction over corporate defendants to sovereign interests in regulating the conduct of a
corporation which it incorporated, which develops corporate policy within the forum (i.e.,
headquarters or autonomous branch office functions), or which conducts "core activities" in the
forum. Sarah R. Cebik, A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma: General Personal
Jurisdictionand Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 33, 36, 40 (1998). This is
another way of saying that general jurisdiction based upon any of the three factual bundles present in
a litigation event is most persuasively supported by the enterprise regulation principle that I have
discussed, supra, at notes 49-51 and accompanying text. As Professor Cebik describes it, "an
'interest' in the defendant [sufficient for general jurisdiction] is legitimate if the state would have a
reason to be concerned about the rights and duties of the defendant under any circumstances." Id. at
33. For other views of the scope and application of the general jurisdiction rule see, for example,
Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141
(2001); Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at GeneralJurisdiction,66 TEX. L. REV. 723 (1988);
Stein, supra note 103, at 722, 741, 758 (finding close connection between "doing business" general
jurisdiction and the most significant interest test for applying forum law).
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juridical jurisdiction is firmly rooted at the level of principle. 136 Indeed, each
of the rules depicted by the four Quadrants directly corresponds to the
37
interaction of the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles.

136. Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990), implicitly recognized the significance of the
enterprise regulation principle for the rules ofjuridical jurisdiction:
[A] totality of the circumstances test... guarantee[s] what traditional territorial rules of
jurisdiction were designed precisely to avoid: uncertainty and litigation over the
preliminary issue of the forum's competence. It may be that those evils, necessarily
accompanying a freestanding "reasonableness" inquiry, must be accepted at the margins,
when we evaluate nontraditional forms ofjurisdiction newly adopted by the States .... But
that is no reason for injecting them into the core of our American practice, exposing to such
a "reasonableness" inquiry the ground of jurisdiction that has hitherto been considered the
very baseline of reasonableness, physical presence.
Id. at 626-27 (citations omitted). The physical presence of the defendant in a forum that forms "the
very baseline of reasonableness" (to use language of personal jurisdiction) explains the power of the
finding that a defendant is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the forum. Id. at 627. Assignment of
a "litigation event" to the rule of Quadrants I, II or III and satisfaction of that rule is more than a
conclusion that a court is empowered to hear a particular dispute. It is also a finding that the state's
substantive law may regulate the actions of the parties. The stronger the case for personal
jurisdiction, the stronger the case for applying the forum state's law. Youngblood, supra note 27, at
50-51; James Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872 (1980);
Courtland H. Peterson, Proposals of Marriage Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 U.C.
DAVIS. L. REV. 869 (1981). Indeed, as Professor Youngblood has observed, there are "myriad
values of linking judicial and legislative jurisdiction." Youngblood, supra note 27, at 38. As
Professor Korn has observed, "[I]n the United States.... the permissible extrastate's reach of each
state's law is circumscribed by federal constitutional limitations-analogous to those governing the
reach of its juridical jurisdiction-commonly referred to as constraints on each state's 'legislative
jurisdiction."' Korn, supra note 125, at 2196. Professor Stein has defined legislative jurisdiction as
"[t]he sphere of a state's substantive rule making authority" and notes that legislative jurisdiction "is
tied to its interest in regulating activity within its borders." Stein, supra note 103, at 742. The
common theoretical underpinnings between personal jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction in the
area of tort law are the subject of the next subsection.
137. In this sense, personal jurisdiction doctrine leads cleanly to an underlying observation that
connects personal jurisdiction to regulatory power via the due process clause. Indeed, "a forum's
assertion of jurisdiction constitute[s] the imposition of its sovereign's regulatory machinery." See,
e.g., Philip F. Cramer, Note, Constructing Alternative Avenues of Jurisdictional Protection:
Bypassing Burnham's Roadblock Via § 1404(A), 53 VAND. L. REV. 311, 325 (2000) (discussing "a
unified theory of jurisdiction based on the idea of jurisdiction as not place but rather the imposition
of a regulatory regime"); Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial
Jurisdictionand Choice ofLaw, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 273-76 (1991); see also Stein, supra note
103; Weisburd, supra note 125 (arguing that, because assertions of jurisdiction are exercises of
sovereignty, limits on judicial power must be derived from limits on the sovereignty of the states);
Harry B. Cummins, Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in
Product Liability Actions, 63 MicH. L. REV. 1028 (1965). This "unified standard for both general
and specific jurisdiction not only recognizes that imposition of the appropriate regulatory regime
should be the real issue, but it also acknowledges the merging of choice of jurisdiction with choice of
law." Cramer, supra, at 334. Included in this "machinery" is the substantive law (including choice of
law rules) that implement the state's legislative policies-the very fabric that controls the conduct of
the state's individual and corporate citizens. Professor Heiser has effectively summarized this
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That correspondence is effectively illustrated by Diagram 5, which combines
graphic metaphors. The common subset of litigation events encompassing
each litigation event that falls within the domains of both the corrective justice
and enterprise regulation principles and therefore correspond to Quadrant I
rules. Litigation events within the domain of the corrective justice principle
but outside of the enterprise regulation principle's domain map to Quadrant
IV rules of juridical jurisdiction-i.e., there is a wrong, but the forum in
question cannot adjudicate or remedy the wrong. Significantly, the two "gray
area" litigation events described by Quadrant II and III rules of juridical
jurisdiction sit on the limbs of intersection between the domain of the
corrective justice and the enterprise regulation principles.

relationship as the natural implication of the multi-branch system of government in the American
model:
[T]he assertion of personal jurisdiction is not merely the assertion of the right to decide a
case between the parties at a given geographical location. Rather, as Maier and McCoy
explain, the selection of the forum is the selection of an "entire decision-making regime."
Constitutional controls on personal jurisdiction, Maier and McCoy astutely observe,
"determine the legitimacy of the forum as a decision maker and thus the legitimacy of
imposing that forum's policy choices" on the parties. What is at stake in the constitutional
restriction on personal jurisdiction is whether it is unfair for the forum to select and apply
the legal policies that will govern the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant
as to the cause of action. Convenience in terms of geographic location is not much of a
concern, and will be increasingly less so as technology makes interstate litigation even
easier than it already is.
Walter W. Heiser, A "Minimum Interest" Approach to PersonalJurisdiction,35 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 915, 936-37 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
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DIAGRAM 5: CONCEPTUALIZATION OF LITIGATION EVENTS AS
PRINCIPLES MAPPED TO JURIDICAL JURISDICTION RULES
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Operative facts of litigation events fall within domain of
Corrective-Justice Principle, but outside domain of EnterpriseRegulation Principle-Maps to Cartesian (Quadrant IV).

~

Operative facts of litigation events fall within domain of both
Corrective-Justice and Enterprise-Regulation principlesMaps to Cartesian (Quadrant I).

Falls on limb of intersection between domains of Enterprise
X
Regulation and Corrective-Justice principles-May fall
loutside Enterprise-Regulation Principle Domain depending
on (1) Quality and/or (2) Quantity of minimum contacts
(Quadrants II and III).

As limb-dwellers, those litigation events in Quadrants II or III may fall either
inside the common domain of the two principles1 38 or outside of the common
domain and solely within the corrective justice principle's domain.
Assignment of a "litigation event" to the rule of Quadrants I, II, or III and
satisfaction of that rule is more than a conclusion that a court is empowered to

138. The personal jurisdiction rules of International Shoe already imbed a shorthand FNC
analysis-not as elaborate as the Gilbert factors but directed at the same kind of facts. See DuvalMajor, supra note 13 at 664-65 & nn.105-20; Stewart, supra note 26, at 1266 n.23-117; Stein, supra
note 4, at 803-05 & nn.88-92. As to Quadrant III cases where corporations are sued in a home state,
however, Chief Justice Stone clearly assumed that no FNC-type analysis would apply when a
corporation was sued where it resides. An "'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to
the corporation form from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of business is relevant" to
determine whether the demand the court makes based on the defendant's contacts with the forum
"make it reasonable.., to require the corporation to defend the particular suit" in the forum. Int'l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. Indeed, it is quite plausible that the convenience factors were not meant to
come into play when minimum contacts are established in Quadrants I1and III. To the contrary, the
convenience factors do not "short-circuit" the exercise of personal jurisdiction in cases where there
are minimum contacts. The convenience factors merely function as a means of articulating why a
Quadrant II or III case that does not present sufficient forum contacts not be dismissed because such
cases fall outside of the domain illustrated in Diagram 2, supra. So complete is the analysis under
the convenience branch that Professer Heiser observes that sufficient minimum contacts for
sovereignty purposes generally guarantee that there will be no "manifest and grave" inconvenience,
and that the convenience branch analysis effectively renders the FNC analysis moot: "In light of the
current level of communication and litigation technology, such due process violations should rarely
occur. Inconvenience to the defendant should only be sufficient to defeat personal jurisdiction on an
individualized basis, but does not provide justification for broad invalidating rules such as 'minimum
contacts."' Heiser, supra note 137, at 935-36.
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hear a particular dispute. It is also a finding that the state's substantive law
may regulate the actions of the parties. The stronger the case for personal
139
jurisdiction, the stronger the case for applying the forum state's law.
Indeed, as Professor Youngblood has observed, there are "myriad values of
linking judicial and legislative jurisdiction." 140 For example, as Professor
Kom has observed, "[i]n the United States... the permissible extrastate reach
of each state's law is circumscribed by federal constitutional limitationsanalogous to those governing the reach of its judical jurisdiction-commonly
141
referred to as constraints on each state's "legislative jurisdiction.,
Professor Stein has defined legislative jurisdiction as "[t]he sphere of a state's
substantive rule making authority, its 'legislative jurisdiction,"' and notes that
legislative jurisdiction "is tied to its interest in regulating activity within its
borders., 142 The coterminous underpinnings of personal jurisdiction and
legislative jurisdiction in the area of tort law is the subject of the next
subsection.
C. Source Domain Two: Mapping the Rules of Legislative Jurisdictionto the
CorrectiveJustice andEnterpriseRegulation Principles as a Metaphorfor
Describinga Litigation Event
Legislative jurisdiction is the second "rules" metaphor for the litigation
event that we shall examine from the perspective of the target domain's
principles. Legislative jurisdiction is that group of rules that describe a
litigation event from the perspective of the forum legislative power. The
power in question is that of a forum state to require its courts to apply the
1 43
positive law of that state to a litigation event brought to its court system.
The relationship between personal jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction has
been generally recognized by a number of scholars, including Professors
Martin, 144 Brilmayer, 145 and Youngblood.146

More specifically, Professor

Stein has described the link between the theoretical underpinnings of personal
jurisdiction and of legislative jurisdiction in the tort area as rooted in "[e]arly

139. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 50-5 1; Martin, supra note 136, at 872; Peterson, supra note
136.
140. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 38.
141. Kom, supra note 125, at 2196.
142. Stein, supra note 103, at 742.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 9 (1971).
144. Martin, supra note 136, at 872-73.
145. Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State-Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REv. 77, 86 ("[F]orum contacts that are related to the dispute are exactly
those already defined as a proper subject for regulation under the applicable substantive law.").
146. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 37-51.
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conceptions of the legitimacy of jurisdiction" that rest "on tort-like
justifications.' 4 7 In short, "jurisdiction was justified when it would advance a
' 48
legitimate state interest in maintaining public health, safety, or welfare"' _
the classic triumvirate of the state's police powers. 149 The regulatory function
served by personal jurisdiction in torts cases "is based on a public ordering
imposed on individuals by the state to prevent or redress injury" and "is
considered fair when it appropriately balances the implicated public policies
and the autonomy of the tortfeasor."' 5 ° Thus, the contacts between the state
and the defendant that relate to the regulatory function of the state should be
the most important in the analysis of personal jurisdiction.' 5 '
It is Professor Youngblood's analysis, however, that is most illuminating,
147. Stein, supra note 103, at 691-92.
148. Id.at 691-92.
149. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Comment, Compelling Governmental Interest
Jurisprudenceof the Burger Court: A New Perspective on Roe v. Wade, 50 ALB. L. REV. 675, 699706 & nn. 117-18 (1986); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, ConstitutionalizingRoe, Casey, and Carhart: A DueProcess Anti-Discrimination Principle to Give Constitutional Content to the "Undue Burden"
Standard of Review Applied to Abortion Control Legislation, 10 S. CAL. REv. L. & WoMEN'S STUD.
211 (2001).
150. Stein, supra note 103, at 691. Professor Stein criticizes personal jurisdiction doctrine for
having been diverted from its regulatory moorings to a model of individualized fairness that obscures
the important original function of allocating sovereign authority. Stein, supra note 103, at 691. "The
focus of argument in personal jurisdiction thus has changed from reliance on public regulatory
justifications to consideration of how the defendant and forum state have consensually ordered their
relationship. This privatization mirrors the transformation of due process from an instrument of
federalism to a guarantee of individual fairness." Stein, supra note 103, at 691-92.
151. Stein, supra note 103, at 738. Professor Stein's comments intimate that a regulatory
principle-like rationale contributes to comprehension of the rules for juridical jurisdiction:
The appropriate sphere of state authority should be defined without evaluating whether the
state, as a private actor, is entitled to enforce a contractual or quasi-contractual obligation
with the defendant. Instead, the reach of the state's authority should be defined by the
allocation of authority between sovereigns. Within a state's territory-its proper regulatory
sphere-it need not ask an individual's permission to act as sovereign, or pay compensation
for the burdens of citizenship.
The recognition that jurisdiction should be evaluated by reference to the state's
legitimate sphere of authority vis-a-vis other states does not necessitate the wholesale
rejection of the minimum contacts doctrine. To the contrary, it gives additional meaning to
the test by providing a means to evaluate the importance of the contacts.
Stein, supra note 103, at 738. Professor Stein emphasized that:
The allocation model recognizes the legitimacy of a sphere of state regulatory authority
independent of the defendant's intent or purpose. When the state asserts jurisdiction
within that sphere of authority, it cannot be argued that the defendant is being treated
contrary to traditionalnotions offairplay and substantialjustice.
Id.at 738-39 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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because her work recognizes the metaphoric relationship between the two sets
of rules based on the same aggregation of minimum contacts and has
elucidated that relationship through a Cartesian graphic metaphor that shows
the actual identity between them. As Professor Youngblood recognizes, the
minimum contacts required for the exercise of legislative jurisdiction in a
particular case involves the same sets of
minimum contacts that define the
52
litigation event for personal jurisdiction.
From the choice-of-law vantage point along the litigation event
continuum, the litigation event is understandable through a Venn metaphor,
Diagram 6:

152. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 38.
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DIAGRAM 6: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CHOICE OF LAW:
LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION MIRRORS MINIMUM CONTACT
DOMAINS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION' 53

Significant
contact or
aggregation of
contacts

*

Creating
state
interests

State interest
N supports lexi
fori:
[a] not an arbitrary choice
[b] not fundamentally unfair

153. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13, 320 (1981); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-14 (1985); Youngblood, supra note 27, at 38.
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Diagram 7 illustrates the confluence of minimum contacts that, in the
Supreme Court's language from Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague "creat[e]
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair."' 54
Youngblood's insight was to perceive the
continuum of the same minimum contacts-a litigation event in my lexiconunderlying both the International Shoe rules and Allstate's legislative
jurisdiction rule and to represent the operation of Allstate's legislative
jurisdiction rule through the same Cartesian graphic metaphor she used to
represent the operation of International Shoe's personal jurisdiction rules.
Professor Youngblood's graphic metaphor for legislative jurisdiction
(Diagram 7 below) is virtually identical to Diagram 3 representing personal
jurisdiction rules.

154. 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
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DIAGRAM 7: CARTESIAN METAPHOR FOR SOURCE DOMAIN TWO:
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155. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 6. In Quadrant III, Professor Youngblood opines, to satisfy
the due process requirements, the exercise of legislative jurisdiction must be based not only on the
defendant's forum contacts, but also on substantial contacts between the forum and either the
plaintiff or the transaction at issue. Id. at 49. In her view, that additional set of relationships justifies
the exercise of the state's regulatory powers in Quadrant III cases. Id. at 49.
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The striking conclusion inescapable from the Cartesian graphic metaphor
in Diagrams 3 and 7 is that both personal jurisdiction and legislative
jurisdiction rules describe the same litigation events in virtually identical
ways. For example, in those Quadrant I cases in which personal jurisdiction
"has never been doubted," the Cartesian metaphor also reveals that legislative
jurisdiction should be similarly free of doubt:
An essential element of a state's sovereignty is its right to regulate
certain conduct and activity with its borders ....The regular activities
or conduct of the defendant within the state are occurrences that may
permissibly be regulated by the state. The fact that the claim arises
out of systematic local activity establishes the claim as one falling
with in the
state's legitimate sphere of both legislative and judicial
56
concern.1
Whereas the personal jurisdictional rules for Quadrant II litigation events
require examination of "the nature, quality and circumstances" of the
minimum contacts within a litigation event, the same characteristics of the
litigation event are also determinative for legislative jurisdiction:
Where the liability sued upon arises from the defendant's single forum
act, that act qualifies as an occurrence subject to state regulation. The
frequency of the defendant's forum acts might be seen to increase the
state's regulatory interest, and diminish any argument that the
application of the forum law was unforeseen, and thus unanticipated,
by the defendant. Nonetheless, the isolated nature of the contact, while
diminishing a generalized regulatory interest of the forum, neither
defeats nor diminishes the specific regulatory interest over an act out
of which the claim arises. The regulatory concern of the forum over
claim-creating contacts within its territory, therefore, exists and
constitutionally justifies the forum's selection of its own law without
regard to the heightened examination of contacts and interest required
by InternationalShoe's Quadrant II standards. 5' 7
Quadrant III litigation events are those characterized by minimum
contacts in the form of the defendant's "extensive general business contacts in
the forum state, but the [plaintiffs] claim ... does not arise out of that

156. Id. at 41-42.
157. Id. at 44.
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activity,"' 5 8 although it may very well be "related to" that activity. 15 9 Both
personal and legislative jurisdiction rules empower the forum state to hear
cases against a resident defendant that engages in the general conduct of its
business within the forum-even when the cause of action does not,
technically, "arise out of' the in-forum activity, but is related to it in the sense
that the forum activities permit the outside-of-forum actions that give rise to
160
the plaintiffs legal claim:
Quadrant III legislative jurisdiction may be constitutionally based on
the coincidence of a general regulatory interest in the conduct of a
defendant engaging in the requisite level of business activity within
the state, and that state's sovereign interest in either a resident plaintiff
or a transaction otherwise linked to the forum....
In Quadrant III cases, therefore, a single inquiry should suffice to
establish whether the forum possesses legislative as well as judicial
jurisdiction: is there a relationship between the forum and the plaintiff
(beyond the relationship created by the plaintiffs choice to bring suit
there) or between the forum and the transaction, its incidences or its
consequences? If there exists such a relationship and the defendant has
purposefully availed itself of doing a sufficient level of business in the
forum to satisfy a Quadrant III judicial jurisdiction analysis, the forum
ought to have wide latitude in regulating the defendant's activities
where those activities trigger legitimate16 sovereign interests in events
or persons otherwise within its territory. 1
As Youngblood notes, "the regulatory interest of the forum ... flows not
from the claim-creating occurrence there, but rather from the more
generalized sovereign interest in regulating the conduct of persons who,
although not citizens, are physically present actors within the state on a
1 62
continuous or systematic basis.

158. Id. at 45.
159. Helicopteros Nacionale de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.10 (1984)

(Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 49.
161. Id. at 49.

162. Id. at 45-46. The only place where a ripple may exist in the otherwise seamless,
coterminous fit of juridical and legislative jurisdiction arises in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797 (1985), a case that Professor Mullenix has described as "a sprawling, multi-state class
action for the recovery of oil and gas royalties, a subject so arcane that no one understands it,
exactly." Linda S. Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 727, 727 (1998). As Professors
Miller and Crump described Shutts:
The jurisdictional holding in Shutts means that attorneys for a multistate class generally can
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In litigation events that fall within Quadrant IV, the results under the
personal and legislative jurisdictional rules are also identical: "the plaintiff is
refused his chosen forum and application of that state's laws will arise, if at
all, only 3 through a choice of law methodology employed by another
16
forum.'

Not only do the rules of legislative and juridical jurisdiction present
identical graphic Cartesian metaphors of their operation, but they both are
firmly rooted in the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles. The
integral relationship between those principles and the rules of legislative
jurisdiction are depicted by the same combined graphic metaphor in Diagram
5, above. The common subset of litigation events created by the common
file suit in whichever state they choose. As Shutts demonstrates, there may be few
claimants residing in the forum. Indeed, under the logic of Shutts, a forum having literally
no connection with the suit may still decide it. Like the tail wagging the dog, a state with
an insubstantial interest in the dispute can bind the nation. These circumstances call for
limits on the choice of law to prevent forum shopping, unfairness to defendants, and
interference with other states' sovereignty.
Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 57 (1986) (footnote omitted). The ripple in the
seamlessness of the juridical-legislative jurisdiction fit occurs in the case of Quadrant III juridical
jurisdiction cases-in which the defendant may be hailed into the forum court on the basis of
minimum contacts that are "unconnected" to the cause of action, as was the case in Shutts. In that
event, it is possible that the forum court might, consistent with the constitution, exercise juridical
jurisdiction but might be prevented, by constitutional considerations, from exercising legislative
jurisdiction. Shutts proposed one additional "rule" beyond those reflected in Diagrams 3, 5, and 7,
supra. That rule provides that "even if the law of the forum state conflicts with other laws that might
apply, it may nonetheless be constitutionally applied to the claims of all class members if the forum
has significant contacts with the claims of each class member, creating a state interest in the claims."
Alan M. Mansfield, Nationwide Class Actions in State Court: Starting with Shutts, 1172 PLI/CoRP
263, 268 (2000). Thus, the legislative jurisdiction rule in Quadrant III cases requires the additional
inquiry of whether there is a relationship between the forum and the plaintiff; if so, and the defendant
has itself been doing a sufficient level of business in the forum to satisfy general jurisdiction analysis,
the forum state court has wide latitude in regulating the defendant's activities where those activities
trigger legitimate sovereign interests. See Youngblood, supra note 27, at 49; Heiser, supra note 137,
at 970 n. 256. As Professor Heiser notes, however, that relationship between the forum and a foreign
or non-resident plaintiff may be in protecting others within the state who are similarly situated to that
plaintiff:
One argument that supports the continued approval of general jurisdiction in products
liability cases under the proposed minimum interest approach is that the forum state has
legitimate interests in regulating a nonresident defendant who is selling in that state a
defective product which has already caused injury elsewhere and therefore may cause,
although it has not yet caused, injury to residents within the forum state.
Id at 969 n.254 (citing Mary Twitchell, The Myth of GeneralJurisdiction,101 HARV. L. REV. 610,
660-61 (1988)). Thus, as refined by Youngblood's additional inquiry, the legislative jurisdiction
rules continue to mirror the rules for juridical jurisdiction and draw their essence from the
intersection of the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles.
163. Youngblood, supra note 27, at 40.

2004]

THE IRONY OFINSTRUMENTALISM

domain of the principles gives rise to the Quadrant I rule where the forum's
legislative jurisdiction is beyond doubt. Likewise, Quadrant IV litigation
events fall outside of the enterprise regulation principle's domain, so that the
forum cannot apply its substantive law creating rights and a remedy for their
violation. Similarly, Quadrant II and III juridical or legislative jurisdiction
cases dwell on the limb of the principles' common domain and require further
consideration of the litigation event from both qualitative and quantitative
perspectives before the image can be magnified to sufficient intellectual
resolution that the litigation event can be confidently placed either inside the
common domain-or outside of it.
D. Source Domain Three: Subject MatterJurisdictionas a Conceptual
Metaphorfor a Litigation Event
Rounding out our survey of the "source" domains for the target domain of
principle, subject-matter jurisdiction is the third "rules" metaphor for the
litigation event we shall examine. Subject-matter jurisdiction is that group of
rules that describe a litigation event from the perspective of the forum court
system's competency to exercise personal and legislative jurisdiction over a
litigation event.'64 The competency in question is really nothing more than a
gatekeeping function that matches up certain portions of the litigation event
against pre-determined "categories" of litigation events defined in constitution
and statute.1 65 As Professor Stein has observed, subject-matter jurisdiction
rules are simply a different perspective on the same litigation event: "The
164. TEPLEY & WHITTEN, supra note 4, at 42. Professor Stein has described the traditional
view of subject-matter jurisdiction in terms that assist us in demonstrating later in this section its
inadequacy for discerning the larger picture of court-access rules and their relationship to the
litigation event:
At the top of the hierarchy is subject-matter jurisdiction: the scope of a court's
"competency" to adjudicate given "types" of lawsuits. This "competency" is seen as
somehow distinct from the particular controversy or litigants; it implicates the very
integrity of the court. Objections to subject-matter defects cannot be waived, and subjectmatter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the court by the parties. Subject-matter
jurisdiction is perceived as fundamentally different from the other doctrines insofar as it
addresses institutional policies-the allocation of power between state and federal
governments in the case of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, or the allocation of authority
within a unitary system in the case of state or federal courts of limited competence.
Stein, supra note 4, at 787-88 (footnotes omitted).
165. Every state has at least one court of general jurisdiction that "possess[es] the broadest
subject-matter authority within a state." TEPLEY & WHITTEN, supra note 4, at 42. The federal
Constitution much more stringently limits subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts. U.S. CONST.
art. III; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The product-injury claims that are subject to FNC dismissal in
federal court arise under state law almost exclusively. Therefore, we will examine subject-matter
jurisdiction from that perspective.
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requirement of minimum contacts with the defendant is not different in kind
from the" federal diversity jurisdiction "requirement that the parties come
from different states. Both are characteristics of the litigation that authorize
resolution of a particular lawsuit in a particular court. 166 The "characteristics"
to which Professor Stein's observations refer are the set of facts within the
litigation event that trigger that subject-matter jurisdiction rules. Indeed,
viewed from the baseline of the litigation event, there is no meaningful
distinction among the subject-matter jurisdiction, the other court-access rules,
and the litigation event itself. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a particularly
elusive concept. It refers to the authority to adjudicate certain "types" of
controversies, yet "type" does not necessarily mean the nature of the cause of
action. It may refer to the amount in controversy or the identity or citizenship
of the litigants. Under such a broad construction, "type" simply means some
factual characteristics of the litigation that will determine whether the court
has authority to hear the case, a definition that could well encompass67those
characteristics on which juridical and legislative jurisdiction are based.
To better understand subject-matter jurisdiction's relationship to personal
and legislative jurisdiction, we may visualize subject-matter jurisdiction as
depicted in Diagram 8 as coextensive with those other court-access doctrines:

166. Stein, supra note 4, at 790-91. The typical distinctions lawyers make between the various
court-access rules are based on rigid compartmentalizations of the results of the rules, rather than the
common source of the rule:
Any first-year law student can attest that however well ingrained these distinctions are in
the legal mind, the commonsense differences are far from obvious. Commentators tend to
define the doctrines by describing the differences in procedural treatment each is accorded:
personal jurisdiction may be waived, subject-matter jurisdiction may not; a judgment may
be voided for lack of personal jurisdiction but not for improper venue, and so on. Such
differences in procedural treatment presumably reflect differences in the political or social
values underlying each doctrine. Subject-matter jurisdiction may not be waived because it
advances a policy more important than, or at least significantly different from, the policy
furthered by personal jurisdiction or venue. Once the differences in proceduraltreatment of
each doctrine are set aside, however, the qualitative differences that remain are
surprisingly subtle; the differences in procedural treatment then become much more
difficult to justify.
Id. at 789-90 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 789.
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Thus, the relationship between the other court-access rules and the
corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles depicted in Diagrams 3,
5, and 7 above, also describes the relationship between those principles and
the subject-matter jurisdiction rule. This is appropriate, for it closes the circle
of the perspectives from which the litigation event can be viewed, and
demonstrates the seamlessness among court-access rules, their foundational
principles, and a litigation event that satisfies their requirements.' 68 In that
event, any FNC dismissal must be foreclosed-if the rules are to be based in
principle. 69 The kinds of considerations associated with the FNC rule can
enter the calculus only when they fit within the parameters of the existing
court-access rules. Those rules must define the reconceptualization of FNC so
that court-access rules continue to operate consistently with the Dworkinian
principles upon which they are based. In Part V that follows, we use the
metaphoric framework we have constructed around the litigation event using
168. Professor Stein's observations reflect a struggle to articulate what the graphic metaphors
in this Article make clear:
[T]here is no reason why the location of the relevant contacts, the residence of the parties,
or the place of service of process, traditionally characteristics of personal jurisdiction and
venue, could not also be considered to address [the] institutional concerns [cited as the
basis for subject-matter jurisdiction]. Both personal jurisdiction and venue reflect notions
of the proper division of power between courts. The "minimum contacts" test employed
after InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington to determine whether an assertion of personal
jurisdiction is constitutional does not simply evaluate whether it would be "inconvenient"
for the defendant to litigate in the forum. Rather, the doctrine calls for considering whether
the forum's relationship to the particular controversy in question justifies assertion of the
forum's judicial power beyond its border, that is, whether the state has a sufficient
regulatory stake in the activity in question to justify the extraterritorial reach of its judicial
power. Implicit in that consideration is a theory of how sovereign power is properly
allocated among the states. The due process clause is a relevant consideration even when
the defendant would experience no hardship in coming into the jurisdiction and has no
application to assertions of jurisdiction over defendants within the forum even when it
would be unfair and inconvenient to drag a defendant across a large state. Personal
jurisdiction thus reflects institutional concerns about the proper allocation of authority
among sovereigns in much the same way that subject-matterjurisdiction addresses the
proper allocation ofauthority among courts.
Stein, supranote 4, at 791-92 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
169. Although they do not make this connection to the FNC rule, Professors Tepley and
Whitten observe of subject-matter jurisdiction that
[c]ourts in the United States consider it obligatory to hear cases within their grants of
constitutional and legislative subject-matter jurisdiction. This obligation is the product of
principles of legislative supremacy embedded in the separation-of-powers doctrine. The
courts disregard this obligation only for the most compelling reasons.
TEPLEY & WHITTEN, supra note 4, at 46.
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the court-access rules to reconceptualize the place of the FNC rule-and we
find that FNC's rule and role must be entirely recast based on the principlerule distinction.
V. FNC RECONCEPTUALIZED: APPLYING DWORKIN'S PRINCIPLE-RULE
DISTINCTION TO FIND A NEW CONCEPT OF THE FNC RULE
We have demonstrated in Part III that the court-access rules are derivable
from the overarching principles of corrective justice and enterprise regulation.
It should be apparent from that discussion that FNC is quite different than the
court-access rules. Unlike the court-access rules, FNC is not derived from
these principles. FNC has no roots in either principle. FNC's roots are
outside of the Dworkinian universe-they are purely instrumentalist,
functioning as a judicially adopted trap door to allow courts to avoid
adjudication of cases that clearly fall within the terms of court-access rules.
Having reached a stage in our efforts to reconceptualize FNC in which we
have concluded what FNC is not, we may now consider what, if anything,
FNC should be. Two main questions confront us. First, although we have
demonstrated FNC's illegitimacy in the context of a Dworkinian model, how
do we answer the typical assertions of "FNC-philes" who advance those
assertions in support of the current FNC rule? Second, if we accept the
Dworkinian model and its implications for FNC as currently conceptualized,
is there any legitimate function for FNC? If so, what specific
reconceptualization is required for FNC to fulfill that function? In this Part,
we take up each of those questions in turn.
A. Response to the Proponentsof the CurrentFNC Doctrine in Product
Injury Cases Brought by InternationalPlaintiffs
Much of FNC is based on myth and "received" wisdom that does not
withstand logical scrutiny. Here, we scrutinize the "wave of litigation,"
"difficult-law choice," and "adequate alternative forum" arguments that
FNC's supporters often cite as the rule's rationale, particularly in productinjury cases where the plaintiff is a foreign citizen. Those arguments have
been so often repeated by commentators and courts without serious skepticism
that they have acquired the formulaic quality of myth. Each argument suffers
from two defects-first, each argument is inconsistent with the corrective
justice and enterprise regulation principles; second, none of the arguments has
a persuasive basis in law or fact.
1. The "Wave" of Litigation Myth
Much of the scholarship that has embraced FNC for international personal
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and product injury cases has done so in an almost xenophobic tone, imagining
"foreigners" threatening to flood American courts with a "tidal wave" of
lawsuits. 170 One commentator writing in the Texas Law Review, for example,
expresses the parochial view that the Bhopal litigation-a lawsuit by the
families of thousands killed by Union Carbide's Indian subsidiary's gasrelease incident-"brings to a head a problem of increasing concern to the
federal judiciary-the glut of litigation by foreign plaintiffs in the United
States courts-and it highlights the important role forum non conveniens can
play in stemming this tide."'' 71 However, the commentator supports this
highly dramatic statement with only seven cases in a footnote.1 72 This is
symptomatic of a view of FNC as a kind of legal "Hadrian's wall"'173 at the
judicial borders. And like Hadrian's wall, this view of FNC fails because it
employs ineffectual means to pursue an illegitimate goal-to dispense justice
through law to those who happen to dwell within the boundaries of an
artificial geopolitical demarcation but not beyond it. 174 Such a view calls to
mind the nursery tale of "Chicken Little" (i.e., "the sky is falling") and has
distorted the scholarship in the area. Indeed, most scholars (and many courts)
view it as vitally important to examine FNC from the perspective of
stereotypes about the motivations of American lawyers, the alleged greed of
foreign plaintiffs, and the evils that some see with tort litigation practice in
U.S. courts. 175 Thus, much of the scholarship has been repetitive and
170. E.g., Dorward, supra note 18, at 141; Douglas W. Dunham & Eric F. Gladbach, Forum
Non Conveniens and ForeignPlaintiffs in the 1990s, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L LAW 665 (1999); Russell,
supra note 18.
171. David Boyce, Note, ForeignPlaintiffs andForum Non Conveniens: Going Beyond Reyno,
64 TEX. L. REV. 193, 195 (1985).
172. Id. at 195 n.14.
173. The wall of Hadrian was an eighty mile long frontier wall in Roman Britannia constructed
during Emperor Hadrian's reign (A.D. 117-138) to keep marauding foreigners out-and to preserve
the hegemony of the status quo. THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 1135 (2d ed. 1970); see 5
THEODOR MOMMSEN: THE PROVINCES OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE: SELECTIONS FROM THE HISTORY

OF ROME, Book 8. at 195-96 (T. Robert S. Broughton ed., 1968).
174. See PETER SALWAY, ROMAN BRITAIN 184 (1981).
175. The often-quoted English Judge, Lord Denning, was particularly egregious in this kind of
stereotyping in Castanho v. Brown & Root (U.K.) Ltd., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 833, 849, aff'd, 1981 A.C.
557. In dissenting from the Court of Appeal's decision to permit an English citizen, who had filed a
suit in U.S. federal court, to dismiss a suit in the English courts, Lord Denning decried the American
legal system and lawyers as "champertous in the extreme," to which the court's majority replied that
Brown & Root had conducted itself with equal concern for financial gain, hoping to avoid exposure
in the American courts and heaving a "sigh of mingled astonishment and relief breathed by those
concerned for [their] insurers... when proceedings were proposed in England." Id. at 859. Denning
later embellished his stereotyped and (comically) ill-informed portrait of contingency fees in tort
litigation practice in America when he wrote his famous metaphor comparing international plaintiffs
suing in the U.S. "[a]s a moth is drawn to the light" and asserting "[i]f he can only get his case into
their courts, he stands to win a fortune." Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All
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misguided. By fixating on these dubious notions, the relationship of FNC
with other key legal concepts has been obscured. 176 FNC exists only as a
dropped stitch in the larger fabric of the litigation event. The importance of
the principles underlying the court-access rules vastly overshadows FNC's
prosaic docket-congestion rationale offered since the days of Paxton Blair.
The solution to docket congestion, of course, is to fill more open
judgeships, especially in the federal system. 177 The number of open federal
judgeships at both the district and appeals court level is staggering. As of
December, 2003, there were forty-five vacancies in U.S. District Courts and
Courts of Appeals. 178 In the meantime, the senate confirmation process has
practically ground to a halt, 179 and the current Administration continues a
trend of late of nominating a fair number of judges who appear to espouse a
politicized jurisprudence or who have attempted to reinvent themselves to
avoid a past that raises questions-in either case, making their confirmability
questionable.' 80 We cannot rely on devices like FNC that merely address the
E.R. 72, 74. Empirical studies such as that of Dunworth and Rogers refute Lord Denning's quotable,
but misplaced, contention. Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporationsin Court: Big Business
Litigationin U.S. FederalCourts, 1971-1991, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 497, 558-59 (1996).
176. Litman, supra note 19, at 570, 593-94 (noting the two principle rationales for FNC as
convenience to defendants and to the courts, and discussing emergent judicial recognition that "at
least implicitly ... consider[s] whether the state has a substantive interest in the outcome of the
litigation"). Litman argues that the forum's regulatory interest in Piper-which the Supreme Court
overlooked-was substantial because defective aircraft and propellers were as likely to injure forum
citizens as foreign citizens. Id. at 597. However, Litman sees the state's interest in regulating injury
to foreign citizens in their own countries as weaker.
Id. at 597.
This view, however,
compartmentalizes regulation of tortious conduct in a way that is logically unsound and ignores the
international nature of the markets served by MNCs.
177. See Jeffrey Rosen, Obstruction of Judges, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 11, 2002, at 38; see
generally STEPHEN CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1999).
178. Vacancies
in
the
Federal
Judiciary
December
11,
2003,
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2003).
179. Rosen, supra note 177, at 38; see, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Callsfor Higher
Salaries and More Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2003, at A15; Deborah Sontag, The Power of the
Fourth, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., Mar. 9, 2003, at 40; Neil A. Lewis, G.O.P. Groups Judicial
Nominees to Thwart Opponents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at A21; Neil A. Lewis, G.O.P. Loses
Filibuster Vote on JudicialNominee, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2003, at A2 1.
180. E.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Bush's Judges, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2002, at A35 (characterizing
President's announcement of speedy judicial confirmation plan "[j]ust days before a closely
contested election" as indicative of "think[ing] judicial appointments are just the issue to fire up the
conservative base"); Editorial, The Real Problem in Making Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at
A30 (arguing that "[t]he administration should turn its attention to the real roadblock-its own overly
ideological, and often slow-moving method of selecting nominees"); Editorial, Second Chance on
Judges, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2002, at A30 (criticizing current Administration for "largely
ignore[ing] Democratic concerns and tr[ying] to proceed with judicial nominations as though the
mistreatment of the Clinton nominees had never happened" and chastising both political parties "to
be thinking about what kind of nominees everyone could regard as above political dispute"); Patrick
Leahy, Comments of Senator Patrick Leahy on the Change in the Senate Majority and the Judiciary
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effects of one problem (alleged congestion and high workloads) by creating
another problem (dismissal of cases that should be adjudicated in conformity
with principles of corrective justice and enterprise regulation). The real
problem that requires attention is the flawed
process for recruitment,
8
confirmation, and retention of federal judges. 1 1
2. The Myth of Avoiding the Application of "Difficult Foreign Law"
The integral, metaphoric relationship of legislative jurisdiction to the
litigation event is obscured by the misapplication of FNC, as Part IV.C,
above, amply demonstrates.
Courts, however, have been slow to
acknowledge this problem, and instead have employed FNC as an excuse not
to even examine choice-of-law issues. There is a tendency to gloss over those
issues superficially in judicial opinions182-a tendency established by the
Supreme Court in Reyno, which gave choice-of-law to judges as another "out"
in FNC motions filed against international product injury plaintiffs.18 3 In
Reyno's wake, federal courts began to use even the potential existence of
choice-of-law issues as another excuse for FNC dismissals. Pro-FNC courts
and commentators tend to denigrate the forum's regulatory interest by twin
arguments: (1) that choice-of-law rules would require the application of
foreign substantive law, typically based on a lex loci delicti approach, and (2)
that it is "too hard" for the courts to figure out how to apply foreign law.
However, these positions are unwarranted for three reasons, especially in
cases where the defendant is a MNC with significant ties to the forum (i.e.,
incorporation, headquarters, or doing business).
Committee, Nov. 6, 2002, at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200211/110602.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2002) (expressing the expectation that "there will continue to be disagreements over nominees who
are chosen primarily for their ideology and not for their independence").
181. See Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and
Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319 (1994); Michael D. Schattman, Picking FederalJudges:
A Mysterious Alchemy, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1578-79 (1998) (reviewing SHELDON GOLDMAN,
PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN

(1997)) (review author describes his personal experiences in a lugubrious, politicized federal judicial
confirmation process); Carl Tobias, Choosing FederalJudges in the Second Clinton Administration,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 745-46 (1997); Carl Tobias, FederalJudicial Selection in a Time of
Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998); Carl Tobias, Modern FederalJudicial Selection,
67 U. CN. L. REV. 527, 533 (1999) (reviewing GOLDMAN, supra and discussing the "persistent
vacancies problem," the "increasing difficulty in filling all of the authorized judgeships," and recent
"impasse[s] over court appointments" at the federal appeals and district court levels).
182. See, e.g., Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 1985); Cheng v.
Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1983); Penge v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., 228 F. Supp.
2d 929, 936-37 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (denying motion for FNC); Ministry of Health, Province of Ontario,
Canada v. Shiley Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1440-41 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Dorman v. Emerson Elec. Co.,
789 F. Supp. 296, 299 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (motion to dismiss denied).
183. Litman, supra note 19; see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981).
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First, there is the rhetorical question'84 whether the forum state's law
would apply at all-whereby the question is posed, not thoroughly answered,
but used as a reason to denigrate the forum's interest. 85 Where did such an
unfettered approach originate? With the Reyno majority. The Reyno majority
clearly did not want to be bothered with conflicts law and, therefore, refused
to look at the relationship of FNC to legislative jurisdiction. The majority
rejected the idea of considering conflicts of law too deeply "to help courts
avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law."' 86 While the court
was specifically referring to considering whether application of foreign law
would be less favorable to an international plaintiff, the majority's overall
attitude towards conflicts issues was impatient and dismissive. The Third
Circuit in Reyno had recognized that the forum product design activities of
two MNCs ought to be judged by U.S. law because of the regulatory interest
involved.' 87 The Supreme Court majority apparently did not want to
acknowledge the clear mandate of the Third Circuit's holding-that Reyno's
lawsuit must be heard in the forum and that FNC could not apply-nor did the
majority apparently want to evaluate the conflicts issue. Instead, the Reyno
majority effectively dismissed the entire issue of whether forum law
applied-and therefore erased the implications of legislative jurisdiction-in a
terse line that "[e]ven if the" Third Circuit is correct about the choice of U.S.
law, "all other public interest factors favored trial" in the foreign forum. 188 Of
course, this is incorrect because it ignores the appropriateness of an American
forum with personal and legislative jurisdiction. However, this ill-considered,
throw-away line of the Reyno majority may well be the single most significant
source of incoherence and confusion in FNC. This is so because it shortcircuited recognition of the integral relationship of (a) foreign plaintiff cases
filed against MNCs in their U.S. homes to (b) the goals of both the corrective
justice and enterprise regulation principles.
Second, the paeans ring hollow to lexi loci paid in cases such as Union
Carbide' 89 that result in leaving foreign sovereigns to regulate MNC activity
in host countries. The lexi loci principle certainly permits those sovereigns to

184. Litman, supra note 19, at 585.
185. See, e.g., Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co., 555 F. Supp. 9, 20-21 (D.C. Cal. 1982); Gschwind v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1998); Reyno, 454 U.S. at 259-61.
186. 454 U.S. at 250.
187. See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft, 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980).
188. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 260; see TEPLEY & WHITTEN, supra note 4, at 359-60 (noting that
Reyno "actually discourge[s]" choice of law analysis in FNC and observing that nevertheless, "such
an analysis is inevitable").
189. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd and modified in part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
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exercise jurisdiction over torts committed in their country, but it does not
compel it. Indeed, in every case filed against a MNC, there is a clear
justification for application of U.S. law under any of the other leading choice
of law theories-"governmental interest," "significant contacts," or lexi
fori.190 The preeminence of the forum state's interest in regulating the
activities of a domestic FNC are apparent under any of those theories and will
be decisive.19'
The reality of choice-of-law outcomes revealed by empirical scholarship
also sinks the Reyno choice-of-law rational. For example, Professor Ralph
Whitten has presented a paper before the American Association of Law
School's Conflict of Laws Section at that group's January 2002 meeting 92 in
which he debunks choice-of-law as a serious consideration in favor of FNC
dismissals. 193 Professor Whitten has recognized that "fear of foreign law" is
not a legitimate consideration in support of FNC dismissals because most U.S.
courts reason their way to a de facto lex fori outcome. "Although... only
three U.S. states have adopted a lex fori approach, and at this writing,...
only.., for tort cases," both empirical and non-empirical scholarly
commentary "indicates that there is a strong statistical tendency in states using

190. Abby C. Smumy & Nicole E. Erb, InternationalLegal Developments in Review: 1999
Business Transactions & Disputes, 34 INT'L LAW. 569 (2000); Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174
F.3d 842, 844-45 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.) (discussing various theories of conflicts of law
applied by U.S. courts to claims involving overseas tortious actions or omissions).
191. See, e.g., Luther L. McDougal, III, Toward the Increased Use of Interstate and
InternationalPolicies in Choice-of-Law Analysis in Tort Cases Under the Second Restatement and
Leflar's Choice Influencing Considerations, 70 TuL. L. REV. 2465, 2479 & n.50 (1995-96)
(observing that it "is true in all tort cases in which a court employs one of the modem choice-of-law
theories" that courts "have shown a strong tendency to want to apply forum law"); Luther L.
McDougal, III, The Real Legacy Of Babcock v. Jackson, Lex Fori Instead of Lex Loci Delicti: And
Now it's Time for a Real Choice-of-Law Revolution, 56 ALB. L. REV. 795 (1993); Mark B. Rockwell,
Choice-of-Law in International Products Liability: "Internationalizing" the Choice, 16 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 69, 70-73 (1992); Willis L. M. Reese, American Trends in Private
InternationalLaw: Academic and Judicial Manipulationof Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases, 33
VAND. L. REV. 717, 725 (1980) (noting that forum courts "have determined, almost invariably, that
their own local rule was. . . 'better' and should therefore be applied"); Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting
Erie in a New Age of InternationalLaw: Toward a Federal Common Law of InternationalChoice-of
Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 165, 217 & n.298 (1988) (observing that "domestic choice rules often lead to
the application of the forum's own laws"); cf Russell J. Weintraub, A Proposed Choice-of-Law
Standardfor International Products Liability Disputes, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 225, 238 (1990)
(proposing an essentially lexfori approach limited to those cases "when this is desirable to punish
and deter a defendant's outrageous conduct").
192. Russell J. Weintraub, Introduction to Symposium on International Forum Shopping, 37
TEX. INT'L L.J. 463 (2002).
193. Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International
and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 559 (2002).
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one of the modem conflicts-of-laws methodologies to select forum law."' 194
Professor Whitten suggests that it would be better for the American legal
system overall explicitly to "switch to properly constructed lex fori systems"
to reduce "inefficiencies and costs in multistate and multinational litigation"
through the elimination of the complexity and intellectual dishonesty in
current conflicts approaches.' 95 He sees the benefit as far outweighing (or
even eliminating) the costs of "the current chaos in U.S. conflicts law"
without, at the same time, "exacerbating forum shopping," because explicit
acknowledgement of lexfori "would also correspond largely to the results that
now occur under
existing conflicts" methodologies-"without the costs of
196
those systems."'

Third, even if foreign law should (in a handful of cases) provide the rule
of decision in an international product injury lawsuit, it is still best for the
goals of American tort law that its regulatory objective be achieved in the
courts of the American home forum of MNCs and under American
procedures. 197 The application of foreign law by the courts who usually hear
194. Id. at 569; see Miller & Crump, supra note 162, at 60-62 & nn.416, 420.
195. Whitten, supra note 193, at 569.
196. Id. at 568, 569, 589. Professor Whitten has made the insightful proposal that the most
effective way to achieve this change is through federal legislation mandating a "default lexfori rule"
for "any case in which the Constitution would not be violated by the application of the forum's law."
Id. at 588.
At least in cases involving multistate and multinational commerce, it seems likely that the
interstate and foreign commerce power would allow Congress to mandate the application
of foreign law in the gaps left by other federal substantive or conflicts rules ....
The
existing Supreme Court decisions under the Commerce Clause are arguably broad
enough... to supply a federal rule of decision for any kind of interstate or international
commercial activity.
Id. at 583-84 (footnotes omitted).
197. Alex Wilson Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction: A Confused and Inappropriate
Substitute for Forum Non Conveniens, 71 TEX. L. REV. 351, 354 (1993). Professor Albright notes
that:
[e]ven if the forum's choice-of-law rules direct that foreign law will apply, the choice of an
American forum still can have a significant effect because the foreign law is applied with
local sensibilities. The jury that renders the verdict and the judges who review that verdict
will apply their own concepts of liability and compensation ....
Id. at 354 n. 14. Professor Albright observes that these "may be very different from those envisioned
by the country whose law is being applied." Id. But this difference in legal accent does not establish
that this is improper, particularly when dealing with the state of the corporation's domicile or
substantial business presence. Professor Paula Johnson has discussed the need for U.S. courts to
engage in precisely this kind of judicial regulation of U.S.-based companies' tortious conduct abroad
in the context of tobacco and cigarette product liability. Johnson, supra note 9, at 79-80. As
Professor Johnson notes, "[t]he surge of international products liability litigation is likely to include
the tobacco industry. Similar to their domestic counterparts, foreign consumers are likely to allege
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cases against a MNC should not be the basis for an FNC dismissal. Nor
should a "fear" of foreign law fuel FNC dismissals, although it has. Indeed,
the helplessness that the Supreme Court and others have professed for
American judges in understanding and applying foreign law appears
disingenuous but typical of the isolation of segments of our legal profession
from fifty years of globalization.' 98 Some have complained of the difficulties
of applying a "dual" system of laws at the same time--one for substance, the
other for procedure.
Such complaints, however, are also unpersuasive.
Lawyers in many other cultures successfully operate on a daily basis thinking
in multiple legal systems. 199 Moreover, American courts have long been
required to apply treaty provisions as the law of the land, which they will be
called upon to do with increasing frequency with treaties such as the U.N.
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, a strongly civil-law influenced
approach to contract law. 200 Those who aspire to prevent unfamiliar law from
injuries from the use of United States tobacco companies' products and, more significantly, are likely
to initiate such lawsuits in the United States." Id. at 79. She argues that courts in the U.S. have a
duty to regulate the activities of U.S.-based multinationals and should therefore "focus on the center
of decision making, particularly with respect to product design, marketing, advertising, and labelling,
as determinative of the nexus factors which justify adjudication in the United States." Id. at 80.
Similarly, her argument sees the need for "recogniz[ing] advancing theories which adopt flexible
approaches to choice of law determinations." Id. at 80.
198. E.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243, 51 (1981) (characterizing a U.S.
district court's need to apply Scottish law to be "a substantial practical problem" that requires
"untangl[ing] problems.., in law foreign to itself' which are 'hopelessly complex and
confusing'); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (commenting on the fact that
foreign law might govern the indemnity claim between Japanese component vendor and Taiwanese
component manufacturer); see Boyce, supra note 171, at 217 n. 155.
199. E.g., Liana Fiol Matta, Civil Law and Common Law in the Legal Method of Puerto Rico,
40 AM. J. COMP. L. 783, 792 (1992) (noting the experience of Puerto Rican lawyers who are used to
"double reasoning"-"justify[ing] their conclusions, according to the fundamental concepts of both"
the American common-law and the Spanish civil law).
200. E.g., MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, 144 F.3d 1384
(11 th Cir. 1998); see Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem with Common-Law Jurisdictions, 10 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 217 (2001); Peter A. Piliounis, The Remedies of Specific Performance,
Price Reduction, and Additional Time (Nachfrist) Under the CISG: Are These Worthwhile Changes
or Additions to English Sales Law?, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1 (2000); Alexis Thompson, Translation
of Oberlondesgericht Karlsruhe Decision of 25-06-1997 including Commentary-Buyer Beware:
German Interpretationof the CISG Has Lead to Results Unfavorable to Buyers, 19 J.L. & COMM.
245 (2000); Bruno Zeller, The UN Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods
(CISG)-A Leap Forward Towards Unified InternationalSales Laws, 12 PACE INT'L L. REv. 79
(2000). Kilian notes that the "fear of foreign" law has appeared in the CISG arena, where, despite
ample cases (over 500) in Europe interpreting and applying CISG, U.S. courts continue to
characterize the availability of CISG case law as "sparse." Kilian, supra, at 235 ("The courts'
reluctance to look beyond the U.S. border for CISG case law does little to accelerate the certification
of international trade law."); see also David Fuisch, Commercial Common Law, The United Nations
Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods, and the Inertia of Habit, 74 TUL. L. REV. 495, 522
(1999) (criticizing U.S. Judiciary for failing to recognize cross-border application of laws by
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entering American courtrooms using FNC as their instrument might be
described as legal Luddites who, like their phobic forebearers in Industrial
Revolution England, are being overtaken by an irresistible tide of
globalization washing over them. Indeed, even Justice Sandra Day O'Conner
has criticized this "fear of foreign law" in American courts as "insular" and
"short-sighted" and has exhorted "American judges and lawyers" to devote
themselves to the study of foreign law to "benefit from broadening our
horizons. 22° In the same vein, American judges and lawyers need the benefit
of a FNC rule that is not formulated upon jurisprudence of legal isolation.
3. The Myth of the "Alternative Forum"
Many FNC dismissals turn not on a precise or considered weighing of the
Gilbert private and public interest factors, but rather on the comforting
illusion that plaintiffs should be sent to the court systems of their own
countries to find "justice." However, this often amounts to a delusion, as
noted above with regard to this Indian court system that was found to be an
"alternative" forum for litigation of the Bhopal wrongful death claims against
Union Carbide. 20 2 Similar problems present themselves in the court systems of
Columbia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuelaalthough the governments they serve have been deemed by American
diplomats as "corrupt," "subject to influence," and "inefficient," each country
has "been deemed [an] adequate alternative forum in various U.S.
proceedings. ,,203 Many such decisions purport to be based on U.S. Department
of State Country Conditions Reports on Human Rights Practices. 20 4 However,
"constru[ing] mandatory provisions as if no change had occurred"); Michael P. Van Alstine,
Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 689, 693-94 (1998) (criticizing U.S.
judiciary for continuing to embrace a "narrow conception of the judicial function" in the face of "the
new generation of international conventions" and noting the parochialism of "[a] restrictive formalist
approach to interpretation [that] permits domestic adjudicators to embrace their natural bias for
familiar domestic legal norms"). Moreover, the globalization of commerce has been mirrored in a
significant expansion of foreign law materials available to U.S. lawyers, particularly via the Internet.
See David S. Clark, Applied Comparative Law: ResearchingForeignLaw in an Imperfect World, 30
INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 232 (2002); accord Andrew Grossman, Toward Cooperation in Access to
Foreign Primary Law, 30 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 15 (2002) (noting "the scale and speed with
which" various foreign governments and universities "have moved to publish on the Internet their
codified law and official gazettes" and the private "publi[cation] [of] CD-ROMs of statutes in force
in the vernacular in most European and many other markets"); Susan Van Syckel, Strategiesfor
Identifying Sources of Foreign Law: An IntegratedApproach, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 289 (2000).
201. Sandra Day O'Conner, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn
About Foreign Law, 45 FED. LAW. 20 (1998).
202. See Whitten, supra note 193.
203. Christopher M. Marlowe, Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals and the Adequate
Alternative Forum: Latin America, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 295, 310-11 (2001).
204. Id. at 297 & n.1, 310-12 & nn.71-74.
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the State Department is hardly undertaking a rigorous look at the court system
from the position of a prospective litigant; for example, such reports typically
do not factor in practices such as "prohibition on cross examining witnesses,
prosecutorial anonymity, exclusively written (vs. oral) argument, lack of jury
trials, and relatively limited"-if any--"discovery procedures. 20 5 A candid
assessment of judicial performance in such comparative-law exercises reveals
that provinciality, rather than informed evaluation,
drives the willingness to
2 °6
find alternative fora where, in fact, none exist.
Integrity and functionality of court systems in developing countries is not
the only problem facing foreign plaintiffs. A number of Latin American and
African nations are considering or have adopted legislation that "would
extinguish national jurisdiction once the plaintiff had elected to file suit in
America," thereby closing the municipal courts to plaintiffs upon their
return. 20 7 Ecuador is one country that has adopted such legislation-the

Second Circuit recently affirmed an FNC dismissal in the face of the
uncertainty that the Brazilian and Ecuadorian plaintiffs would have access 2 to
09
Ecuador's courts. 20 8 Moreover, in Chiazor v. Transworld Drilling Co.,
plaintiffs from Nigeria were told to return home to file suit in a case alleging
corporate negligence in an oil drilling crane on which the plaintiffs'
descendent was killed.2 10 Yet, the reality is that corrective justice cannot be
205. Id. at 310 n.68. Even what the reports do tend to emphasize-judicial independence-is
often couched in inconclusive and contradictory terms tantamount to a "buy-as-is" disclaimer on
used goods. See id.at 311 & nn.71-76.
206. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 106, at 417-21 (discussing astonishing paucity of refilings in alternative fora in the wake of FNC dismissals). Professor Mark Galanter pierced the veil of
superficiality in the comparison of other legal systems' adequacy for obtaining corrective justice in
the context of the Bhopal case. Mark Galanter, When Legal Worlds Collide: Reflections on Bhopal,
the Good Lawyer, and the American Law School, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 292, 295-98 (1986). To
compound this superficiality of comparative law, American law schools have generally not equipped
American lawyers and judges either with the substantive knowledge or analytic framework on which
to base a rational conclusion of adequacy. Id.at 293-95. For example, "India has been invisible to
the American law school" despite the presence of a generation of Indian law students in American
LL.M. degree programs. Id; see also J. Gillis Wetter, The Casefor InternationalLaw Schools and
an InternationalLegal Profession, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 206 (1980).
207. Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated?-The Emergence of Retaliatory
Legislation, 10 TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 186 & nn. 19-20 (2001).
208. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d. 470, 477 (2d Cir. 2002).
209. 648 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1981).
210. Id. The defendant corporate parent was a Delaware corporation headquartered in
Oklahoma that operated drilling rigs for oil exploration in Nigeria through a series of wholly owned
subsidiaries. Id. The effect of this case in "foreign offshore oil worker injury cases" was to
"virtually eliminat[e] the availability of United States law to [a] class of potential maritime injury
plaintiffs, despite American ownership and control and an American base of operations." Jack L.
Allbritten, Choice of Law in a Maritime PersonalInjury Setting: The Domestic Jurisprudence,43
LA. L. REv. 879, 904 (1983).
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achieved at this time in that nation-the court system is disabled by a lack of
infrastructure, while the legal system itself is torn between received law from
21
the British Colonial period and the recent rise of shar'ia, or Islamic law.

1

Finally, using the "alternative" forum approach is not supported by the
argument that forum shopping requires an antidote. American lawyers
frequently speak of "forum shopping" with an almost Polyannesque quality.2 12
Much like Captain Renault's famous line in the film Casablanca-"I'm
shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here!"-before he
proceeds to cash in his roulette chips,21 3 American lawyers decry forum
211. Islamic Law in Nigeria-The Attractions of Sharia, THE ECONOMIST, Sept 7-13, 2002, at
44. The writer describes a schizophrenic system that is hardly prepared to deal with sophisticated
product injury claims:
However, most of Nigeria's Muslims applaud the imposition of sharia. This is partly
because they believe it reflects the will of God, partly because Nigeria's secular courts are
so awful. A former British colony, Nigeria inherited a judicial system based on English
common law. Trials involve expensive lawyers, fussy procedures and lots of paperwork.
The system is cumbersome and underfunded.
In crumbling courtrooms, judges take evidence in long-hand, court records are typed
up on ancient manual typewriters, and law books are in short supply. Underpaid policemen,
and judges too, often accept bribes to pervert the course ofjustice.
Id. This picture of the Nigerian court system is also reflected in the U.S. State Department's Country
Report
on
Human
Rights
Practices
for
Nigeria,
available
at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18220.htm (last visited on Oct. 6, 2003). A writer recently
noted that the State Department's reports can be useful for a court facing an FNC motion claiming
that a foreign court system is adequate; however, those reports are of limited usefulness because they
focus on criminal, not civil, adjudication and ignore important procedural differences. Marlowe,
supra note 203, at 310-12 & nn.66-68.
212. As Professors Clermont and Eisenberg have astutely observed: "The name of the game is
forum-shopping. In the American civil litigation system today, few cases reach trial. After perhaps
some initial skirmishing, most cases settle. Yet all cases entail forum selection, which has a major
impact on outcome." Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of ForumShopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1995) (footnote omitted).
213. Captain Renault (inimitably portrayed by Claude Rains) is responding to a demand by the
German Gestappo commander that Rick's place be closed after German soldiers are drowned out in a
national- anthem-singing contest by French patriots. A film historian describes the scene vividly:
Reluctantly, Renault closes the saloon, hypocritically blaming it on illegal gambling:
Rick: How can you close me up? On what grounds?
Renault: I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here!
[Pause... as Rick walks away... and Renault's attention is drawn to the croupier:]
Croupier: Your winnings, sir.
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shopping while they do it all the time-and are expected by their clients to do
it in their best interest as well. "[I]t is simply part and parcel of the litigator's
job to explore the feasibility of bringing suit in the most advantageous forum"
and then bring suit in that forum.2 14 Indeed, "[w]hen a relationship becomes
litigious, failure to select an advantageous forum may amount to malpractice,
for attorneys owe a duty to vindicate their clients' rights wherever they can
expect the best results."2t 5
"Forum shopping" is a negative label, but merely a label nonetheless; "it
is only a pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of
jurisdictions, he will naturally choose the one in which he thinks his case can
be most favorably presented," a fact of legal life that "should be a matter
neither for surprise nor for indignation." 21 6 The negative connotation of the
phrase gained popularity through Justice Brandeis' negative use of it in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Thompkins,217 and its famous use in Erie has lead to sixty
years in which law students are told that "forum shopping" is evil2 ' 8-while

Renault: Oh.... Thank you very much... Everybody out at once!
Renault is handed his gambling winnings by the croupier as he finishes his
pronouncements.
Adapted from Tim Dirks, Casablanca,at http://www.filmsite.org/casa4.html (last visited December
11, 2002) (emphasis in original). The same kind of double-think (to borrow Orwell's phrase) is
necessary to comprehend the traditional American position on forum shopping.
214. Reed, supra note 121, at 32.
215. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International,supra note 121, at 572 (1989)
(footnote omitted) (noting that the "proposition ought to be obvious, and so it would be but for the
nasty phrase 'forum shopping,' which suggests that those who represent their clients' interests
effectively commit a breach of professional etiquette").
216. THE ATLANTIC STAR, 1974 A.C. 436, 471 (Opinion of Lord Simon of Glaisdale).
217. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
218. Id.; see Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (1990)
("The modem tendency to condemn forum shopping stems largely from two Supreme Court
decisions, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins and Hanna v. Plumer."). In the famous case of Hanna v.
Plumer,380 U.S. 460 (1965), Chief Justice Warren reified and perpetuated this myth:
[The Erie rule] was also in part a reaction to the practice of "forum-shopping" which had
grown up in response to the rule of Swift v. Tyson. . . . The "outcome-determination" test
[of Guaranty Trust v. York] cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie
rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws.
Id. at 467-68 (footnote and citations omitted). John Hart Ely observed of Warren's approach:
But while the likelihood of forum shopping may turn out to be a handy touchstone for
identifying those situations exhibiting the evils against which the Act was directed, forum
shopping is not an evil per se. It is evil only if something evil flows from it; indeed, the
very idea of the diversity jurisdiction was to provide an alternative to state court. Thus,
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they are learning how to do it themselves! This "traditional" position on
forum shopping is simply hypocritical. Recently, Professor Mary Garvey
Algero blew the dust away from this old legal saw by comparing the received
doctrine in law school classrooms with the reality of law practice:
Many practicing attorneys and judges were led to believe in law
school that forum shopping was a terrible thing, practiced by only the
most manipulative and devious attorneys. This teaching may have
confused some who may have wondered why venue and jurisdictional
provisions existed that allowed some discretion in selecting a forum,
yet "shopping" for a forum was taboo. Thus, "selecting" a forum was
a necessary practice for those filing a lawsuit; "shopping" for one, on
the other hand, was forbidden. Likewise, "evaluating" the plaintiff's
chosen forum was certainly necessary to adequately represent a
defendant, but "shopping" for a better forum was forbidden.
The confusion may have been compounded when these graduates
began to practice law and were asked by their respected colleagues to
evaluate jurisdiction and venue for the cases to which they were
assigned. Were they being asked to compromise their legal ethics
already and join the ranks of the manipulative and devious, or were
apply the procedural rules and analyze their
they just being asked
219 to
cases thoroughly?

unless the Rules of Decision Act was a pointless exercise, the First Congress must have
seen something else wrong with allowing federal courts to formulate their own rules of
decision and thereby to create a separate regime for those nonresident plaintiffs who wish
to avail themselves of it.
John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 710 (1974) (footnotes
omitted). Even more pointedly, Henry Hart, a successor to Frankfurter at Harvard and a Brandeis
law clerk in 1930, viewed Brandeis's reference to forum shopping in Erie as "merely 'a minor
consideration which Brandeis mentioned in passing"' and deemed a "policy of eliminating forum
shopping [to be] an unworthy 'triviality."' EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION-ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 251 (2000) (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., Relations Between State and
FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508, 512-13 & n.80 (1954)).
219. Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a
Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 80-81 (1999) (footnotes omitted). As Professor Algero observes,
"[a]ttempts to extinguish the 'danger of forum-shopping' have been only partially successful because
forum shopping is an intrinsic part of the American judicial system" because "[n]ot only do venue
options provided by procedural rules allow forum shopping, but the structure of the judicial system
provides incentives to shop for a forum." Id. at 82 (footnotes omitted). She concludes that the
traditional hypocrisy towards forum shopping be dropped and "the practice of forum shopping should
be recognized as a legitimate practice and a legitimate use of procedure when procedural rules are
followed." Id. at I11.
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To the contrary, "[t]here is nothing inherently evil about forum
shopping., 220 As Professor Juenger has suggested, "[f]ar from doing anything
legally or morally reprehensible," forum-shopping lawyers "simply serv[e]
their clients well. 221 Intelligent observers have handily demonstrated that
"[a]nti-forum shopping policies draw on legitimating myths about the nature
of law, a reluctance to acknowledge that social and political biases shape the
law, and widely-shared views about the proper role of chance in judicial
outcomes. 222 Critical analysis further demonstrates that "forum shopping
predominantly furthers" at least "three goals of the legal system-ethical
representation of one's client, efficiency, and community control over law";
and that by furthering these goals, forum shopping furthers "the broader goal
of providing a remedy for every injury. '223 In this way, so-called "forum
shopping" promotes justice in those cases that fall within the common domain
of the corrective justice 22 4 and enterprise regulation 225 principles set forth in
Diagram 5, above. Criticism of "forum shopping" and invocation of the FNC

220. Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987) (describing an argument as
"invok[ing] the specter, or set[ting] up the strawman, depending on whose ox is being gored, of
forum-shopping"). In Goad, Judge Widener explained the basis for his observation:
The statutes giving effect to the diversity jurisdiction under the Constitution, 28 U.S.C. §
1332 (jurisdiction) and § 1391 (venue) are certainly implicit, if not explicit, approval of
alternate forums for plaintiffs. For example, § 1391(a) provides a suit may be brought in
the district where all of the plaintiffs or all the defendants reside, or where the cause of
action arose; and § 139 1(c) provides that a corporation may be sued in any district in which
incorporated, or is licensed to do business, or is doing business. Thus, complaints about
forum shopping expressly made possible by statute are properly addressed to Congress, not
the courts.
Id.
221. Juenger, ForumShopping, Domestic and International,supra note 121, at 570.
222. Forum Shopping Reconsidered,supra note 218, at 1684 (footnotes omitted) (identifying
anti-forum shopping policies as driven by "deeply embedded positivist and formalist conceptions of
law").
223. Id. at 1689.
224. Id. at 1692-93 ("A central purpose of the legal system is to facilitate the provision of
remedies, and forum shopping is often an important tool in this process" when "forum-shopping
plaintiffs invoke substantive rules that are socially beneficial, the net effect of forum shopping is
greater enforcement of the law and protection of plaintiffs' legitimate interests") (footnote omitted);
Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International,supra note 121, at 571 (citing the filing of
U.S. litigation as the spur to the Indian Government to "establish an acceptable framework for
recovery" in the Bhopal case, Professor Juenger concludes "[t]hus, forum shopping can promote
important substantive policies, such as the protection of those injured by transnational activities").
225. Forum Shopping Reconsidered, supra note 218, at 1693-94 (footnotes omitted) (stating
"the ability to forum shop into a particular jurisdiction can enhance that jurisdiction's autonomy over
an issue it may consider important," and providing examples, such as when "[d]efendants in such
cases are often sophisticated multinational corporations that have availed themselves of and profited
from plaintiffs desired forum state").
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rule are simply obverse and reverse sides of the same instrumentalist
approach, which, as demonstrated in Part IV, the relevant principles have
exiled from their domain.
B. Reconceptualizing FNC in The Context of PrincipledCourt-Access Rules
Across the Spectrum of a Litigation Event
Our use of Dworkin's principle-rule distinction and the metaphoric
reconceptualization of the relationship between two of these principles
(corrective justice and enterprise regulation) and the court-access rules have
been driving toward a single goal. That goal is the reconceptualization of the
FNC rule ab initio in four ways. First, the FNC rule must be reconceptualized
with the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles as its anima.
Second, the FNC rule must be reconceptualized within the context of the
court-access rules, as represented in Diagrams 3 through 7. Third, as
reconceptualized, FNC must function only within the narrow parameters of
those litigation events 1 earlier described2 26 as "limb-dwellers," where
minimum contacts are stretched to their thinnest point-on the verge of
becoming isolated and unconnected contacts that fall outside of the common
domain of the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles. Fourth,
the FNC rule must produce outcomes that are consistent with the operation of
the other court-access rules within a litigation event. The contrast between
the "old," untrammeled, discretionary FNC rule and an FNC rule that meets
the criteria defined above can be understood by comparing the following
graphic metaphors depicting the "old" FNC rule on Diagram 9 and the
reconceptualized FNC rule on Diagram 10.

226. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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DIAGRAM 9: "OLD" FNC RULE
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DIAGRAM 10: OPERATION OF A RECONCEPTUALIZED FNC RULE
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The old FNC rule (Diagram 9) operates sui generis in a vacuum totally
outside of the Dworkinian universe of principles and rules. As used in federal
cases, it has resulted in the dismissal of cases that fall within jurisdictiongranting quadrants of the court-access rules. In contrast to the old FNC rule, a
reconceptualized FNC rule (Diagram 10) must be fully integrated into the
Dworkinian principle-rule universe and produce results predictable and
consistent with other court access doctrines.
How can the FNC rule be reconceptualized to achieve such an
ambitious-but mandatory-goal?
The key lies in the metaphoric
relationship among the litigation event, the corrective justice and enterprise
regulation principles, and the court-access rules. That interplay is represented
in Diagram 11 below.
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DIAGRAM 11: RELATING THE CARTESIAN METAPHORS OF
DIAGRAMS 1 AND 5 TO THE LITIGATION EVENT METAPHOR
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Diagram 11 loosely borrows from Albert Einstein's basic concept of
relativity. Litigation events are treated as a fluid continuum of minimum
contacts that are aggregated on the macro-level to correspond to one of the
Each quadrant
four quadrants in Youngblood's Cartesian metaphor.
represents a particular jurisdictional rule that operates as a metaphor for the
litigation event it describes. Within each quadrant, the bundles of minimum
contacts will vary in ways that will affect the operation of court-access rules.
In Quadrants I and IV, factual variations are fairly limited; therefore, the
categorization of those litigation events is outcome determinative. Quadrant I
litigation events are always within the critical subset domains where the
corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles overlap. Quadrant IV
litigation events will never fall into that critical subset domain. The metaphor
for Quadrants II and III varies. Some Quadrant II litigation events fall within
the critical subset domain; others-where the "quality" of the contacts in the
bundle is dubious-will not. Similarly, Quadrant III litigation events that
involve minimum contacts of the key corporate activities of incorporating,
headquartering, and/or doing business come within the critical subset domain;
other kinds of minimum contacts that may fairly be described as systematic
and continuous (but are of a lesser degree than the key corporate activities)
nonetheless do not fall on the "critical subset domain" side of the limb, but
rather, just outside of it.
Diagram I I's visual metaphor allows us to conclude on a principled basis
that FNC analysis should be factored in as a more sophisticated "second-step"
in the personal and legislative jurisdictional rules that the Court in
InternationalShoe spoke of when it referred to the issue of whether defending
in the forum will impose an "undue" burden on nonresident defendants 227 of
litigating in a distant and inconvenient forum, and the Supreme Court dubbed
this as the "convenience branch" of the International Shoe rules.2 28 These
factors articulated in support of the supposed "fairness" branch are ill-defined
and suggest only a nascent comprehension of the aspects of a litigation event
that should be considered-nor as articulated, does the convenience branch
provide a clue about which quadrant of the litigation event in which
"convenience" factors should be considered. 9
227. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
228. World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Youngblood, supra
note 27, at 8 & n.36.
229. Professors Cameron and Johnson have made similar observations about the International
Shoe test:
Where did the "minimum contacts/fair play and substantial justice" formula come
from? One of the most curious things about InternationalShoe is the lack of a good answer
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Youngblood's visual metaphor of personal jurisdiction provides the
answer to that question, as well as to the related question of how FNC may be
integrated into that analysis. As Youngblood's work suggests, the Quadrant
rules correlate with a presumption of jurisdiction. Those presumptions may
be summarized as follows:
Litigation
Event Quadrant
Quadrant I

Applicable Presumption

Quadrant II

Rebuttable presumption-personal jurisdiction exists only
if the claim for relief is closely connected ["arises out of']
the defendant's forum contacts.

Quadrant III

Rebuttable presumption-no personal jurisdiction unless
quantity of contacts is so substantial that the nonresident
defendant can be said to be "doing business" in the forum
as if it were a forum citizen.

Quadrant IV

Unrebuttable presumption of no personal jurisdiction.

Unrebuttable presumption of personal jurisdiction

It should be apparent that Quadrant I and IV litigation events never
require conscious "convenience" branch or FNC analysis. Quadrant I
litigation events never involve cognizable inconvenience because of their very
intimacy with the forum. Quadrant IV litigation events, conversely, are
to this question.
As of December 3, 1945, our research showed that the formula lacked direct precedent
in any prior reported opinion of the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, or the state
courts. No prior scholarly commentary appears to have proposed or discussed such a rule.
Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome
Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 809 (1995). And more
specifically, they observed that "[c]ourts ... have been left to define 'fair play and substantial
justice,' a standard affording little guidance but requiring consideration of what has been termed the
'Gestalt factors."' Id. at 772-73; see George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal
Realism, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 358 (describing Stone's opinion as both "in many ways a
synthesis, preserving the results in as many earlier cases as possible" yet "at the same time a
deconstruction, rejecting the formal territorial theory that was involved in many of the prior decisions
themselves," and concluding that "in writing an opinion that tried to satisfy everyone, Stone offered
guidance to no one"); see generally Leslie W. Abrahamson, Clarifying 'FairPlay and Substantial
Justice': How the Courts Apply the Supreme CourtStandardfor PersonalJurisdiction,18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 441 (1991); Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 322-26 (Black, J., concurring) (criticizing use of the
formula).
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always inconvenient by definition because there is no intimacy with the
forum. Quadrant II and III litigation events, therefore, are where an FNC rule
can come into play-indeed, as scholars have recognized, it is crudely built
into the so-called "convenience branch" of the personal jurisdiction rule.23 °
These presumptions are important because they must also guide the
development of our new approach to FNC. To be consistent with the other
court-access rules, a reconceptualized FNC rule should not produce dissonant
results. Dissonant results are produced when applying the FNC rule results in
dismissal of a case which comes within common domain of the corrective
justice and enterprise regulation principles under court-access rules. Thus,
FNC should only become relevant in those cases in which the court's
jurisdiction is open to substantial doubt, i.e., those that are "limb-dwellers" of
Diagram 5. In that event, some might take the position, espoused most
notably by Professor Stewart, that FNC is redundant of the fairness
considerations that the World-Wide Volkswagon Court delineated as 2 3a1
separate inquiry-a "convenience branch"-under International Shoe.
However, that aspect of InternationalShoe is flawed, much like FNC, because
it is so vague and amphorous that it is difficult to apply. 232 Rather than tinker
with the Court's formulation of the personal jurisdiction rule, I will treat FNC
as having a continued-albeit much limited-role as an analysis that expands
upon and supplements the "convenience" branch in those cases where the
outcome under the personal jurisdiction test is unclear either due to the
paucity of minimum contacts or to the tenuous nature of the relationship
between those contacts and the plaintiffs' course of action. In Part VI,
therefore, I apply these presumptions to complete the reconceptualization of
the FNC rule by transforming the rule into one that emphasizes the
preservations-rather than the destruction-of court access, consistent with
the inter-relationships between the corrective justice and enterprise regulation

230. E.g., Rutherglen, supra note 229, at 360-61. Professor Rutherglen observes a school of
scholarly thought that emphasizes these "fairness" considerations by arguing that:
[A]ny examination of the defendant's contacts with the forum state must be subordinated to
an overall inquiry into the fairness of continuing the litigation there. This approach, similar
to the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the law of venue, abandons any pretense of
devising concrete rules of personal jurisdiction. It substitutes instead a case-by-case
examination of fairness, achieving a degree of uniformity in decisions only by imposing a
heavy burden on the defendant to demonstrate the unfairness of proceeding in the forum
chosen by the plaintiff.
Id. at 360-61 n.72 (footnotes omitted).
231. Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 1259 (1986).
232. Cameron & Johnson, supra note 229, at 772; Rutherglen, supra note 229, at 358, 360-61.
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principles.
VI. RECONCEPTUALIZING FNC IN HARMONY WITH CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
AND ENTERPRISE REGULATION PRINCIPLES: THE MORAL PRESERVATION OF
COURT-ACCESS STATUTE

The fruits of a theoretical examination of FNC should be expressible in a
concrete way that reifies the principles into a rule. Moving from the realm of
the Dworkinian principle-rule distinction, we should be able to apply the
lessons from reconceptualizing FNC to derive a rule that both serves the
principles of corrective justice and enterprise regulation, as well as integrates
with the existing court-access rules. This has lead me to express that rule in
the form of a model statute.
The model statute is a vehicle to allow Congress to overrule Gilbert,
Reyno, and their progeny, and to replace them with positive law that
vindicates, rather than vitiates, the principles upon which the court-access
rules are founded. z3 3 The model statute appears below, followed by a
commentary section that should be enacted with the statute to ensure that the
courts do not misperceive the scope and rationale of the changes that the
statute effects.
The statute below would fit best among the traditional transfer statutes in
the U.S. Judicial Code, Title 28 of the United States Code. First, the text of
the proposed statute is set out. Next is set out a series of comments that
should appear in the United States Code following the statute. Although such
a practice is unusual for the Code, it is typical of Federal Rules compilations
in the form of Advisory Committee Notes and typical of Uniform Acts, such
as the Uniform Commercial Code's "Official Comments" following each
233. Other commentators have prepared model statutes as vehicles for reform of other federal
court procedures. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Jurisdictional and Transfer Proposals for
Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 325 (1991). Others have proposed a legislative solution to the
problems caused by forum non conveniens in a more instrumentalist vein and without making a
detailed statutory proposal. See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum
Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposalfor a Uniform
Standard,28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 501, 504 (1993) (proposing "federal legislation establishing standards
for jurisdiction over alien defendants and clearer rules for access to United States courts by foreign
plaintiff's injured abroad"). Others have made a detailed statutory proposal that "simply refines and
codifies existing common law" and expressly eschews any effort whatsoever of "eliminating judicial
discretion." Peter J. Carney, Comment, InternationalForum Non Conveniens: "Section 1404.5 "-A
Proposalin the Interest of Sovereignty, Comity, and Individual Justice,45 AM. U. L. REV. 415, 46364 (1995). Still others have noted that states have proposed or adopted forum non conveniens
statutes that, unfortunately, do little more than purport to codify Gilbert and Reyno for a state-court
system. See, e.g., Michael J. Jacobs, Note, Georgia on the Nonresident Plaintiff's Mind: Why the
General Assembly Should Enact Statutory Forum Non Conveniens, 36 GA. L. REV. 1109, 1130-33,
1144-47 (2002).
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section. 23 Given the magnitude of the change this provision would bring, it is
submitted that more detailed and directive commentary may be necessary, and
therefore should be readily accessible, to guide the courts who must use it.
The proposed model statute will fit best within the "1400s" Section of Title
28, which deals with transfer of venue, and particularly as a companion to
Section 1404, which deals with transfer of venue for the convenience of
parties and witnesses. 235 Unlike Section 1404, the proposed statute--"Section
1404.1 "-focuses on preserving plaintiff's chosen forum, rather than ousting
it. The text of a proposed bill and comments for codification of Section
1404.1 appear below:
23 6
THE MODEL PRESERVATION OF COURT-ACCESS LEGISLATION

A Bill to Preserve Court-Access
Section 1: Overruling of Prior Cases
The rule of forum non conveniens announced in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 255 (1981), and
applied in all other federal court decisions relying upon those cases, is
overruled as of the effective date of this section.
Section 2: Codification of Court-Access Statute
Title 28 of the United States Judicial Code shall be amended to add a new
section to be numbered "1404.1 ." The text of Section 1404.1 follows:
1404.1 [1]: It shall be the policy of the courts of the United States to preserve a
plaintiff s access to the federal courts when that plaintiff commences litigation
234. See, e.g., Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform
CommercialCode, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 597 (1966). As Professor Skilton noted:
Although the Comments appended to each section of the Code are unusually elaborate, the
use of this technique is not entirely novel. In fact, for more than half a century, it has been

the custom of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to append to most of the sections
of the uniform laws a note explaining briefly the purpose of the section and the prior case
law which the section was intended to codify or to change; sometimes these notes also
contain references to leading treatises or other literature.
Id. at 604-05 n. 19 (quoting 1 NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE 158-60 (1955)). In particular, a "comment may be primarily concerned with
explaining and defending the way in which the Code section differs from its predecessor." Id.
at 607.
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
236. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, supra note 1, for the application of this provision to five
paradigmatic international product-injury cases.
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that satisfies the requirements for jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction
of the subject matter.
1404.1[2]: Definitions:
A. Prejudice shall mean that the defendant cannot enjoy the
opportunity to present a defense that satisfies the minimum
standards of due process of law in the U.S. Constitution. To
demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must by a preponderance of
the evidence establish that it would be a manifest miscarriage of
justice for trial to be held in the plaintiffs chosen forum. In order
to establish such a manifest miscarriage, defendant must show
that:
1. It would be deprived of access to evidence necessary to
preserve a substantial right; or
2. The cost of the litigation in the forum is so disproportionate to
the defendant's financial and physical resources that defendant
would be deprived of the opportunity to be heard; or
3. The forum state has no legitimate, regulatory interest in the
defendant's conduct that might be advanced by adjudication in
the forum; or
4. It would violate the defendant's rights under an international
treaty ratified by the United States or to which the United
States is a signatory.
In determining prejudice to the defendant of a trial in the forum, the
fact there may be other fora in which the action may be filed shall be
accorded no consideration.
B. Minimum contacts shall mean the operative facts that describe a
relationship between the defendant and the forum.
C. Every use of the masculine pronoun shall include the feminine
pronoun.
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1404.1[3]: Preservation of Court Access
A. General Rule of Court Access
In all civil cases in which a court of the United States(i) may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant
consistent with the requirements of the U.S. Constitution; and
(ii) is possessed of jurisdiction of the subject matter under
applicable statute(s) of this title
-access to such court shall be preserved to the plaintiffs in such
cases, without regard to nationality, citizenship, or residence; and such
court cannot dismiss a case under this section unless the defendant
makes one of the showings specified in Section 3.B, infra.
B. Grounds for Dismissal Upon Defendant's Showing of Prejudice
1. In all cases in which a defendant has systematic and continuous
minimum contacts with the forum and the plaintiff is suing on one
or more causes of action arising out of those contacts, it is
conclusively presumed that defendant cannot establish prejudice
and that plaintiffs court access shall be preserved.
2. In all cases in which a defendant has only single or occasional
minimum contacts with the forum and the plaintiff is suing on one
or more causes of action arising out of those contacts, a
presumption arises that defendant is not prejudiced by the
maintenance of action in the forum. The defendant may rebut that
presumption through admissible evidence that clearly and
convincingly establishes prejudice.
3. In all cases in which a defendant has continuous and systematic
minimum contacts with the forum and plaintiffs cause of action
does not arise out of those contacts, a presumption arises that
defendant is prejudiced by maintenance of the action in the forum.
The plaintiff may rebut that presumption through admissible
evidence that:
i. establishes that defendant is either incorporated in the forum or
maintains a principal residence, a functional headquarters, or a
branch office in the forum; or
ii. establishes that the defendant's contacts with the forum
demonstrate that defendant has engaged in such a continuous
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and systematic course of "doing business" in the forum as to
support the conclusion that it is present in the forum; or
iii. establishes that one of his causes of action are related to the
defendant's forum contacts and defendant would not be
prejudiced by maintenance of the suit within the forum.
The showings described in this section shall be made by a
preponderance of admissible evidence.
4. In all cases in which a defendant has only single or occasional
minimum contacts with the forum and the plaintiffs cause of
action do not arise out of those facts, prejudice to defendant
requiring dismissal of the case shall be conclusively presumed.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 1404.1
Comment to Section 1404.1121IAl: This section is intended to overrule
the use of the amorphous public and private interest factors first stated in
Gilbert. Many of these factors proved not to relate to the core issue of
prejudice to a defendant. Prejudice as defined herein is the only acceptable
basis for dismissing an action that otherwise satisfies court-access rules. The
eliminated factors reflected inappropriate paternalistic concerns about the
burden on the plaintiff of his own chosen forum, or burdens on the forum that
should be naturally attendant upon satisfaction of the standard court-access
rules. The eliminated factors have been replaced with factors that, if proven
by defendant, establish the degree of prejudice upon which dismissal of an
action may be based within the intent of this section. In addition, the factor of
other available fora under the previous forum non conveniens rule could be
misapplied by the courts. Some courts tended to dismiss any time that a
nonforum plaintiff might arguably have had the choice to sue in the place of
his residence or domicile. However, dismissals under this Section do not
permit such highly speculative or subjective considerations to come into play.
Experience under the prior rule established that many dismissals were based
on too little accurate information about prejudice to the international plaintiff
in the alternative foreign forum. This section recognizes the tremendous
difficulty that a court in the United States will often have in trying to
understand the practicalities and realities of litigation in the court systems of
another country with which American lawyers are not intimately familiar.
Corroborative of that fact is that most lawsuits dismissed on the assumption
that an alternative foreign forum was "available" were not refiled in the
alternative foreign forum.
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Comment to Section 1404.1131: This provision overrules the statement in
Reyno that there should be any differentiation in the relative "right" to court
access in the courts of the United States depending upon whether the plaintiff
is a citizen, subject, or resident of a foreign state. Such distinctions are
illogical in cases in which the defendant has minimum contacts with the
forum and have no relevance to the underlying court-access rules. In suing
the same defendant with the same minimum contacts to the forum, the
plaintiff's citizenship, nationality, or residence should not lessen the forum's
interest in the matter. Thus, the former forum non conveniens rule produced
inconsistent and discriminatory results between plaintiffs who were similarly
situated but for those irrelevant factors. Under this section, all plaintiffs stand
equally before the law.
Comment to Section 1401.1[31IBI311iil: Before the advent of the
minimum contacts test in International Shoe, the federal courts had
recognized that a nonresident can engage in such a pervasive course of
conduct within the forum that it was reasonable to conclude that the
nonresident was a functional resident and thus generally amenable to the
court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259,
267, 268-69 (1917), where Judge Cardozo observed of the foreign
corporation:
If in fact it is here, if it is here, not occasionally or casually, but with a
fair measure of permanence and continuity, then, whether its business
is interstate or local, it is within the jurisdiction of our courts .... The
essential thing is that the corporation shall have come into the state.
When once it is here, it may be served; and the validity of the service
is independent of the origin of the cause of action.
Id.; see also Philadelphia& Reading. Railway v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264
(1917); Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir.
1984); BroadcastingRights InternationalCorp. v. Societe du Tour de France,
SARL, 675 F. Supp. 1439 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Lea Brilmayer et al., A General
Look at GeneralJurisdiction,66 TEX. L. REv. 721 (1988).
Comment to Section 1401.1[31lBll311iiil: This provision guarantees
court access in those for which can properly be considered a defendant's
"home." The special provision for rebutting the anti-access presumption for
cases in which a defendant's activities make it present within the forum but do
not rise to the level of making the forum a "home" recognizes, as Justice
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Brennan did in Helicopteros v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 425-26 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting), that contacts might still be jurisdictionally relevant even if, in a
causal sense, the action cannot not be said to arise out of the contacts. In
those cases, the relationship of the contacts to the action coupled with a lack
of prejudice to defendant should preclude dismissal. Reliance on "related
contacts" in that scenario is appropriate because the Supreme Court majority
in Helicopteros specifically declined to decide whether the broader set of
"related" contact would be constitutionally sufficient for the exercise of forum
sovereignty. 466 U.S. at 415 n.10.
VII. CONCLUSION

The unprincipled development of the FNC rule to the point that MNCs
successfully win dismissals of international plaintiffs' product-injury suits
filed in the MNCs' bailiwick has occasioned my effort to reconceptualize the
way we view the interactive relationship between substantive and procedural
(i.e., court-access) rules.
I have reconceptualized that relationship as
metaphoric for the bundle of operative facts in each case to which the rules
are applied-what I call the litigation event.
Each set of rules, substantive and procedural, looks at the same litigation
events, differing only in emphasis because of their positioning on a continuum
of minimum contacts that compose the litigation event. The metaphoric
nature of rules that lawyers traditionally compartmentalize with pedantic
strictness is further clarified when they are tied to broader principles (e.g.,
corrective justice and enterprise regulation) that Dworkin has explained bind
the rules together into a coherent system. By demonstrating how the current
FNC rule falls outside of that system, I have demonstrated why FNC has
created analytic dissonance and incoherence and how that dissonance is
eliminated by reconceptualizing FNC within the context of the litigation
event. The theoretical reconception achieved here is reified in the form of a
model "preservation of court access" statute in Part VI, above.
Perhaps of greater significance than merely reforming the FNC rule, this
Article has proposed a new tool of jurisprudential analysis that might best be
described as "applied principles and principle-rule relationships." As used
here, the jurisprudence of applied principles and principle-rule relationships
harmonizes substantive and procedural rules within the context of Dworkin's
principle-rule distinction. By illustrating the operation of the system through
graphic metaphors to clarify the inter-system relationships, a pragmatic
application for Dworkin's principal-rule distinction has been realized.
Similarly, the paradigm based on the principle-rule distinction will lend itself
to more productive examination of other long-standing stand-offs in law
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reform that have remained mired in debates on the instrumental level. By
including a view from the level of principle and relating principles to rules,
our applied principles and principle-rule relationships will contribute to a new
and more meaningful dialogue, especially in exploring substantive-procedural
conundrums in other areas-those areas in which seemingly endless debate on
an instrumentalist, rule-bound level has simply left closet legal realists and
acolytes of critical legal studies to conclude that our law lacks principle, to
deride non-positivist jurisprudence, and, despairing of any end to endless
debate, to mutter in the pessimistic tones of a neo-Llewellyn with each new
case reporting yet another instrumentalist-ordained result, "See, I told you
so."
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